059-349.xml

Title: [10 June 1804 Procedure (20]

Description: 10 June 1804

Procedure (20

Ch. Basis

' Turkish

The acknowledged defects of Turkish judicature have for more than half an age been the stronghold of the patrons of abuse /bad judicature/. There (they say) you have your judicature in the family /domestic/ state, and see what it is you get by it. The vexation, no expence, no delay, but the small matter /portion/ of [...?] that may happen to /is indispensable //[...?]// from enquiry, whichever may be the subject in the end/ be absolutely indispensable. No vexation expence and delay, or next to none: yet Turkish judicature is a proverb /proverbial/ for injustice.

Causes, concomitant but influencing circumstances - Co-effects and obstacles - all have their connection /are connected in one way or another/ with the effect. Shallow /weak or hasty/ men actually take - wicked and deceitful men pretend to take - not only co-effect, and uninfluencing circumstances - but even obstacles for causes.

The vexation, the expence the delay, even the dangers of "justice, are the price (says a French writer /says [...?]/) which each Citizen pays for his liberty." The observation in itself is true: and so true as in itself to be not worth making. But the conclusion which he designs /intends/ the reader should draw, and which but too many readers have been weak /hasty/ or wicked enough to draw - though he had not the face /courage/ to draw it himself - is - that these obstacles to good judicature are indispensable causes: [...?] quibus [...?] and that as according to the trite but uninstructive /familiar but more perplexing than instructive/ maxim effects are always proportioned to their causes - the greater the mass of vexation, expence and delay preceded your /any/ decision, the better the /your/ chance /security[?]/ it has of being conformable to direct justice. Examine (says he) the formalities of justice in respect of the trouble /hrams/ which it costs a citizen ti get /must be at/ his property restored to him, or to get satisfaction for any personal injury, you will doubtless find too many: regard the relation they [...?] to the liberty and security of individuals /citizens/, you will often find too few: and then comes the passage from whence you are to understand that the justice you buy is good, in proportion as the price you are made to pay for it is excessive.

059-353.xml

Title: [10 June 1804 Procedure (6)]

Description: 10 June 1804

Procedure (6)

Ch. Basis

Turkish

The story /epigram/ about the bastinadoes is a wretched /miserable/ sophism. It would have been argument, had the adversaries he was combating /causes //opponents// of the abominations he was pleading for/ recommended this ceremony /operation/ as a substitute to the formalities they were complaining of, or if /had/ any necessary connection had been shown /pointed out/ between this accidental use of power on the one hand and the hearing of the best evidence, extracted in the best mode free from the injustice of unnecessary /useless/ expence and delay, and vexation on the other.

The question is - if in any European state, the natural and summary system of procedure as above described were substituted throughout to that technical system which alone is recognised by lawyers /professional men/ under the name of regular - would the practice of giving a beating to both parties without cause, be a probable consequence - or say even more likely to happen than at present? To state the question it to answer it.

Excepting the exclusions put upon the best evidence by any false science, in respect of the faculty of saving the suitor from unnecessary vexation expence and delay, the mode of judicature of the English Country Magistrate is exactly upon a footing with that of the Turkish Bash[...?]. In the compass of a twelvemonth how many bastinadoes are distributed among suitors by the aggregate body of the English Justices of the Peace?

059-348.xml

Title: [10 June 1804 H Procedure (1]

Description: 10 June 1804

H

Procedure (1)

Ch Basis

'.8. Turkish

 After Ch[?] [...?] on domestic Tribunal

Of Turkish judicature /justice/.

A Turkish Court of Justice, and to speak more generally, a Court of justice proceeding according to the mode of procedure in use in Mahometan Countires, may be considered as little more than the domestic tribunal, furnished only with more extensive powers. A mode of procedure having no technical rules to fetter it, adopts of course the fundmental arrangement here distinguished as the only just and natural one. It convenes[?] the parties /litigants/ in the first instance, and brings them face to face.

Yet Turkish judicature is bad enough: worse probably than the worst of European judicature: - Why? because the natural /this findamental/ arrangement though it will do much, will not do every thing: though no judicature can be good without it, yet without other securities, it is not sufficient to institute good judicature. It will not of itself institute a good public. It will not supply the want of a written rule of action - a body of statute law pointing out every thing that is to be done or not by all suitors. It will not constitute a good public: it will not render the Judge dependent on the preappointed rules of positive law, and unless it be the law of public opinion, independent of every thing else. Though his probity be ever so pure though his zeal abd oublic spirit /public spirit and love of justice/ be ever so sollictous and active, it will not furnish his mind with that prodigious stock of apposite and instructive information, which it requires ages to accumulate - the histories of the judicial transactions in individual causes, [...?] down by reporters, and methodized by institutionalists and abridgers. It will not: but no art /skill/ can avail for compressing into a single paragraph the substance of a whole work.