date

[xxxvi. 144] 1822 July 16 Constitut
[xxxvi. 144]

1822 July 16

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I Monarch absolute

II Monarch Limited

III Aristocracy

IV Monarcho-Aristocracy

1. Borough-mongers subject.

2 Why spoken of as paramount.

?. In a limited say rather a mixt Monarchy, the Aristocracy are not in practice co-equal with but dependent on and instruments of the Monarchy.

In England the Borough-mongers are under the King not the King under the Borough-mongers.

The King (it has been said) is in a state of subjection to the Borough-mongers. The party by whom this notion is adopted is the party of the people: it is on every occasion assumed, and argued upon as a principle. In relation to it, two questions will here present themselves. 1. Is it correct?: 2. Correct or /If/ incorrect to what cause is the use made of it to be attributed /what is the cause of its currency?/

Question 1. Is it correct /true/? Answer. It is not. /untrue./ That they /the two powers/ act not in constant union, thus far is true. But, on each occasion whatsoever be the course taken by the union, it is by the will of the King not by the will of any power that that course is determined: not by the will of any other power whatsoever be the situation of it, or by what name so ever denominated.

By Borough-mongers are meant the aggregate of the several individuals by whom the seats in the Commons House are filled. The cause why this denomination is employed will be mentioned in its place.

What is here assumed is - that the Lords House in its corporate capacity is in fact /practice/ in a state of subjection to the Commons House. Thus much is true, manifest and undisputed. ( Quere whether to state the proofs)

What is also assumed is that in a very large proportion the occupiers of the seats in the Commons House are located by individuals who have seats in the Lords House. This also is manifest and undisputed.
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    §.1. Why not attacked by J.B.

    1

    1

    Power of the Borough-mongers – why not here stated /held up to view/ as the principal power against which the reformists have to contend?

    In speaking of the powers against which the system of radical Parliamentary reform has to contend against, the power of a certain description of persons under the name of Borough-mongers is that which of late years the advocates of reform have to a great extent been in use to hold up to view in the character of the principal power if not the only one: as if there were a determinate set of men to and by whom not only the King but the House of Lords are /were/ held in subjection, in such sort that instead of being a mixt Monarchy the government is a sort of aristocracy – an aristocracy, the Members of which are /which has for its Members/ the persons the individuals who ever they are who are to be considered as comprehended under that name.

    Of an enquiry of which this conception has been the subject the result has been that the representation /this conception/ given by it is not /wants much of being/ upon the whole /not/ a correct one; that errors are included in it and that of /among/ the errors included in it, there are /the natural /practical/ result is some the effect of which, if acted upon would be to lead the mind aside from the course best adapted to the purpose of applying the most advantageous remedy, and such errors the /an/ effect of which if not corrected might have a disadvantageous effect /exercise a disadvantageous influence/ on argument and practice.
  • Title: [1818 Sept. 9. Things as they are]
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    §.1.

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    What is true is – that to the Monarch it belongs to dissolve the Parliament and with it the House of Commons whenever he pleases: 2. that in the hands of the Monarch alone is the power of appointment with regard to all offices and of removal at pleasure in regard to the greatest part of the value[?] of whole mass, purse and pay taken together: 3. that in the hands of the Monarch alone is the whole of the military power, by sea and by land, over regulars and over non-regulars and that in no one of these powers are the so-called Borough mongers either collectively or individually considered partakers.

    On the other hand what is no less true is that of the persons appointed by these so called Borough Mongers /these Borough mongers and the persons appointed by them/ is composed a considerable majority of the Members of the House of Commons: true it is moreover /perhaps/ that by a dissolution of Parliament it would not at any time be in the power of the Monarch to destroy their effective power to reduce their habitual majority to a minority.

    But to the members of this set of Borough mongers the object of concupiscence, those objects by which alone /principally/ such their condition is rendered valuable to them are many by office and commission – power by peerage bishopricks and inferior office, and fictitious dignity in all its various shapes, and by any other hand than his /without his concurrence thought[?]/ not one of all these good things is there any one of them that could ever possess himself of.
  • Title: [[xxxvi. 145] 1822 July 19 Constitut]
    Description: [xxxvi. 145]

    1822 July 19

    Constitut. Code Rationale

    Supreme Operative

    I. Monarch absolute

    II. Monarch Limited

    III. Aristocracy

    IV Monarcho-Aristocracy

    The simple truth of the matter is this. It is by force and intimidation that the conduct of the people at large is determined. It is by corruption /corruptive influence/ that the conduct of the majority in each of the two Houses of Parliament is determined: in the House of Commons in the first instance, and then in the House of Lords: the will of the Lords following of course that of the King and the Commons

    But the matter of corruption - on whose will does the application of it depend? On that of the Minister. And the Minister - on whose will does his continuance /existence/ in that situation depend? On the Kings.

    Let the King give to what man he will the disposal of the matter of corruptive influence, the will of that individual is sure to be confirmed /done/ by the majority in both Houses

    Events may happen - events which for a time may make the King see his /a/ convenience in substituting to a Minister more agreable to him a Minister less agreable to him. But in this temporary exception there is nothing that detracts from the truth, to all practical purposes, of the general rule. In this there is nothing more than what is every now and then happening in the most absolute governments, that of Turkey not excepted.