date

1819 Aug. 25 Fallacies 5 Ch. | | Cause
1819 Aug. 25

Fallacies 5 Ch. | | Cause and Obstacle confounder

Whatever there is in the English Constitution that is conducive to the greatest happiness of the greatest number has formed in such influence as the greatest number have been able to exert its only cause.

Under the English Constitution the whole of the operating power of the government is divided among /between/ three branches: that of the King, that of the House of Lords and that of the House of Commons.

Over /On/ the composition of the House of Commons, and on its operations when composed the people have at all times had some influence. In this influence will be found if any where at that is good in the composition of the whole Government if all that is conducive to the universally acknowledged as the only proper and justifiable end /end/.

Proportioned to the number of those who, each man in an equal proportion, contribute to the choice /determination/ of the persons by whom the immediate power of government are exercised, will be the number of those whose interest in the exercise given to those powers will be endeavoured to be preferably promoted.

The persons to the promotion of whose interest the exercise of the powers of government is directed will be not only the persons by whom those powers are exercised but also the persons /to/ on whom /whose will/ it depends that they shall be in possession of the exercise of those powers: and upon the will of all those persons over whom the powers are exercised it will depends who shall be in the exercise of those powers, in so far as by a manifestation of their will it is in their power to cause those person to be no longer in possession of the exercise of those same powers.
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