date

13 August 1804 Procedure False
13 August 1804

Procedure

False ends

As to might and might not - is there a or is there not any sense in which it is true that every man, on every occasion ought to pursue his own interest? The answer depends upon the meaning attached to the words ought and ought not. Upon the principle of utility, every man ought on every occasion every man ought to maintain /pursue/ that line of conduct which on his part is that most conducive to the aggregate interest of the community: every man ought not to pursue - ought to avoid pursuing - every other line. Ought he so to do? What more, what else can this mean, save that it is desirable that he should do so? Desirable in the eyes of every one who on the occasion in hand regards the interest of the community as his own. Ought he to do? Good - but will he? Can he? Most certainly if urged to forbear doing so by any actually predominant interests, well or ill /rightly or wrongly/ understood.

------- them of the actually /actual/ solely-operating or preponderant interest the application of the word ought or the words /its opposite/ ought not is alike /equally/ idle and improper. Suppressing action under the consideration of obligation - moral obligation - is of no use. He will do /a man will perform/ the act in question: the act being certain /------/ what additional certainty can it receive from its being his duty i.e. thought or said by others to be his duty to do /perform/ it? He will not do the act in question: this being certain, what effectual opposition can it receive from the circumstance of its being his duty to abstain from it?
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