date

Procedure 17 Aug 1804 Non-homologation
Procedure

17 Aug 1804

Non-homologation

In the infancy of this branch of law antecedently to the establishment of this rule describing adherence to precedents, its decisions would sometimes be conformable to the dictates of natural justice and original utility, sometimes unconformable. But by degrees /at length/ when a certain stock of precedents - in terms of a certain number of judicial instruments - and the memorials of a certain number /stock/ of judicial decisions had come to have been preserved, the possibility of adhering to that golden rule, and thence the [...?], grew up together. Thus progress being made, the whole stock of judicial precedents would have become distinguishable an idea into two parcels: the first consisting of those which at the moment of their formation were consonant /conformable/ to the dictates of natural justice and original utility, the other of such as at that period were unconformable in that original standard. Grounded upon any article or articles in the first the good parcel A subsequent decision will be at once conformable to the primary dictates of original utility, and to the secondary dictates of that secondary sort of derivative utility which consists /depends/ /proscribes/ upon adherence to precedence. Grounded upon any article or articles in the second parcel - the bad /faulty/ parcel - a subsequent decision would be conformable to the dictates of that secondary sort of utility - that derivative utility which depends upon /proscribes the/ adherence to precedence, but would be unconformable to the dictates of natural justice and original utility, as above explained.
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