1 June 1805

Evidence

Introd

Ch. False Ends. Judge

' 5 This & bribery

Between corruption in the shape of bribery, and corruption in this shape, there is another distinction and that a most momentous /serious/ one. In the shape of Bribery, like the sort of the English lawyers it dies with the person: in the shape of this unheeded and innumerate /undenominated/ species, it lives with the system, lives as long as that does, and grows richer and richer the longer it has lived. Bribe-taking is the work of an instant, and dies as soon as born. In the other case the profit made by the first purchaser (to speak as an English lawyer) descends to successors, and descends pure: pure, not only of all danger but of all blame.

Bribery is seldom employed but to produce misdecision: ultimate injustice to one or the other side. But of this corrupt connection /corruption/ injustice is equally apt to be the fruit[?] in all its shapes: in the shapes of vexation, expense and delay more naturally and directly than in the shape of misdecision in favour of /for or against/ either side.

When under the influence of this principle of corruption, a system corrupt throughout, adverse throughout to the ends of justice has been produced, the poison of it applies itself to all sorts of causes and to each individual cause of every sort: whereas when it is only in the shape of bribery that the cause of injustice is applied, the effects of it, except in the shape of danger and alarm, that part of the mischief of it which is of the first order, is confined to the individual cause on the occasion of which the briber is given and accepted /received/.
Similar Items
  • Title: [3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform.]
    Description: 3 Jan y 1810

    Parl. Reform.

    B.II. Influence. Titles of Chapters and Sections.

    Part I.

    Exequent[?] /Excreatory[?]/ mass[?]

    Ch. 1. Of Influence, Dependence, Independence, Obsequiousness

    and Corruption. and Bribery

    {§.1. Influence, due and undue }

    §.2. Dependence and obsequiousness.

    §.3. Dependence, the only considerably mischievous fount of undue influence.

    §.4. Of Corruption.

    3 or 2

    Ch. 2. Of the Matter and efficient cause of Corruption – and material cause of undue

    influence.

    §.1. Matter of Corruption – its general nature.

    §.2. Modifications of the matter of corruption – their respective corruptive powers.

    §.3. Distinction between King-created article and ordinary d o –

    its uses.

    § Different articles suited to different purposes.

    2 or 3

    Ch. 3. Dependence, its mode and degrees

    §.1. Where the possessor of the benefit is the dependent

    himself.

    §.2. Where the possessor of the benefit is a friend of the

    dependents.

    8

    Ch. 8. Of the influence of Property.

    7

    Part 2[?] continued[?]

    Ch. 7. Of dependence on a party in partiones[?] +

    Ch. 8. Of the consequence of corrupt Boroughs and other Electoral Districts on party

    dependence.

    Part I

    4

    Ch. 4. Gratitude, considered as a bond of dependence /an efficient[?] bond[?] of

    corruption/.

    §. 1: Bond, the affection[?] or the duty

    §.2. To afford ground for the affection, the benefit must

    be irrevocable.

    §.3. The affection rare in this case.

    §.4. Immorality of the affection in this case.

    If private[?] interest[?] is the shape[?] no other[?] interest[?]

    […?] or that[?] See Spencers virtua[?] & Graves[?] motives[?]

    §.5. Sinister interest by which the duty has been imposed.

    §.6. or Ch. Bonds of dependence, their invisibility Consequence – Frequent Elections

    &c necessary.

    Ch. 5. Dependence, in what cases undue, and in what manner mischievous –

    /{ Ch. 5. Mischief of conduct[?] […?]}/

    or

    { 6

    Independence in what sense desirable.

    §.1

    §.2. Objection answered. }

    5

    Ch.6. Of the Dependence of Members on their Constituents.

    §.1. Instructions ought not to be made legally binding.

    §.2. Instructions ought not to be considered as morally binding.

    Ch. 7.* Of Corruption &c considered as applicable /accident[?]/ to the

    situations of Member and Elector indiscriminately. See Ch. 19 How to combat

    &c.

    §.1. Radical error in the mode of treatment.

    §.2. Cause of the error, sinister interest

    §.3. Leading principle. Sole immediate seat of the mischief parliament itself.

    Part II Corrupt Memb.

    Ch. 2. Corruption &c its mischief in the case of a Member –

    I. The corruption habitual – Corruptor, the Crown.

    §.1.1. Mischief to the state.

    §.2.2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupted, habitual insincerity.

    §.3. On the Opposition side, the insincerity has /had/ necessity for an excuse.

    §.4. After parli y reform, no such necessity would have place.

    §.5.3. Mischief to the mind of the subordinate corruptor.

    §.6.4. Mischief to the King’s mind.

