2 Sept 1804

Evidence

Ch. Explanations

To show at the same time that all that there is of reality in the case, where certainty and impossibility are attributed to the facts themselves, is the persuasion /the persuasion in question in such cases/ which exists in our own minds - and at the same time to show that this persuasion is sufficient for every practical purpose, I shall proceed to give a short and general view of the alledged impossibility in the character of a species of circumstantial evidence, operating in disproof of the existence of some corresponding principal fact alledged to be evidenced, the existence of which is on the other [.../] no matter from what source. By the view thus given of the subject (of impossibility) two propositions will I flatter myself all along appear. One is, that impossibility is merely relative - relative to the person by whom it is employed: in as much as the same[?] fact which to him /one/ is called impossible because to him it appears so /because he is persuaded of its being so/, might naturally to another man appear probable, or even to himself, at another time. The other is - that in so far as any fact thus really appears to him to be impossible, he is fully warranted, as well in point of prudence as of probity, in acting as if it really were impossible in its own nature: as if he had so full a comprehension of its nature that is of the nature of all things, as to be able to pronounce the[?] fact impossible, without the possibility of being deceived.
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  • Title: [2 Sept 1804 Evidence Ch. Explanations]
    Description: 2 Sept 1804

    Evidence

    Ch. Explanations

    For this purpose it will be necessary, to take a view of the principal topics or considerations /sources of argument from the consideration of which the existence or non-existence of this or that individual fact has[?] been wont[?] to be pronounced certain or impossible.

    Impossibility - sources of man's persuasion in relation to it - it is merely relative - what to one man is impossible may /to one man/ to another be probable or certain. Such are the topics and propositions a succeeding chapter will under the title of physical impossibility endeavour to bring to view.
  • Title: [31 Aug 1804 Evidence Circumstantial]
    Description: 31 Aug 1804

    Evidence

    Circumstantial

    Ch. 1. General[?]

    §.3. Order [...?]

    §3. Order of enquiry.

    The course pursued by /order observed in/ the disquisitions contained in the present book will be found to be [...?] as follows -

    1. To exhibit some general explanations of relation to the nature of this class of /circumstantial/ evidence -

    2. To give a catalogue, the more ample the better /as ample as possible/ of such tools[?] /species/ of evidence referable to this class as appear alike applicable to an extensive class of causes: leaving as an endless task /labour/, the task of giving /exhibiting/ the whole mass of circumstantial evidence capable of applying to this or that particular species of cause.

    3. In describing, as far as appears necessary, the nature and characteristic properties of each such species of circumstantial evidence, to show in what manner it may contribute to satisfy the mind[?] concerning the existence or non-existence of the principal fact (the fact supposed to be evidenced) to which it applies.

    4. To show at the same time the cases in which, and thereby sometimes the causes from which, its probative force is liable to fail: - the cases and causes of its failing to be conclusive.
  • Title: [31 Aug 1804 Evidence Circumstantial]
    Description: 31 Aug 1804

    Evidence

    Circumstantial

    Ch.2. Explanation

    In all questions respecting evidence, it is the aim of the speaker or writer to communicate /generate in the minds of/ to others (and in particular to the Judge for example) the persuasion which he himself entertains or professes to entertain - and that in the strongest degree possible. According to the logical nature of the fact in question - i.e. whether it be affirmative or negative his endeavour is to cause it to be received /regarded/ as certain, or impossible. To produce the persuasion in question he will naturally employ in preference - the strongest, the most impressive the most efficient the most impressive terms he can find /that are to be found/ and such are the above.

    This same artifice a man will even employ in addressing himself to himself. Words are so necessary to give distinctness and permanence[?] to ideas that even in debating with himself a man makes use of their assistance. Indecision is an unpleasant state of mind. Whatever word bids fairest for liberating the mind out of it bids fairest for being accepted and employed.

    As between the two terms certainty and impossibility the latter will for that same reason be apt rather to obtain the preference. In the use of the word certainty the idea of human opinion, the opinion of the speaker is unavoidably brought to view. In the use of the word impossibility no such necessary idea is brought to view. The impossibility of the fact in question is regarded as arising out of the nature of things, and that alone. The existence of such a fact is certain: I am certain of the existence of the fact /neither more nor less than to [...?] [...?] is as much as to say [...?] [...?] [...?]/. Such is my opinion, my persuasion: the strength of my persuasion in relation to it is at its highest pitch In doing this I imply /appear to/ what I never confess as the great truth be the fact it may[?] - that the best /strongest/ ground I can have for regarding the fact as true is but opinion, persuasion: my own persuasion howsoever grounded, whether on my own perceptions, or the [...?] /supposed/ perception of any other person or persons. But in saying the fact is impossible, every thing of opinion, the idea of opinion with the attendant idea of weakness and fallibility, are kept out of sight.