date

June 1805 Evidence Introd.
June 1805

Evidence

Introd.

Ch. Means

' 5. Weaker reason

Section 5. 4. Weakening man's reasoning faculties

In law, as in religion and government, the importance of this object[?] of policy is too obvious to stand in need of explanation. Strong and weak are relative terms. The strength on the one part, is as the weakness on the other. The weakness of the lay-devotee is the strength of the priest. The weakness of Louis the XIIIth was the strength of Richelieu: the weakness of Louis the XIV was the strength of Mazarin. Of the Duc de Mont[?] the Governor of one of the [...?], it was fairly said by Fontanelli, [...?] [...?] not a day but what he strove more and more to render himself unnecessary. The praise seems to have been merited: but Mont[?] was not to be depository of his [...?] power, nor ever looked to be.

The congruity of this object in the character of a subordinate end being thus not of dispute, what remains for notice[?] are the means.

The three preceding maxims /laws of policy/ are all subservient to this one. In addition to their respective particular uses, this use is common to them all. Keep the rule of action in the dark, discourage criticisms, promote blind admiration, be the subject what it may, what recipes can contribute more powerful towards producing the requisite object, producing a general prostration of strength in the patient the destined victim - the public mind?

There remain two other medicaments of policy that have not yet been mentioned. 1. Inculcate in the mind of the pupil a blind reverence for antiquity in general: - for law, jurisprudential law not merely as the work of lawyers, but as the work of ancient lawyers. 2. Ply him with false wit: the particular species of false wit invented by lawyer craft for the lawyers. For though wit, true or false, is not argument, is not reason, either it may serve as a cloak to bad reason, or a substitute to good, and in either way /both may/ be conducive to the purpose.
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    Of the false or sinister ends by the pursuit of which the persons occupied in the construction of existing systems of procedure could not but have been governed enough has now been said. It may be of use to convey some general conception of the principal means: the modus operandi: I mean not the arrangements themselves of details of which the fabric is composed of these in passing ample exemplification, and that a pretty ample one, has already been given in the Table. I speak rather of the principal instruments: the psychological tools or by the help of which the fabric of injustice /work of darkness/ has been reared. Of the general rules principles or maxims or lines of policy pursued in the execution of the work.

    1. The first was to keep the body of the people in a state of ignorance, as profound as possible in regard to the contents of the law substantive as well as adjective, of the rule of action to which they on all occasions were called upon to conform, and from which they never could swerve without from it: to keep the terms of it as unintelligible, and even the existence of it as little known as possible.

    2. Another was, in relation to such parts as they could not prevent men from being more or less acquainted with, discouraging them as much as possible from all inquiry into the reasons of it and exercising the right of private judgment in relation to it: representing it as either not standing in need of reason for its justification, or as being founded in reason that were too sublime and mysterious to be intelligible.

    3. To lose no opportunity of inculcating in mens' minds a [...?] of admiration and veneration[?] for the law and its professions: an admiration as abject and blind and undiscriminating as possible.

    4. To do everything in their power towards keeping in a state of imbecility the faculty of reason in mens' minds.

    5. To use their endeavour in like manner to corrupt the morals of mankind by weakening mens' regard for truth and justice by encouraging in them a disposition to regard mendacity and iniquity with indifference, complacency, and even with respect, under the notion of their being instruments, necessary instruments of law.
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    In the case of forgery, fraudulent personation and perjury this distinction is observed in practice: for without persuasion of the existence of the consciousness in question /this evil/ no man would concurr in /give his concurrence to/ a conviction: in the case of forgery and personation it is implied; in the case of perjury it is, to wit by the word wilful directly asserted in direct terms. But with these exceptions, the disregard paid to it is general: the consequence is that while many a man who ought to suffer is exempted, many a man who ought not to suffer suffers.}

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    The court without power of inflicting punishment, under the name of punishment, but with an untainted[?] power /possessed of an unrestrained faculty/ of interrogation, and therefore /thence/ not without the power of calling for compliance with their advice, under the penalty of present shame[?].

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    But would it be absolutely impossible to find an honest lawyer who for all the rewards that profit /salary/ or honours could bestow could not be prevailed upon to act under the natural system of procedure? Is the conception of an honest lawyer so compleatly visionary.

    In the English Courts of Conscience the same practice /design/ /policy/ and perhaps with the same view with regard to /so far as concerns/ the exclusion of lawyers, I mean from the bench, appears generally to have been adopted: the object was the getting rid of those technical rules the observance of which would, in relation to that humble and limited sphere of notion have been altogether incompatible with /[...?] to/ all justice.