date

April 1805 Evidence Ch. Ends
April 1805

Evidence

Ch. Ends 3. Delay

' 3. Necessary

It comes next to be shown why delay and precipitation are separated, as above, from the preceding heads of inconvenience, and placed in an inferior rank. It comes accordingly to be shown that in these heads of inconvenience, though different in name, no separate results are contained, distinct from those already exhibited in the form of inconveniences of the first order.

In the penal branch one effect of delay so long as it lasts is the non-application of the punishment where due: thence the disfulfillment of the prediction - the prediction of the substantive branch of the law - by which, for the prevention of delinquency the application of the appointed lot of punishment in the event of delinquency has been announced. Delay of punishment is impunity while it lasts.

So again in the non-penal branch; as well as in the penal, as far as satisfaction is concerned. Delay of justice is denial of justice while it lasts.

But the whole process of procedure - in the penal branch or especially - is in its very nature a vexatious process. Vexation is the accompaniment and the result of every step that comes to be taken in the course of it. The different shapes in which the monster juridical vexation displays itself have just been brought to view. AS the delay extends itself, so does the vexation. Delay moreover breeds incidents: every portion of delay is pregnant with these evils: each incident brings on its group of vexations: each incident too breeds fresh delay, and each delay more incidents.

[marginal note demand for expense] As it is with vexation in other shapes, so it is with vexation in its most prominent shape, expense. AS the delay extends itself so does the expense. Delay breeds incidents: each incident is pregnant with expense: each incident breeds fresh delay: and each fresh delay more expense.
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