1
results found in
21 ms
Page 1
of 1
[114-031v]
1821 Nov 28 /1822 March 5/
Codification Offer
/'.9. Known whose hand/
2. Note in the second place the Cortes. The Members of that assembly are all of them as such partakers in the above described sinister interest. They are in the aggregate joint possessors in conjunction with the Monarch of the supreme operative power are displaceable every two years by the greatest number in the character of possessors of the supreme constitutive power. But they can not thus be displaced till after they have continued in that their situation for two years: and in the course of those two years they have had time each of them to an indefinite amount to give way and effect to such their sinister interests, by concurring in continuing in the hands of a Monarch the objects /those sources/ of general desire power money and factitious dignity to an amount which it is contrary to the interest of the greatest number that he should possess it: in continuing in his hands this excessive quantity or in adding to it in any proportion. /to any amount./
Against an aristocratical fraud not uncommonly exemplified, some precautionary measure may here be requisite Where in the character of reward, the matter of good in any shape is held up to view in the character of a prize to be earned by literary competition, some man without /who has talent without/ influence is set to perform the task, that some man who has influence without talent may receive the prize.
If antecedently to his being entrusted with a part in the disposal of the aggregate interests of the community every functionary according to the nature of the office were subjected in the face of the community to some appropriate test of aptitude, amongst other good effects, might be that of putting an exclusion upon this species of imposition hopeless.
Similar Items
-
Title: [1822 Nov. 5 Tripoli. Securities against]Description: 1822 Nov. 5 Tripoli. Securities against Misrule 30 Preliminary Explanations 2. Sanctionment The other consequence is - that amidst such a diversity and such a diversity, the Judge in so far as the union of disposition and opportunity produces on his part an inclination to corruption seldom finds any difficulty in gratifying it. With regard to aptitude of diction /phraseology/ - aptitude of phraseology on the part of the rule of action, thence security and sense of security on the part of the members of the community, thus much may with confidence be asserted with reference to the best penned /most apt/ body of European law namely that in respect of determinateness of designation as well as aptitude with relation to the only proper end of legislation the greatest happiness of the greatest number they are in a deplorable degree deficient. Using /Continuing to use /apply// the words which custom has applied to the several occasions, on each occasion the assumption they proceed upon is that of the word in question the import is adequately determinate, and scarcely perhaps in a single instance is that assumption true. If such is the case in the instance of those bodies of law the composers /authors/ of which in /during/ the penning of it set /kept/ before them all along a determinate object of pursuit namely the greatest happiness of somebody - the greatest happiness of the Monarch whose power was employed in giving birth to them and binding force still more assuredly must it be the case in the instance of which the rule of action has from time to time been spun out in the way of inference from a work which whatsoever may have been the talent employed in the writing of it was and is of a mixt character having something of religion in it something of law with here and there a passage of history
-
Title: [1819 Aug. 28 Defence against Ed. Review]Description: 1819 Aug. 28 Defence against Ed. Review Beginning 5 Of the power of the ruling few that part which is in the hands of the King is in the hands of the possessors of Seals: of seals in the two Houses of Parliament: more especially of the House of Commons in which resides the principal share of the power, the deficiency in power being made up in the other House by dignity, and that together with the power hereditary: and among the possessors of seats in the House of Commons a great number perhaps the greater being Members of the House of Lords, hence of the aggregate power the greatest proportion is at all times in the Members of the House of Lords, and thus it is by that division /portion/ of the ruling few whose interest interest is most constantly and permanently opposite to that of the subject many that the lot of those over whom the power is exercised is determined. To the seats, as such, no immediate pecuniary profit is in either House attached: on the contrary in the House of Commons, in so far as those seats are in reality what in shew and formal discourse they all are, open to competition, the acquisition of them is loaded /burthened/ with considerable expence: the price current, setting aside casual causes of abatement, £1,000 a year: or £5,000 once paid for the seven possible years, reduced by casualties to about five. But it is by means of the power conferred by the unlucrative offices called seats, that the other offices called offices are obtained: and those offices are almost all lucrative: some of them to a degree unknown even in absolute Monarchies: and of these offices, though some can not, the most lucrative may and of course are held by the possessors of seats: and all the rest are as above potentially at the disposal of the Monarch, actually disposed of by him or the possessors of seats, as they can respectively agree.
-
Title: [1822 June 16 Economy etc The]Description: 1822 June 16 Economy etc The case in which alone it has place is that in which by delegates of theirs in quality of /the character of their/ representatives having in the right as representatives of the people a share in the supreme operative power they in this way exercise with relation to that mass of supreme operative power, the correspondent constitutive power. These possessors of supreme operative power may be either sole possessors of it or sharers in it in conjunction with some other functionary or functionaries. In the case of an ordinary mixt Monarchy supposing that in so far as in the mixture Democracy is included one person /a functionary/ with whom they share it is the Monarch In no form of government ? to this bad purpose any more than to any good one can profit in any shape be conveyed for a continuance into individual hands otherwise than through the intervention of an /a Supreme/ Executive, doing or professing to do the will of the Supreme Legislators. When in the highest sphere of government, for the purpose of the sinister sacrifice, the game of corruption is carried on, it is by the hands of the Chief of the Executive Department. In a Monarchy he is the Monarch /Chief of the State to whom this subordinate Office also belongs in addition to whatsoever share it happens to him to possess in the supreme operative, commonly stiled the legislative./ in a representative democracy he is also the Chief of the State by whatsoever appellative distinguished whether it be /such as/ President, Supreme Director, Protector or any other In either of these cases there exists a functionary, by who to this purpose without his being recognized, not the less effectually is exercised a function which may be termed that of Corrupter General. For in him /his hands, as will be seen/ from the very necessity of the case is /must be/ the disposal of a multitude of offices: in a greater or less degree these offices can not but be in the eyes of the members of the community be in an indefinite multitude, objects of general desire. Here then we have a functionary acting /operating/ whether he will or no in the character of Corrupter General: and on the other part persons in indefinite number functionaries of all sorts included occupying the situation of persons exposed to corruption, exposed to the being his corruptees. ? Note making a salvo in the case of a minute /small/ Democracy.
1
results found.
Page 1
of 1