date

[036-088v] 1821. Nov r. 28.
[036-088v]

1821. Nov r. 28.

Codification Proposal

'.9. Draughtsman Gratuitous.

I. On the part of the workmen, inaptitude in the shape in which it stands opposed to appropriate moral aptitude.

1. Be they who they may, the patron or patrons will be exposed to the influence, not to say subject to the dominion, of sinister interests and prejudices. This has been shown in Section the fifth. The dependent or protigo (for in English though we have the thing, we have not the name) will be under the dominion of these same interests and prejudices, and to these the draught will endeavour to give effect, with the addition of any such of his own as he thinks he can venture to steal in.

II. On the part of the workman, inaptitude not only in the above shape, but in all shapes: in those in which it stands opposed to the two other elements of appropriate aptitude, namely appropriate intellectual aptitude and appropriate active talent.

The pay is a determinate and tangible object: an object to the value of which every eye is sensible: those of the patron or patrons, be they who they may, among the rest. In comparison of this - in competition with this - the goodness of the service, where it is in any degree an object, will generally speaking be at best a secondary one. The appointment, or the vote towards the appointment, will accordingly be given - not to the individual who is regarded as being likely to render the best service, if it be before the work is done, or as having rendered it, if it be after the work is done - but to the individual, whom, whether on his the patron's own account, or on the account of some connection of his, it will be most agreeable to him to see thus served.

III. On the part of the work, on the one hand comparative inaptitude through precipitation, or on the other hand needless and useless delay up to final non-execution, according to the mode in which the pay is connected with the looked-for service.

Apply the pay in one way, the work suffers for want of time to do it well in: apply the pay in another way, the work lingers, and for a time more or less considerable, the benefit of it is lost: apply it again in another way, the pay is continually received, and the work never executed.

1. The work suffers for want of time to execute it in - if, a time being fixed, after which no draught shall be received, the interval allowed is not sufficient for giving to the work that

degree
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    Cause 4. On the part of this work, aptitude probably diminished, by diminution of the number of the works which there would otherwise have been to choose out of.

    A man who looks upon himself as having in the common phrase interest enough to afford him a sufficient prospect of success will accept the invitation, and apply himself to the task: a man who knows he has no interest at all, or thinks he has not enough, will not apply himself to the task: the number of these last, whatever it be, is the number of those, on whom the pay puts an exclusion. To which groupe shall the greatest number be assigned? to which groupe, number for number, the greatest aptitude? The claim of the excluded groupe seems the strongest.

    The case being a case of patronage, those evil effects, will have place, whatever be their amount, in whatever hands the power of patronage be lodged.

    It may be lodged in that branch of Government which is purely legislative. It may even be lodged in the branch stiled the executive branch: for, by the supposition, the draught can not receive the force of law, but from the hands of the branch stiled the legislative. If in the legislative, the hands it is lodged in, will be either those of the President of the Assembly, those of a Legislation Committee, or those of the whole body of the Legislature: if in the executive branch, the hands in which the appointment, (or under the Monarch the recommendation) is lodged, may be those of a Chief Minister, those of the Minister of this particular department, those of the Assemblage of Ministers, or those of some Council of State. The choice may thus be made by appointment, or it may be made by vote: but whether it be made in the one way or in the other, still the case is a case of pay and patronage: as between the mode of choice and the other, no sensible difference will have place.

    To the influence of these causes of inaptitude, so long as specially appointed reward in any shape bestowed, an encrease of the public expence has place, the nature of the case admitts not of any tolerably effectual correction. The patron or patrons at whose hands the reward is looked for, let them be, with relation to the whole body of the people, in a state of

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