date

4 Feb y 1807 Letter IV Juries
4 Feb y 1807

Letter IV

Juries

L d Presid t

2. For the purpose of the argument I will admitt two things. One is that the technical justice the sort of justice which /in the administration of which/ the Right Honourable President bears so distinguished a part - this technical justice, high priced as it is, dilatory, vexatious and expensive without which it could not be so good as it is is so good so perfect, that of all the causes /decisions/ that are determined /pronounced/ according to /by/ it from year's end to year's end, those which are reserved in the House of Lords (about half of these that are [...?] from) being, as his Lordship pleases included or not included, there is not one that is not right, and in every point imaginable as pure from the charge of mis-decision as possible. And to this position /proposition/ at any rate, I shall not, I flatter myself find any objection on his Lordship's part.

Another /The other/ is that of all these causes there is not one that, were it to be d in respect of security against misdecision on natural Justice in question is so bad, that of all the causes decided on such perfection under technical justice /procedure/, there is not one that would not be decided as badly as it was /is/ possible for a cause to be decided, under Natural procedure.
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  • Title: [13 Feb y 1807 + C To III. Facienda]
    Description: 13 Feb y 1807

    + C

    To III. Facienda

    Trial[?] Letter IV

    Resolut. 6.7.8.9

    Juries

    And now my Lord, that, in this single article - denial of justice - the price paid by the people for the services rendered /supposed to be rendered/ to them by I know not what support supposed to be given to I know not what by these retainers[?] of justice, may be the more clearly understood, I venture to submitt to Your Lordship a concluding proposition which is this -

    Supposing the decisions now given in the way of technical procedure to be all /uniformly/ right - supposing that under natural procedure if substituted to technical they would be all wrong <...> at the same time. Protesting that in the technical system there are causes of misdecision to a great extent, and under the natural none at all - yet for argument sake I will suppose that the decisions habitually given at present in the way of technical procedure are all right - and that had they been given in the way of natural procedure they would have been all wrong - erroneous in the highest morally possible degree: assuming on the other hand, at the same time, what the 43 English Courts of Conscience Debts so well entitle me to assume for England, and the Small Debt Court Act (to G.3.6 with the Certificate of the Lord President and Mr Hutchinson in its favour for Scotland, viz: that to the extent of its jurisdiction in the two kingdoms natural procedure does at present fulfill the ends of justice /even under this extravagantly/. This being the supposition unfavourable as it is, and to the degree of stark absurdity, still any proposition is -, that the benefit, resulting from the substitution of the natural system to the technical, would be clear and incontestable.

    Vexation and expense out of the question, denial of justice is neither more nor less than misdecision to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side: a debt of 40' being due to me, if, for want of a Court in which I can recover it without paying more than 40', I give it up, here my loss is 40': if by an unjust decision of any such Court it were refused to me, still my loss, exclusive of the vexation and expense as above[?] would be the 40' and no more. But the number of cases in a year in which misdecision could take place, supposing all the causes now decided in the technical mode were decided and misdecided in the natural mode, would as above not exceed 4000: whereas upon the demands under 40' above, the number of cases in which denial of justice takes place runs as high as 583,338.
  • Title: [Feb y 1807 Letter I Juries]
    Description: Feb y 1807

    Letter I

    Juries

    L d President

    Admitting both these propositions - (and the Right Honourable President will not refuse me the praise of being not altogether illiberal[?] in my admissions) still with humble submission I contend that so far as the ends of justice in the aggregate are fit to be pursued to the prejudice of the fee -harvest the substitution of natural procedure to technical would afford a clear and prodigious benefit.

    Go on with the proof.
  • Title: [13 Feb y 1807 Letter IV Resolut]
    Description: 13 Feb y 1807

    Letter IV

    Resolut. 6.7.8.9

    Juries

    Lawyer

    In a part of these, though but a small part, /it may be observed on the other hand/ the decision of right, would have been against the Plff's side (Non Lawyer True: though but a small part: consequently no prejudice to justice but the contrary from /by/ the exclusion put upon that part of the number of causes which under the natural system would have been commenced).

    Non-Lawyer

    True: though but a small part: - deduct accordingly: the difference /remainder/ will still be considerable enough.

    Lawyer. But the importance of the causes! You seem to overlook this difference in which every thing depends you seem to have overlooked. Under technical procedure as you call it in one of our 4000 causes may have been decided a case equal in importance to your 583,338 under 40' cases put together. There was the late Duke of Bridgewater's estate stated in the public prints at ,100,000 (,180,000) a year: 30 years purchase upon this would give a sum amounting to the whole value of your 40' cases many times over: that /upon/ the validity or import of a will, or the construction of a deed the estate might have come into Westminster Hall, all in a [...?] as well as a 40' a year estate.

    Non-Lawyer. Thus far I allow, but it is all I can allow, that the circumstances of the parties being unknown the importance of ,180,000 a year cause is greater than the importance of the /an/ ,18 a year cause. But the true measure of importance is not the absolute amount of the sum in question - but its relative amount, relation being had to the circumstances of the parties. Suppose themn in each of the above cases half the estate of the proprietor in question in the one case the Duke's in the other a widow's, (suppose) a life estate have been the subject in dispute: viz: ,90,000 a year, and ,9 a year. To you the ,90,000 a year cause would appear the more important cuase: to me the ,9 a year cause. Why? because supposing the Duke to lose the ,90,000 he would still have other ,90,000 a year left, in which he might continue to support himself without much difficulty: whereas the Widow, if out of her ,18 a year she were to lose the ,9, might have to come upon the parish.