    Ch. 9. Continuation as

    II. The Corruption habitual; corruptor an individual – patron of the seat.

    §.1. Mischief to the state +

    §.2. Mischief to the mind of the corrupted incumbent. +

    §.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron. +

    Ch. 10. Continuation

    III. Benefit gained or sought by the Corruption, possession of a seat.

    §.1. Mischief to the state.

    §.2. Mischief to the mind of the incumbent /purchaser/ or proposed incumbent

    /purchaser/

    §.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron or supposed patron /seller or proposed

    seller/.

    Ch. 11. Continuation.

    Doctrines of the Speaker of the H. of Commons A o 1809 concerning

    this case examined.

    §.1. The doctrine examined

    §.2. Anecdote for illustration

    Part II Corrupt Membs

    Ch. 12. Continuation.

    IV. The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote – matter

    of corruption liquidated.

    § 1. Mischief to the state

    § 2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupt ed.

    § 3. Mischief to the mind of the corrupt or.

    Ch. 13. Continuation.

    V. {The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote:} matter

    of corruption, unliquidated.

    §.1. Mischief to the state.

    §.2. Mischief to the corrup ted mind.

    §.3. Mischief to the corrupting mind. In case of bribery, briber or bribee must

    put[?] confidence: this confidence in […?] violated: no real[?] disparity[?] than is

    produced by it.

    Part III. Corrupt. in Electors.

    Ch. 14. Corruption – its mischief in the case of an Elector.

    §.1. Leading[?] principles

    §.2. Boroughs open, close, and pocket -

    §.3. Scales of mischievousness as between the three species according to the

    Speaker’s doctrines and the above.

    §.4. Anecdote for illustration Dialogue between a great character and a little one.

    Ch. 15. Continuation.

    §.1.
  • Title: [24 Dec r 1809 Parl y Ref m]
    Description: 24 Dec r 1809

    Parl y Ref m

    Ch.15 Electors Contin

    '.1. Mischief to the State

    6

    8

    8

    Such is the supposition of an equal chance as between a King's slave and a free man /member/ - such viz. 50 per cent would be the gain to independence and real parliamentary virtue, by the substituting to what in the language /interpretation/ of some men might be meant by "the legitimate rights of influence" what in the language /interpretation of the same man might be meant by "dry and sordid gain". The clause in favour of independence /parliamentary virtue/ would it be greater than an equal chance? is it more likely that the successful briber should be /{prove}/ an independent Member than a Court dependent? the more the chances thus exceed an equal chance, the greater then would be the advantage given to parliamentary virtue.

    Is it that independence and parliamentary virtue have not in this case an equal chance - and is it then that the gain to them by the substitution of gross and dry bribery to legitimate rights of influence would not rise so high as 50 per Cent? Then so it is that so fast the chains of corrupt dependence bound upon the neck of parliament and that of the country, that taking the House throughout, the odds are in favour of corrupt dependence: that there are habitually more members in that state than in a state of freedom and purity: in a word /other words/ that the King is absolute: rendered absolute, not as formerly he now and then was by the precarious /odious and precarious resistible and continually resisted/ instrument of prerogation, but by the rare and irresistible and unresisted instrument of influence.

    [Marginal note:] 10 June 1809. p.167.
  • Title: [4 March 1807 Judicial Justice]
    Description: 4 March 1807

    Judicial Justice

    Letter V

    II. Sources

    4. Accident: under which head may be included any event which either does not depend upon the will of any human being, or even, to the present purpose, any event which whatsoever other will may be concerned in the production of it, does not depend either upon the system as abovementioned (the work of past Judges and Legislators) or upon the will of any of the dramatis personae acting as above in the theatre of justice.

    With a view to remediation, the chief use of bringing to view accident in the character of a source of injustice is this: viz: that cases exist and to a great extent, in which that injustice is apt to be referred solely to this source, when in truth it would not have taken place, but for some imperfection in the system, with or without the concurrence of misconduct, for example on the part of a malâ fide suitor, occupied in taking advantage of it.

    If a person whose testimony is necessary to prove the plaintiff's right, dies before such testimony has been collected, injustice to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side, viz: in the shape of misdecision, is the necessary consequence. Misdecision, when it is seen to originate in this source is commonly referred to pure accident. But, under the technical system in the great majority of instances, it has for its source the imperfections of the system itself seconded or not by these frauds and artifices which it invokes on the part of suitors: imperfections, considered with relation to its proper ends, the ends of justice; perfection with relation to its actual ends, the ends of judicature. To accident, for example, will the definition[?] of the evidence, in the case here spoken of, commonly be ascribed: whereas, but for the factitious delay manufactured by the system, the accident, the death would not have been productive of the disasterous effect - the misdecision, which without the guilt or blame it produces, in so far as the losing party and his connections are concerned, all[?] the mischief of injustice.