date

1819 Aug 27 Fallacies 42 3 Ch | |
1819 Aug 27

Fallacies 42 3 Ch | | Logical Highfliers

| | King can do no wrong

2 As to appropriate intellectual aptitude and active talent, /setting aside/ natural faculties excepted /which may be the same in one man as in another/ the state of which is our of the reach of dreaming whether his own condition be considered or that of those around him and in particular during the age of necessary subjection those with whom the formation /furnishing/ of his mind is specially in charge in respect of this element of appropriate aptitude his inferiority to other men who have /behold/ the same means of instruction within their reach is no less necessary, may with no less assurance be anticipated. As to what depends upon his own exertions /himself/ The more respect a man may make sure of without mental labour, the less need he has for labour, and the less likely to subject himself to the uneasiness inseparable from it: and in this situation, be his mind ever so weak and empty, the quantity of respect he stands assured of has no bounds, be he what[?] it may it is at all times too great t be capable of receiving any considerable increase. As to so much as what depends on those who have charge of his instruction it is their interest as well as that of all others that are about to [...?] to take on this as on all occasions that course which promises the most powerfully to recommend them to his favour: to assure /minister/ to him delight in every shape to avoid as much as possible the giving him uneasiness in any shape

This sinister interest will naturally indeed be more or less counteracted by an interest somewhat opposite in the breasts of his parents. As in The uneasiness, attendant in his instance on the receipt of the instruction they will not be sharers, the natural consequence so far as regards the quantity of it is a desire that it should be abundant. But from this abundance the substantial benefit to him will /can/ not be great: whether it be /in what degree it is/ beneficial or mischievous will depend upon the quality of it: and as to this point their chief care will be to furnish /stock/ his mind with those prejudices which accord with their own sinister interests, and in which accordingly they never cease to find a source of so much comfort and satisfaction to themselves.
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