4 July 1805

Introd. Jurisprudential

Ch. II. Sources

''. 3. Reports

Printed memorials, called Reports: containing accounts of Judicial Decisions together with the Judicial Dicta to which they gave rise.

Hitherto, decisions and dicta have been considered only in the abstract: it remains to speak of the physical bodies the printed books, in which the written signs of these discourses are exhibited in a material and concrete form.

A lawyer who happens to be present in court while the arguments on behalf of the parties for and against the decision called for by the plaintiff's demand, and the arguments of the Judge or Judges in support of the decision they are about to pronounce are delivering taken what is called for his notes of the case: that is sets down certain words as containing the tenor or at least the /at any rate/ purport of the whole or a part of which on the occasion in question is /was/ said by such or such a Judge, more particularly, of several Judges by the presiding Judge: with or without the arguments of the Advocates as he thinks fit! This note, when printed and published is called a Report: and a book containing a collection of such notes a Book of Reports.

In any such Report will of course be contained an account more or less explicit /clear/ and copious of the particular decision, and of the general dicta, direct and collateral, decisive and argumentative, on which it was grounded.
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    II. Second of the sources or materials of Jurisprudential law, jurisprudential Dicta.

    Of a general proposition, delivered from a set of particular ones, this much may easily be conceived in a general way, that it may be of any given extent. It may be so short and narrow as to be capable of holding not even those the two particular propositions containing the least quantity of matter which it is possible for it to hold. viz: the anterior decision and the proposed future decision for the warranting of which it is framed. It may on the other hand be ample: and that to any degree of amplitude which the judge find it agreeable or convenient to give to it.

    Scanty /Narrow/ or ample, in as far as it makes law as it goes towards composing the existing body of jurisprudential law it has exactly the same effect as an article of statute law, would have if delivered in same terms, would have: it has either this effect or none: those elements, of this nature and as other is that aggregate rule of action, such as it is, which goes by the name of jurisprudence in English or common law ultimately composed.

    A rule of this sort once recognised or law serves if it is evident for the establishment not only of the individual decision for the purpose of which it was [...?] framed, but of all succeeding decisions that can be included in it. In the framing of any just dictum, a provident Judge will accordingly take care to make it wide enough: wide enough to include not only that particular decision, but all such other decisions, the occasion /demand/ for which, are the [...?] of any particular [...?] may be forseen by laws as likely to arise present itself.
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    Here it appears, that even were the collection of these decisions, [...?] the statements of the several cases by which they were reputedly called forth, ever so compleat, a case to ever get as much as feigned but for the purpose of the present argument, state unless some person or other whose talents fitted him for the task came by adequate inducements came to have been engaged to build certain general propositions of a general nature upon the foundation thus laid, were the labour bestowed upon the foundation thus laid, ample as it can not but be seen to be, would be but labour thrown away.

    Accordingly in the histories given of these decisions general propositions of the nature thus described, are never altogether wanting: and thus, changing the metaphor leads /brings/ us to the consideration of the second of the distinguishable sources from whence the [?] represented by the terms jurisprudential or common law, are left to be extracted: viz Dicta: judicial dicta, propositions of a general nature delivered by the Judges, on the occasion of the several decisions regularly pronounced by them in individual suits or causes.
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    '. Second source. Judicial dicta.

    Judicial dicta was the sort of raw materials that come nearest to the nature of a law. As to particular decisions, except in the comparatively narrow case that will presently be mentioned the case in which they stand convicted with certain [...?] which by referring to them expressly or totally they certainly include, they afford of both or as matter applicable to this /the/ purpose in question, otherwise than in virtue of the dicta to which they happen to give birth.

    These dicta supposing the words of those ascertained and registered, would as far as they want[?] want nothing but the authority attached to the person of the legislator to convert them into so many real laws or portions of real law.

    For writing on publishing a printed paper, a man is prosecuted for example in the court of the King's Bench, the paper being to that purpose denominated a libel. On the trial, or on some other occasion in the course of prosecution, a dictum is any such /some such/ effect as the following is uttered by what is called the Court by the presiding Judge, and nothing said against it by any of the others - "The Court of King's Bench and the austos mores of the nation : every offence /act/ that is contrĂ  bonos mores is punishable as such by this Court. Or very [...?] act that is an offence against good order is cognizable in this Court. Or the alledged libel being charged with being offensive to the Christian Kingdom //

    Christianity is the law of the land: or Every discourse by which the feeling of an individual may in any way be hurt, (the same being committed to writing, and printed /made public/ or otherwise published) is a libel, and not the less so, for being true. The words in these several cases being ascertained it were easy by the addition of the requisite compliment of other words to compleat them into the form of a portion [?] of real law: such as is recognised by the official legislator, would constitute so many articles of Statute law.