date

24 Dec r 1806 Scotch Refom To L d
24 Dec r 1806

Scotch Refom To L d Grenville

5 17(15

Resolut. 10

Advocation Suspension

Again, On the other hand, Let it have been at the defendants instance that the advocation has been performed, advocation in lieu of and in contradistinction to appeal malâ fides is still the cause, but the object /effect and object/ altogether different. Delay he is sure of: and to the extent of the delay, competance with the demand is eluded, so much of the value of the benefit sought by the demand saved[?] to the defendant, taken by him from the plaintiff. But by the delay, coupled with the attendant vexation and defence, the plaintiff may be definitively disabled or deterred from pursuing his demand; or of the evidence necessary to make good his demand, a part in the whole [...?] have punished: in either case the effect of the delay coincidence with that of definitive misdecision /misdecision without/ to the benefit of the defendant's, to the prejudice and injury of the plaintiff's side.

As for suspension, that is, the application demanding it, the effect of it, as contradistinctory [...?] from appeal being delay, and nothing but delay, the advocation having avowedly no other object, the effect and object of it, on which ever side applied for, is under the head of advocation already stated.

On the part of the plaintiff however, application for /praying/ suspension praying advocation for no other purpose than that of suspence, i.e. producing delay, adds absurdity, palpable inconsistency and absurdity, to oppression and injustice. The suspension, what is it to do for him? to prevent him from having the effect of his own demand. Is that his wish? is it his wish to forgo and for [...?] the benefit sought by his demand? he has nothing to [...?] to withdraw it. So is his wish to forgo it, but only for a certain time? he has nothing to do but to suspend, himself to suspend the production of it, for and during that time.
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    In addition to Appeal, or in lieu of Appeal, the practice of the Court of Session, as attended to in this Resolution (resolution the 10 th) admitts of two other modes of Removal - Advocation and Suspension.

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    As to suspension, it is upon the face of it so much pure injustice. Delay and nothing more /beyond/ is the professed /avowed/ object of it delay and nothing more /beyond/ is the declared effect.

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