date

10 April 1805 Evidence Securities
10 April 1805

Evidence

Securities

Ch. Procedure Technical

''.2. Ruling Interests

5. That, in so far as the profit to the lawyer consists of so much expence to the suitor, converted into that shape, the expence to the suitor be in each instance made as great as possible: and thus, whether of any given mass of expence, the whole to be as [...?] [...?], so as may [...?] a part of it be thus convertible

6. That in so far as vexation in any shape whether to the suitors or others be productive of expence or inseperably attended /connected/ with it, that expence being convertible, in whole or in part into profit as above, the quantity of vexation be in each instance made as great as possible.

7. That in so far as delay is productive of profitable expence as above described, or inseparably attended /connected/ with it, the quantity of delay be in each instance made as great as possible.

8. That in all instances /every instance/ in which misdecision would not be productive of any greater degree of professional /lawyers/ or official profit than right decision, the right as far as it is known which that is, be the course adopted in preference: at least so far as the public itself understands which is the right course: because by that course, the /approbation and acquiescence of the/ public upon whose approbation /humour/ /[...?]/ the reputation of the lawyer /man of law/ depends, and by whose acquiescence his power is constituted, is most likely to be secured /consiliated[?]/ /obtained/: - always understood that the particular labour of finding out this best course be not so great in each /any/ instance, as to preponderate when set in the scale against this general advantage.
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