date

15 Jan y 1807 When adequate measures
15 Jan y 1807

When adequate measures are taken, as they easily may be, as above /below/, for the prevention of proposed delay, vexation and expense, appeal to a Jury may without preponderant inconvenience be allowed, not once only, but an indefinite number of times.

But, for any time after the first, the reiteration ought to depend solely in the pleasure of the dissatisfied party: it should have for its sanction the fiat of a competent Judge, pronounced after a public hearing of the reasons on the one part and the other /for and against the application/.

Notwithstanding the necessity of this fiat, upon this plan it is still from the will of a Jury that the business receives its ultimate decision. Without the concurrence of a succeeding Jury it is out of the power of the Judge to reverse of alter the decision pronounced by any former Jury or Juries: and the Juries being supposed to be effectually placed out of the reach of all undue influence on the part of the Judge whomsoever it happens to him /his opinion/ to get the verdict of a Jury in its favour, the supposition that it is by force of reason, and by the subsidine[?] correction of opposite errors and the subsiding of opposite passions that the conversion has been produced seems altogether a reasonable one.

Any excess in the exercise of this sort of a negative power on the part of the Judge, would naturally arm against itself the public resentment and counteract its own purpose, and produce on the part of all succeeding Juries a force of resolution continually /constantly/ /perpetually/ and for any length of time and number of attempts adequate to the frustration of the intended sinister purposes
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  • Title: [[094-469v] 24 Jan y 1807 Letter]
    Description: [094-469v]

    24 Jan y 1807

    Letter IV

    Resolut. 6.7.8.9.

    Juries

    By postponing /confining/ the use of Jury judicature to the case where it is called for by one or other party in the way of Appeal, from the decision of the permanent single Judge (say in Scotland the Sheriff Depute) all the use would be made of it that the most passionate admirer of this mode of judicature, having the ends of justice in detail before him, and applying human reason to the subject, could possible /well/ desire. He in whose disfavour a decision by the Judge has been pronounced, if he is dissatisfied with it, and chooses to have a Jury, he has one: if he is not dissatisfied, or if being dissatisfied, he does not wish for a Jury, why force him to have one? Lawyers excepted (for in civil cases trial by Jury, is of course /constantly//without any exception/ trial with lawyers) what mortal alive can be the better for it?

    Supposing Jury trial in the first instance to be adverse to the ends of justice in respect of delay, vexation and expence, is there common sense, and that in that /those/ respects trial by a permanent single Judge is more conducive to those ends, is there common sense in forcing a man to act as if he were dissatisfied with the decision of such single Judge, before he know what it is?
  • Title: [Jan y 1807 Scotch Reform To L d Grenville]
    Description: Jan y 1807

    Scotch Reform To L d Grenville

    Facienda

    Juries why on appeal only

    Whosoever chooses to have /submitt his cause to/ a Jury may provided the cause /question/ is of the number of those that are physically speaking capable of being tried by a Jury, may have one if he pleases. To any useful purpose what more need any man wish to have to do with Juries?

    Whosoever finds himself /sees cause for being/ dissatisfied with the decision of a single Judge may betake himself to this superior or supposed superior, security against misdecision, if he pleases.

    But if a man is not dissatisfied /before it is in his power to have been dissatisfied/, with the decision of a single Judge, why force him into any other hands? But with the opinion of a single Judge, I will not ask how can he possibly be dissatisfied, but I will ask, with what reason can he be dissatisfied, before he knows what it is.

    The question being, how far and in what respects is the part borne by a Jury conducive /subservient/ to the ends of Justice, the first thing to be done is to advert[?] to the distinction between the different ends of justice.

    This done my Lord, my answer is very simple /short and simple/. In the first instance I do not employ Juries. why? because in the first instance the employment of /giving employment to/ Juries is inevitably attended with that factitious delay, vexation and expense which by the profit attached to it (has begotten in the heart of lawyers /heart of English lawyers/ his impassioned love for Juries.) has secured to that object of interested idolatry the devotion of the English lawyers and his dupes.
  • Title: [24 May 1808 4 (3) 3 The choice]
    Description: 24 May 1808 4

    (3) 3

    The choice thus lies — not between a Judge or Bench of Judges without a Jury, and a Jury without a Judge or Bench of Judges but between a Judge or Bench of Judges without a Jury, and a Judge or Bench of Judges with a Jury. A Jury The Jury-box is therefore in every case an additament appendage to the Bench: and of this additament, the size, whatever it be, must consist in its operating as in the character of a preservative against some of the mischiefs the are as more of the wits opposite and corresponding to the ends of justice: viz. to those wits considered not in the abstract, but as liable to result from this or that feature of imperfection in the mens conduct of the person on the Bench experienced and permanent Judge or Judges.

    Of the check thus applied to the power of the Court (a) (a) The appellation given to that part of the which is composed of the Judge or Judges in contradistinction to that which is composed of the Jury. the effect according to the nearest general description of it that can be given is this — the decisions pronounced in the whole matter question of law and question of fact together is pronounced by the Jury: but of this decision the effect is liable to be defeated by a decision pronouncing by the Court on the question of law taken by itself: which frustration may be produced in any of a variety of ways, some direct and manifest some indirect, and not manifest: and this as well before the pronouncing of the decision of the Jury ( called the Verdict) as afterwards.

    Thus it is that the idea presented by a cause carried on in the

    way of Jury trial is rather that of a cause having for its judges the principal part of the judicatory the Jury with a person in the hands of the Court for controuling the decision of the Jury, than that of a man having for the principal part of its judicatory, the the Court not with a power in the hands of the Jury for controuling the decision of the Jury.

    The influence of the Court over the decision is much more easily and frequently exerted in favouring of the defendants to the disadvantage of the Plfs side than in favour of the Plff's to the disadvantage of the defendants side: [+]

    [+] and in particular after a Verdict in favour of the defendant's side, it is in no case in the power of Court to give a judgement in favour of the Plff's side