date

8 Jan y 1807 Scotch Reform │ │ To
8 Jan y 1807

Scotch Reform │ │ To L d Grenville

Facienda

Causes mostly short

Better remedy by legislative interference in case of disputership[?].

What makes /constitutes/ the superior importance of the question of law is - (it may be said) and naturally will be said that in one cause determined on this ground misdecision may draw after it misdecision in any number of other causes /the repetition of the like mischief/ - viz: of causes in which the decision was[?] /rests/ upon the same point.

That to a certain extent the superiority is real, is not to be doubted /disputed/: but if it be made use of as a justification for the exclusive attention to this one end of justice to the neglect of all those others it admitts of │ │ answers - viz:

1. That in so far as when produced by the system of procedure itself which they are to the amount of at least ninety parts out of a hundred - the evils of delay, vexation and expense, are beyond the reach of men.

2. That in so far as they have place, they produce, with irresistible efficiency, failure of justice which is tantamount to misdecision to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side.

3. That in a variety of ways already mentioned, they are productive of misdecision to the prejudice of both sides.

4. That, whatsoever may be the virtue of the remedies provided by the natural system (viz: multiplicity of judges, central[?] station of the Court in which /those Judges/ sit those Judges in the Metropolis, (the centre of intelligence) and multiplied repetition of argumentations delivered before.) it is not in the nature of them when all added together, to whatever height each of them be carried, to take any thing from the efficacy of the causes of misdecision abovementioned: that on the contrary the further they are pushed, in the greater degree are they all productive of those same causes: the more arguments the more delay vexation and expense: the more Judges, the more delay in the formation and delivery of their opinions, and consequently in the formation of their decision grounded on them: and of the operation[?] of drawing a cause from its original station to the metropolis delay vexation and expense [...?] with the distance, are the inseparable concomitants[?] /accompaniments/.
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  • Title: [3 Jan y 1807 Scotch Reform │ │ To]
    Description: 3 Jan y 1807

    Scotch Reform │ │ To L d Grenville

    Facienda

    Causes mostly short

    But in /by/ comparing the annual number of causes which having thus received their commencement are not brought on to trial with the number of causes which having thus commenced are brought on to trial, we may learn one portion of the aggregate number of causes in which, there being no fact really in dispute between the parties, there exists not in the defendant's side, any ground of defence, and the decision of which the abovementioned average length of time (viz.│ │ minutes) (a length of time, including /comprizing/ defended causes as well as undefended causes) would have been more than sufficient.

    In the number of undefended causes thus brought before the Courts of technical procedure may therefore be seen a part of the number of causes in respect of which two not altogether uninteresting points are established:

    1. That, had the /they been submitted to the/ Courts of natural procedure, the whole of the difference between the aggregate quantity of delay, vexation and expense attendant in the decision of them in these Courts and the aggregate quantity of these inconveniences /evils/ attendant on /attached to/ the decision of them in the technical Courts, being so much factitious delay, vexation and expense, created by the law partnership for its own benefit, for the sale of the profit extractable by them out of the expense.

    2. That as to this number of causes at least, no such evil as that of misdecision, was in the nature of things to the prejudice of the defendants side at least, liable to take place and that therefore had these causes likewise been submitted to the cognizance of the natural Courts, no such evil as that of misdecision would have been to be apprehended at all in the Natural Courts, consequently in respect of this, no possible advantage, in the shape of security against misdecision can have been produced by the reserving[?] of these causes to the jurisdiction of the technical Courts to the exclusion of that of the Natural Courts - by the reservation made of these causes in favour of the technical Courts, to the exclusion of the natural Courts.
  • Title: [3 Jan y 1807 Scotch Reform │ │ To]
    Description: 3 Jan y 1807

    Scotch Reform │ │ To L d Grenville

    Facienda

    Causes mostly short

    It is in the small minority of the causes commenced in the technical Courts - in the number of those brought on to trial, that are to be looked /sought/ for the greatest number in respect of which there is any room for misdecision - any room in which any superiority of security against misdecision (if it were in the nature of technical procedure to afford any) could operate.

    That it is of /in/ the very nature of technical procedure as contradistinguished from natural - of technical procedure by its necessary operation viz: as productive of /pregnant with/ delay, vexation and expense is what I have had frequent occasion to shew +: by delay evidence perishes - by delay, vexation and expense, the plaintiff having right on his side is disabled or deterred from commencing or continuing his demand, the defendant from commencing or continuing his defence. Among the several causes of misdecision by which that system is characterized, these operate and firmly applying indiscriminately to all suits and to all systems is[?] in exact proportion to the degree of the complex evil composed of the delay, vexation and expense. (To this are to be added the instances of misdecision produced by the various devices more particularly characterized by this tendency such that of putting exclusions upon the evidence under the erroneous if not hypocritical notion of security against deception - that of receiving to no great an extent what is received in no other than a bad shape - part of deciding causes against rights /repelling just demands or defences/ on no better ground than the non-compliance with terms blindly fixt for various operations in other words according to the principle of mechanical judicature - the principle of nullifaction (that engine[?] of iniquity in the English system so mighty /powerful/ and so busy, in every other comparatively so feeble and inert!- with
  • Title: [7 Aug st 1807 /7 March 1808/ Letter]
    Description: 7 Aug st 1807 /7 March 1808/

    Letter V

    §.6. Reasons

    Ends of Justice

    In what respect respecting evils, and in what they differ from one another will be shewn immediately

    Evils of the 1 st Order: the list of which gives that of the correspondent and opposite ends of justice.

    1. Misdecision; when to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side of the cause.

    2. Denial of Justice. This evil coincides in the main with that of misdecision, when to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side. The reason for making a distinct article of it will appear further on.

    3. Non-decision. This, while it lasts, has the effect [of] denial of justice. The reason for making a distinct article of it will appear further on.

    Quere[?] 4. Non-demand. viz. of judicial services done. This too has in the main the effect of misdecision to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side. The reason for making a distinct article of it will appear further on.

    5. Vexation: viz. juridical vexation: vexation to which in and by a course of judicial investigation it may happen to individuals of various descriptions to be subjected.

    6. Expence: viz. pecuniary expence: the burthen of defraying it is a particular species of vexation to which the parties to the suit are in a more particular degree exposed. The reason for making of this evil an article distinct from that of vexation will appear further on.

    7. Delay. This article at last has the same effect as misdecision when to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side, denial of justice, and non-decision. The reason for making a separate article of it will appear further on.

    8. Misdecision, when to the prejudice of the defendant's side. The effect of this may be considered as so much vexation, to which that side alone of the cause is i.e. those persons alone whose station is on that side of it are, exposed. The reason for making a separate article of it, distinct as well from misdecision to the prejudice of the plaintiff's side, as from vexation, will appear further on.