JB_094_312v.xml

Title: [[094-312v] Jan y 1808 For the]

Description: [094-312v]

Jan y 1808

For the more correct estimation of the comparative importance of the different ends of justice, as well as for the placing the importance of the natural system and the artificial of the technical in the clearest point of view, there is one very simple consideration to /for/ which I would beg Your Lordship's attention:- and that is the vast superiority of number on the part of those causes in which there is really neither dispute nor difficulty, in comparison of the number of those which being really matter of dispute, may thence be attended with more or less difficulty.

For ascertaining the proportion if not to a degree in itself approaching to correctness yet to a degree of correctness abundantly sufficient for the /this/ present purpose, two main sources of information are open to us: no regular procedure the proportion the aggregate number of writs taken out, that is causes commenced in a year in the several superior courts at Westminster, and the number of causes brought to trial in consequence of these writs.

The other is proportion [...?]

093-123.xml

Title: [3 Jan y 1807 Scotch Reform │ │ To]

Description: 3 Jan y 1807

Scotch Reform │ │ To L d Grenville

Facienda

Causes mostly short

It is in the small minority of the causes commenced in the technical Courts - in the number of those brought on to trial, that are to be looked /sought/ for the greatest number in respect of which there is any room for misdecision - any room in which any superiority of security against misdecision (if it were in the nature of technical procedure to afford any) could operate.

That it is of /in/ the very nature of technical procedure as contradistinguished from natural - of technical procedure by its necessary operation viz: as productive of /pregnant with/ delay, vexation and expense is what I have had frequent occasion to shew +: by delay evidence perishes - by delay, vexation and expense, the plaintiff having right on his side is disabled or deterred from commencing or continuing his demand, the defendant from commencing or continuing his defence. Among the several causes of misdecision by which that system is characterized, these operate and firmly applying indiscriminately to all suits and to all systems is[?] in exact proportion to the degree of the complex evil composed of the delay, vexation and expense. (To this are to be added the instances of misdecision produced by the various devices more particularly characterized by this tendency such that of putting exclusions upon the evidence under the erroneous if not hypocritical notion of security against deception - that of receiving to no great an extent what is received in no other than a bad shape - part of deciding causes against rights /repelling just demands or defences/ on no better ground than the non-compliance with terms blindly fixt for various operations in other words according to the principle of mechanical judicature - the principle of nullifaction (that engine[?] of iniquity in the English system so mighty /powerful/ and so busy, in every other comparatively so feeble and inert!- with

093-121.xml

Title: [3 Jan y 1807 Scotch Reform │ │ To]

Description: 3 Jan y 1807

Scotch Reform │ │ To L d Grenville

Facienda

Causes mostly short

But in /by/ comparing the annual number of causes which having thus received their commencement are not brought on to trial with the number of causes which having thus commenced are brought on to trial, we may learn one portion of the aggregate number of causes in which, there being no fact really in dispute between the parties, there exists not in the defendant's side, any ground of defence, and the decision of which the abovementioned average length of time (viz.│ │ minutes) (a length of time, including /comprizing/ defended causes as well as undefended causes) would have been more than sufficient.

In the number of undefended causes thus brought before the Courts of technical procedure may therefore be seen a part of the number of causes in respect of which two not altogether uninteresting points are established:

1. That, had the /they been submitted to the/ Courts of natural procedure, the whole of the difference between the aggregate quantity of delay, vexation and expense attendant in the decision of them in these Courts and the aggregate quantity of these inconveniences /evils/ attendant on /attached to/ the decision of them in the technical Courts, being so much factitious delay, vexation and expense, created by the law partnership for its own benefit, for the sale of the profit extractable by them out of the expense.

2. That as to this number of causes at least, no such evil as that of misdecision, was in the nature of things to the prejudice of the defendants side at least, liable to take place and that therefore had these causes likewise been submitted to the cognizance of the natural Courts, no such evil as that of misdecision would have been to be apprehended at all in the Natural Courts, consequently in respect of this, no possible advantage, in the shape of security against misdecision can have been produced by the reserving[?] of these causes to the jurisdiction of the technical Courts to the exclusion of that of the Natural Courts - by the reservation made of these causes in favour of the technical Courts, to the exclusion of the natural Courts.