date

18 July 1805 Evidence Note
18 July 1805

Evidence

Note?

Introd. Jurisprudent

Ch. II. Vices

''. ex post facto

5. "At the Court of Chancery assumes a general jurisdiction in cases not within the bounds or beyond the powers of other jurisdictions." This, four or 8 pages after and in a sort of parenthesis. To any penal purpose /purpose purely penal/, in and by any suit of the purely penal class, unquestionably not true. The learned author it is plain, had not any such case in his mind.

6. That "it is not a very easy task accurately to describe the jurisdiction of our Courts of Equity." This in a note.

7. "That" those who have attempted it have generally failed." This in the same note.

8. That "The apparent necessity of making the attempt for the purpose of elucidating the subject of the following pages" (viz - "the Pleadings in suite in the Court of Chancery" (the busiest of the Courts of Equity) "must be the apology for what is there offered." This also in the same note.

From the whole tenure of the above information one conclusion may it should seem be drawn with safety /without much danger of error/ viz - that the power of a Court in English Court of Equity has no known limits. [that the learned author knew of now is ascertained by the best evidence: and for as much as he does not, neither does any body else, though but matter of inference, is one inference, the legitimacy of which seems not in much danger of dispute.]

What does not seem equally clear, is - what this task was, in /in respect of the execution of/ which "those who have attempted it have generally failed," which it was so unnecessary to execute, and which, in contemplation of such failure and such necessity, the learned Author undertook to execute and concerned himself to have executed. Was it, the "describing what has been done and therefore can be done by a Court of Equity? This is what nobody has failed in: this is what every body has done. Were it the describing what can not be done by Court of Equity? This is what the learned Author himself has not so much as attempted.

Note

The same cloud /covenant/ which in the region of the King's Bench hangs /has been spread/ over the rule of action and standard of obedience extends to the other great court on the other side the passages[?].
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