11 Oct r 1807

Lords Delegates

After Ch. │ │ Advantages

Ch. │ │ L d Hale's Plan

By the same circumstance we are led to two other lamentable /outrageous/ defects in the plan of the learned and venerable, and even on this occasion indubitably well-meaning Judge. They stand not indeed upon the face of it: but they are not the less irremovably /incurably/ inherent in it.

According to time[?], as we have seen, the constitution goes to wreck and ruin: unless whatsoever other appeals there be, there be one in "dernier resort, to the true supreme Court, the high Court of Parliament, consisting of Kings, Lords and Commons."

But in the belly of this one preposition, and without a speculum ventres[?], may be seen two mischiefs the least of which might of itself be sufficient to oppose to his plan a peremptory negative.

1. One is that this erects an additional stage of appeal: whence it follows that his proposed Court of Appeal, not being competent to put an end to the cause, is useless: and being a mere manufactury of delay, vexation and expence, is by so much worse than useless. Here then (to use his own words) is "it may be a long and expensive suit for the obtaining of a decree or judgment, (and possibly all the substance of a man's self and his family or some purchaser for valuable consideration are laid upon it)" made by so "much the longer and more expensive." By the consideration of this effect, though he would not deny the existence of it his affections, it could not be expected, should be proportionably moved: for the persons produced by it would be his learned and revered brethren sitting with at least as much " regularity" as well as handsome decorum and dignity as in either of the Exchequer Chambers, in either of which does either the delay or the expence or both together appear to have given birth to any troublesome emotions in his learned breast: when by the contemplation of those evils any of the unpleasant symptoms were produced, it was when the whole course of delay and expence represented itself to his fancy as receiving its termination in a Court the population of which was in the greatest part composed of noble indeed as also of right reverend but not the less unlearned Judges.
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  • Title: [10 Oct r 1807 Lords Delegates]
    Description: 10 Oct r 1807

    Lords Delegates

    after Ch. │ │ advantages

    Ch. │ │ L d Hale's Plan

    Art. 5 ( handsome decorum and dignity) To an unprejudiced eye this reason has /wears/ a good deal of the air[?] of a make-weight: let any one that can find /assign/ a meaning for it. What then was the case that in those days the House of Lords did not know how to preserve a handsome decorum and dignity of themselves? but required some of them to be commissioned by the Crown for this purpose /to receive a commission from the Crown to teach it to them/, and all of them to be outnumbered by a pack of upstart hirelings? If such were the case then let us /that here[?] now/ comfort ourselves with the reflection that such is not the case now. For if so it were that the House of Lords did not understand decorum and dignity, what is it that they would understand? and if ever by a hairs breadth or so, it happens that in that most honourable House the laws of decorum are transgressed, by whom are they transgressed? /is it that the /they most/ transgression is committed/? that the transgression is apt to be broadest? by the unlearned Lords, or by the learned ones whom in the eyes of these[?] their venerable brethren it is so necessary to station there in superior numbers, to serve as instructors and guardians to their noble but unlearned colleagues?
  • Title: [11 Oct r 1807 Lords Delegates]
    Description: 11 Oct r 1807

    Lords Delegates

    after Ch. │ │ Advantages

    Ch. │ │ L d Hale's Plan

    Another /A/ curious enough circumstance is that against this plan of the learned and venerable Judge, there stands /militates/ an objection brought forward by himself, and which, where it applies in fact /point/ is given by him /himself/ as peremptory and unanswerable.

    Not only the supreme legislative power, says he, but the supreme judicial power likewise, is according to a multitude of antient precedents, vested in the hands of the whole Parliament. If then, continues he, you allow /them says he/ a judicial power an appeal to the House of Lords, at any rate you can not disallow the already established and still superior judicial power, on appeal, to the whole Parliament. But after an decree pronounce by the House of Lords, such further appeal to the whole Parliament would by the intervention of the (appeal made to and) decree antecedently pronounced by the House of Lords have been rendered nugatory. For says he, by the whole Parliament nothing can ever be done that has not received the assent of the House of Lords: and can there be any rational ground says he for expecting the assent of the House of Lords to an Act of Parliament having no other object than the removal of their own decree? No, says he, "any such appeal to the high Court of Parliament consisting of King Lords and Commons ... must necessarily be fruitless; because the Lords who as part of the Parliament must have voice in that appeal, are already prejudicated by their own judgment, and anticipated by it."
  • Title: [[...?] 1808 Scotch Reform Letter]
    Description: [...?] 1808

    Scotch Reform

    Letter V

    Letter V

    Bonâ fide Appeals

    In regard to /On the subject //Under the hand of/ delay vexation and expence will this be said? if not siad I suppose it must have at any rate been thought. It is not every cause wil it be said? that will be [...?] by the intermediate Court of Appeal at Edinburgh. Some after passing through that Court, will leap on to Westminster, to the House of Lords. But of the procedure before the Lords is more delatory expensive and vexatious it may be added than the procedure before the proposed Edinburgh Court of Appeal will be: and this to such a degree that the saving /burthen saved/ upon the causes added by these that leap on to Westminster.

    This must naturally have been said: they must /[...?]/ naturally have even thought. But where is the ground for thinking so? Thus again comes the same demand for calculation, and the same absence of it

    1 Actual average[?] delay in the House of Lords under the existing stagnation │ │ so much

    2. Reputed average delay in the House of Lords supposing the superficial number of Scotch Appeals stopped at Edinburgh by the proposed Review[?] Chamber and the stagnation done away │ │ so much.

    3. Expected average delay in the proposed Review Chamber upon the causes that stop[?] there - │ │ so much

    4. Expected average delay in d r[?] and in the House of Lords together, upon the causes passing through to the House of Lords │ │ so much.

    5. Q 7.8.[?] The like questions in [...?] to expence.