[xxxvi. 146]

1822 July 16

Constitut. Code Rationale

Supreme Operative

I Monarchy absolute

II. Monarchy Limited

III. Aristocracy.

IV. Monarcho-Aristocracy

But /Be this as it may/ the fact is - that whatsoever is done, it is with the Kings will that it is done: in each instance it may or may not have originated in the Kings will: but in whose will so ever it /what is proposed/ originated, if it be against the Kings will it is not done

The question here is - what in this respect is the general and habitual course of the government: Of the few exceptions, that by careful inquiry might perhaps be found, the effect will rather be to prove the rule than to disprove it. No Monarchy so absolute, but that exceptions in this or that instance might be found in it

Of the absoluteness of the Kings power, a conclusive proof is /was/ that which was brought /held up/ to view in a Commons House Debate in the Session of 1822 ? Motion by Mr Brougham: object of it, holding up to view what is called the influence of the Crown: that is to say the absoluteness of the King's power in respect of giving determination to the proceedings of the two sets of functionaries who in profession and form are sharers with him in the supreme operative. Proof this. The Prime Minister is the nominee and instrument When once a man has been decidedly located in the situation of Prime Minister, the Commons House a vast majority of it vote according to his will, after having but a few days before namely when he was not Minister but in opposition voted against it

? June 1822. Black Dwarf July 3 1822.
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    1822 July 19

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    II

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    By the will of the Minister, be he who he may so long as it is decided that he is to continue Minister have the wills of the majority in both Houses been at all times determined: and such will be the state of wills, so long as the Government remains in the form it wears at present. Why? because such is the state of interests - of interests and of the means of affording satisfaction to the correspondent desires
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