date

2 July 1804 Procedure and Evidence
2 July 1804

Procedure and Evidence

Note continued

Ch.│ │ Vexation

'.1. Note

It is not therefore to this order or stage of the consequences of a rightful and beneficial judicial act /of an act/ which substantial justice is administered, that we are to look for the good produced by it - for the reason for wishing that all acts [...?] from the same authority, may be grounded in the same substantial ground, it is to the two other stages of the progress of its influence in Society that /for this purpose/ we myst look /turn our eyes/ for the present purpose, and at the very first of the two all doubts will be dispelled: From an unjust decision, especially to the prejudice of the defendant and in a penal cause, we see nothing but alarm and danger: each /either //in [...?] of ///by///reptition/ of them capable of swelling to a mass, capable of overwhelming society and tearing it /society/ up by the roots. From just decision on the side we see nothing but comfort and security: unless it be to the perverse few and among them to no more than such as choose voluntarily to torment themselves with the like alarm by exposing themselves to the like danger. +

Thus important is the distinct between the three orders of good and evil - the three stages of their progress in society. Without no rational foundation could be shown for the preference given to /difference due between/ oppression over /and/ relief, between justice and injustice. The foundations of government would stand on no better ground than the obscure /confused/ and continually fallacious[?] of vulgar prejudice. averring its weakness under some such veil as the word sentiment, right reason, moral sense /common sense/, and so on without end.

/ + Introd. Dum./

/giving its own [...?], as a reason for its own obstinacy-/
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