date

3 July 1811 7 V. ad Juperbriam Fallacies
3 July 1811 7 V. ad Juperbriam

Fallacies Ch. 1. Posterity-Chainers

3 3

2. Occasion Parties

As to the persons /parties/ concerned -

1. In all six cases we have /stand/ the Members of the whole community who whether on the occasion in question any expression of will on their part has or has not place are in all those /these/ cases the parties in some way or other principally concerned in point of interest.

1. It is in the last case alone that any such expression of will actually has place.

2. In all cases but the last, we have as /in the character of/ a party already existing /in existence/ a sovereignty simple or composite

3. In the second case presents to view a composite sovereignty by the different Members of which an engagement of some sort or other is entered into.

3. The first and second cases present no to view /establish/ in the character of a third party the particular person or class of persons in whose favour (always by the sovereignty at the expence of the people in the character of subjects) the priveleges in question are enated[?]

5. The 4\T thT\ case puts in the place of the outer sovereignty addressing the expression of its will directly /in express terms/ to the people in the character of subjects, different branches of the sovereignty entering into in express terms an engagement amongst themselves, but by necessary implication addressing themselves tacitly to the people, for the purpose of inducing them to acquiesce in the new arrangement, and to modify their obedience /in/ according

to

to in conformity to the terms of it.
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    Or[?] As to the occasions on which the imposition of such restrictions have been or seems capable of being /likely to be/ attempted they seem comprizable under the following list

    1. The establishment of any law by the sovereign with the concurrence of all persons and bodies of persons having part in the sovereignty /sovereign power/ at the time

    2. /4/ In case of a compound sovereignty /composite sovereign body/ a New arrangement of its component powers amongst the members.

    3. /2/ Concession made of privileges by the sovereignty or a principal member having power from the whole to the subjects in general.

    4. /3/ Concession made as above to a particular subject or class of subjects.

    5. Incorporative Union whereby two states having or not having one common head are by agreement put under one sovereignty.

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    Fallacies Fallacies 7 or 1 Ch.2 Posterity Chainers

    ' 6. Fallacy - how included in the attempt to nullify future laws.

    Towards the producing of this effect whatsoever is done by the sovereignty itself by the /a/ sovereign legislature itself acting as such is indeed not an argument and therefore not a fallacy

    Under the denomination of a fallacy (it must be admitted) nothing can with propriety be ranked, but what comes under the denomination of an argument. An act by which legislative power is exercised or endeavoured t be exercised, is not itself an argument, and therefore can not be itself a fallacy.

    True: but on this occasion exists in which an argument and thence a fallacy may be raised in two cases /there are two cases on what ground/:

    1. In the first place, if the state of thing thus attempted to be upholden /upheld/ is in itself, besides being an undesirable one, an impossible one, on this supposition /in this case/, even supposing the sovereignty in question to have done its utmost to establish /to give establishment to/ such a state of things, any argument by which the actual establishment of it is assumed, must in the eyes of /by/ every person to whom the assumed /supposed/ fact presents itself as an impossible one, be considered as fallacious.

    In the next place, the fallaciousness of the argument will appear still more unequivocal, of so it be, that in express terms no endeavour of this sort has been employed by the legislature, and that by the argumentater it is only in the way of interference that /on the part of the legislator/ the existence of any such attempt is endeavoured to be established.