date

14 Feb y 1808 on L d Eldon's Bill
14 Feb y 1808

on L d Eldon's Bill

Lett. VI

Omissa and Facienda

1. No Reporting

2. Ends of Justice

II. Under the name of analogous practice Stentor Authority having pronounced /bellowed forth/ his ipse dixit, let no lead[?]-on[?] ear[?], if we can prevail upon ourselves /if the fatigue be endurable/, to the "still small-voice" of reason: observing /and let us observe/ how, without any [...?] advantage, the proceeding /procedure in the cause/ is unfolded with the several evils opposite to the several ends of justice.

1. Evil the first - danger /[...?]/ of misdecision: viz. misdecision in the superior judicatory above for want of sufficient information.

From the judicatory of a judge /is become/ who has collected /possessed himself of/ whatsoever portion of information he has chosen /it has pleased him/ to collect in relation to the cause, it is sent off by him for further procedure and decision to another judicatory which /composed of judges who/ whatsoever ulterior information it may please them to collect have not received undiminished[?] the whole body of light which had presented itself to the eye stationed on the inferior level: in its passage through that lower seated medium feel to have undergone diminution to a greater or[?] less amount, though to what amount it is impossible to say by any general rule.

Even allowing that the whole body of light /information/ has passes on [...?], still no advantage in the respect in question can be pointed out as resulting from the change. Having begun the cause /suit/, what should hinder him from going on with it and finishing it?

2. Another source of misdecision is this - From a judicatory composed of /constituted by/ a single Judge, who has no colleagues to thwart his operations and perplex his thought, the[?] suit by this reference is lodged in a many-seated judicatory, in which in the first stage of the cause /suit/ (for at the stage of appeal the case is different) finds as many obstructions and perplexions[?] as he sees colleagues.

3. Then comes the anticlimax already pointed out /dwelt upon/ in the first of these letters a cause transferred from a single Judge, subjected as such to the whole[?] of responsibility[?] in its greatest form to a many-seated judicatory composed of judge amongst[?] [...?] in which [...?...?] that which is in a great degree dissipated and lost.
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    Oblige the Judge of the immediate single-seated judicatory to decide /abolish at the same time the distinction between/ prohibit at the same turn[?] the Judge of the appellate, the many seated judicatory from taking cognizance of causes in the first instance[?], every thing is therefor placed upon a footing at once rational, simple and [...?] to judicial practice are the judicatories of England and of other nations.

    Immediate judicatory, single-seated, as in the case of the judicatories [...?] in rank[?], the Sheriffs Courts - appellate and in other respects superordinate judicatory, a many seated judicatory.

    That to [...?] i.e. /and thereby/ to the avoidance of the evils of superfluous delay vexation and expence, in the great mass /bulk/ of causes the superiority of single seated judicatories will it is supposed be out of dispute.

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  • Title: [Feb y 1808 on L d Eldon's Bill]
    Description: Feb y 1808

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    Letter VI

    Omissa & Facienda

    1. No Reporting

    2. Ends of Justice

    2. Evils 2 d, 3 d and 4 th. Unnecessary and useless increase given to a triple pact of evils delay vexation and expence.

    If the cause is ripe for decision, then supposing him prepared for pronouncing the decision, decision, if the cause were not this sort out of his hands would be pronounced immediately.

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  • Title: [1823. Feb y. 27. Greece. J.B's Observations]
    Description: 1823. Feb y. 27.

    Greece. J.B's Observations on particular Articles

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    In