Procedure

5 July 1804

Ch. Non-homologation

''.3 Import uncertain

''.3-2. Import uncertain

2. In the next place, from the indeterminateness of the words of which any given mass of the matter of jurisprudential law is composed, follows by necessary consequence the uncertainty of the import. Compare it in this respect with its [...?] and rival. Obscurity, ambiguity, and delusiveness are imperfections to which law in the form of statutory law is but too liable: for statutory law is but a species of human discourse, applying itself to that particular subject, and the above are imperfections to which all human discourse is liable. But in statutory law these are but individual and casual imperfections, imperfections capable of being lessened, and actually lessening every day, as the human mind advances in practice, and in that strength which is increased in practice. In /To/ jurisprudential law on the other hand they are essential, and (as will be seen more particularly under another head) incurable: the portion of them which results from our ill-adopted choice words bearing in proportion to that which arises from the absolute want of determinate words. The words of which the matte of jurisprudential is composed, those words indeterminate as they are, are still words: and to the several imperfections above-mentioned these words whatever they are, are still in no less a degree, but as will be seen in the much greater degree liable, than those determinate words of which the statutory law is composed. To all the imperfections, and those curable ones to which statutory law is exposed, all which it is loaded with and in a much higher degree jurisprudential law add its own essential, peculiar, and incurable ones.
Similar Items
  • Title: [Procedure 5 July 1804 Ch.]
    Description: Procedure

    5 July 1804

    Ch. [...?] ...?]

    3 ''.2.1. Words indeterminate

    The speaking of jurisprudential law the following distinctions or division will require to be observed - the one taken from /grounded on/ its connection or disconnection with statutory law; the other from the consideration of the country in which it took its rise.

    1. Division of jurisprudential law into self-rooted, and engrafted. When the import and application of a clause or portion of the matter of statutory law has been the subject of contestation in the court of judicature, and the Judge, on the occasion of the decision he pronounces, signifies the sense he ascribes to such clause, the interpretation or construction so put may in so far s it is considered as distinct from the portion of law which it thus interprets, and as constituting in that respect a portion of the matter of jurisprudential law termed a portion of jurisprudential engrafted upon such or such a portion of statutory law. It may be termed self-rooted in the opposite case; viz word has no portion of statutory law to stand upon.

    2. Division of jurisprudential (as it statutory) law into nature, or of home-growth and imported or say of foreign growth.

    The Roman Law, as to some parts of it at least may furnish an example of a mass of jurisprudential law of foreign growth.

    As to the compilation made and published by order of the Roman or rather Grecian Emperor Justinian so far as it extends it may be considered as a mass of statutory law; inasmuch as it has been imagined to a determinate mass of words. Exempting /[...?] made/ this property, and setting aside the unlikely advantage which that property can not but give, in some degree or other to every mass, how ill so ever constructed in other respects, it may be considered as being on a footing with jurisprudential law, involving in a considerable degree all the imperfections that are essential to it.
  • Title: [28 July 1805 Evidence Introd]
    Description: 28 July 1805

    Evidence

    Introd. Jurisprud

    Ch. II. Vices

    From all that has been seen, of [...?] of one proposition seems sufficiently /tolerably/ clear,: that uncertainty is of /essential/the very essence of jurisprudential law.

    That this uncertainty indeed admits of degrees, correspondent to the different classes of persons with relation to whom /in whose minds/ the uncertainty is considered as subsisting: viz: 1. non-lawyers: 2. attorneys, 3. advocates, in their character of opinionists, not to speak of Judges.

    That be the answer what it may, how certain and clear what soever the answer to it may appear to be in the eyes of the advocate /opinionist/, or even the attorney, this relative and [...?] /imperfect/ degree of certainty will not be sufficient to divest it of the character of uncertainty with relation to the individual whose conduct is expected in reality or in pretence to be governed by it, and whose fate is made at any rate to depend upon it.

    That the species or degree of uncertainty being of the essence of jurisprudential law, and not being of the essence of statutory law, constitutes a /the/ characteristic difference between the two species or forms of law.

    Not, that even statutory law is essentially altogether exempt from the imputation of uncertainty. Every discourse is liable to be mis-expressed: every discourse, well or ill-expressed, is liable to be misconceived: and statutory law is a discourse. But as in what concerns the mode of exposition in the case of statutory law the mishap /inconvenience/ is but accidental and comparatively rare /and as the powers /faculties/ of the human mind gain strength by exercise is in a way to be every day less and less rare:/ in the case of jurisprudential law it is constant /essential/ and incurable. If Since as hath so often been observed, it is of the essence of jurisprudential law to have no tenor at all, no form and no collection of words, in to which the quality certainty can adhere /inhere/.
  • Title: [Procedure 6 Aug 1804 Ch. Non]
    Description: Procedure

    6 Aug 1804

    Ch. Non-homologation

    Import uncertain

    What in a distillery the wash is to the spirit, the words that are formed in such unhappy abundance in the books written on /[...?] to/ the subject of jurisprudential law are to the words which if they had but the seal /stamp/ of a legislator offered to /stamped upon/ them, would like a portion /mass/ of statutory law to the same effect, constitute a portion of law. /In the manufactory of jurisprudential law,/ Any /every/ man that pleases as to the wash, but the spirit that is extracted, each man is left to extract for himself - for his own use, and at his own peril, as above.

    The words employed and consigned to writing by the compiler or deputator are of course determinate and assignable: but of these there i not one that has, or so much as pretends to have, the force of law.

    In speaking of jurisprudential law the term law can never be used without impropriety and confusion, though (such is the tyranny of established language) it can never be discarded. This impropriety is in a certain /considerable/ degree peculiar to the English language. In Latin, lex is the term employed in speaking of statutory law: jus and not lex in speaking of jurisprudential law. So again in French: loi, answering to lex: droit to jus: in Italian, lege and diritto: in Spanish leige and derecho: in Germany gesetz and recht. In English for want of an appropriate term corresponding to lex, loi, diritto, derecho, recht, we are forced to apply the same term law to the descriptions /[...?]/ of unauthorised deputators, and to the work expressive of the will of the legislator: to the wash out of which spirit ought to be made, and to the spirit when made: to the contents of the [...?] field or of the quarry, and to the palace.

    Note

    Not but that the terms jus, droit, diritto, derecho, recht, are applicable to portions of statutory as well as to portions of jurisprudential law: the distinction is that they are applicable to both, whereas it is only to statutory law that the opposite /contrasted/ and corresponding works, lex, loi, lege, leige and [ ] are applicable.