date

28 Dec r 1806 Scotch Reform To L d
28 Dec r 1806

Scotch Reform To L d Grenville

10

Resolut. 14

Be pleased, my Lord, to observe, that it is only in case of malâ fides in the part of the Judge, that the danger of injustice from this arrangement can with reason be claimed /set down as/ the amount to any thing. For suppose danger of misdecision only simple misdecision, from malâ fides, the Judge below may be tempted, supposing the power given him for taking [...?] measures of precaution as in case /the event/ of misdecision, so pronounced by the Court above, shall prevent the mischief from being irreparable.

I find some difficulty in conceiving that Court of justice, be the Judge ever so mean and ignorant, on whose part such malâ fides can with consistency be presumed. At any rate, of no Court can it be presumed but of that of the very lowest and least trustworthy class, whatsoever that be.

But in Scotland - in the Court of Session, my Lord? In England, in any one of the Great Courts in Westminster Hall is the supposition of that sort and degree of untrustworthiness for a single moment so much as endurable.
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    Undoubtedly, my Lord: neither course (where is the course that is?) is altogether free from danger. But, be pleased, my Lord, to weigh danger against danger.

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