JB_038_028_001.xml

Title: [1822 July 21 Compleat. Code]

Description: 1822 July 21

Compleat. Code

55 or 1.

Of private defamation the evil is manifest: but under it lies unreceived good.

1 Defamation imputation false and mendacious effects of the 1 st. order are less evil than where it is true: a man suffers from the imputation, where groundless than when true.

2. The effect of the 2 d. order are all good: viz. danger and belief of danger on the part of men under temptation to do the evil thus falsely imputed.

What no one can fail to see is that by being guilty a man is more exposed to the imputation than if not guilty

Inducements equal in both cases, no defamer but would find it more convenient to impute guilt where it existed when where it did not.

56 or 2.

Note that currency knowingly given to imputations known to be groundless if or antipathy to the imputer ill grounded: or the punishing of him, on sufficient proof improper.

57 or 3.

All that is meant is imputations, grounded and ungrounded together, ought not to be supposed for the more effectual suppositions of ungrounded ones.

The Public Tribunal should not be suppressed for the mere suppression of the false information conveyed to it.

58 or 4.

Suffering being greater where a man is guilty than where not, though of course will be the marks of uneasiness and the desire to effect suppression and excite vengeance.

59 or 5.

Vexation in case of not guiltiness are 1.Fear of loss of reputation 2. Expence of time and labour in calling on the calumniator for proofs. 3. D o., by eventual defence, by a counter argument, with or without counter evidence.

For comfort, consciousness of innocence: thence assurances of ultimate acquittal.

60 or 6.

Vexation in case of guiltiness. 1. Fear of loss of reputation much greater. 2. Expence of time and labour in the endeavour to exhibit counter argument with or without counter evidence, accompanied with fainter hope, or saved by despair of success.

Discomfort consciousness of guilt: thence assurances of ultimate condemnation.

JB_160_366.xml

Title: [[clx. 366] 1822 July 9 Constitut]

Description: [clx. 366]

1822 July 9

Constitut. Code Rationale

Securities

Public Opinion Tribunal

Defamation no

ground for suppressing

it or depriving it of Evidence

Add Suppression of true instruction by the suppression of every thing obtainable in the character /[...?]/ of former times

? Diffusion of unjust defamation no sufficient reason for diminishing the censorial power of the Public Opinion Tribunal by restrictions on the press.

In the case of private defamation the mischief stares every one in the face. But along with it is mixt much good and to this good it is not customary for [...?] /men/ to appear sensible /men do not in general seem sensible/

To take the strongest case - the case in which if in any the evil would appear /be/ pure - the case where the misconduct imputed is by the imputer known not to have had place: the imputation in a word known to be /have been/ knowingly and wilfully false Here the effects of the first order, the uneasiness experienced by the individual to whom the conduct /misconduct/ is imputed, are evil: the effects of the 2d order, the apprehension excited in other persons at large - the apprehension of being made sufferers by similar [...?] from the same or other sources, are also evil But by the contemplation of the evil suffered in these two ways by groundless imputation, the attention of men is directed to and the more firmly fixed upon the like suffering as being more or less likely to be produced by true imputations: and, in this way accordingly addition is made to these fears - fears of punishment at the hands of the Public Opinion Tribunal - by which misconduct in general misconduct in most of its shapes is repressed: for that which is too obvious and too certain and too obvious to pass unnoticed is that by being guilty of misconduct in any shape a man is in a greater degree exposed to disrepute in respect of it than he would be if innocent. A man if he knew of an article of misconduct of which his intended victim had been really guilty proofs of his guilt more or less satisfactory being in existence would never think of preferring a false /ungrounded/ accusation in any shape to that same well grounded.

Not that currency knowingly allowed to false and unjust imputation are in any degree as such conducive and necessary to the repression of the misconduct that would have had place had the imputation been well grounded

Not that the antipathy against inventor and common circulator of such false imputation is not well grounded: not that they ought not to be subjected to legal punishment in so far as sufficient proof can be obtained.

All that is meant is - that all imputations grounded and ungrounded together ought to be suppressed without distinction, for the more effectual suppression of ungrounded ones. The Public-Opinion Tribunal with its useful effects ought not to be suppressed for the single benefit of more effectually preventing the pernicious ones.

JB_160_367.xml

Title: [[clx. 367] 1822 July 9 Constitut]

Description: [clx. 367]

1822 July 9

Constitut. Code Rationale

Securities

Public Opinion Tribunal

Defamation no ground

for suppression etc

That which a man in whose instance an /the/ imputation is false, is as nothing /little/ in comparison of what the man suffers in whose instance the same imputation is true.

Accordingly the marks of vexation exhibited will naturally be in the same proportion: the intensity of the desire manifested for suppression and vengeance

To see imputed to him a misdeed by which in proportion as his having committed it is believed, the esteem and respect that would otherwise be entertained /felt/ for him will be diminished, is doubtless an uneasy sight: a sight productive of uneasiness proportioned to the degree in which the diminution of respect will be produced if the imputation be believed to be true, and the extent to which such belief has place.

There will be in any case the trouble of calling upon the defamer for his proofs: and if it be a case in which the circumstances admitt of the defamers giving an air of probability to the charge, viz. by means of circumstantial evidence, the trouble of encountering the probative force of such circumstantial evidence by arguments, and counter evidence or both. Note however at bottom[?] of all this trouble will remain for consolation the consciousness of innocence

Look now to the case of him in whose instance the imputation is true.