JB_128_125.xml

Title: [26 Sep. 1809 Parl y Reform]

Description: 26 Sep. 1809

Parl y Reform

B. I. Necessity

Ch. 18. Despotism near

§.1. Commons dependent

6

6

So enormous is become the body of those dependents whose sinister[?] interests are

connected with and dependent on /united to/ the sinister interest of the King, that

the voice of this part of the people alone is become capable of raising itself to

such a pitch as to be scarcely distinguishable from that of the whole. So numerous is

the multitude of deceivers, that one knows not where to look for the deceived.

In Smollets Ferdinand Count Fathom[?], one of the hero’s first exploits is to pick

the pocket of a young maiden of her all, a part of which, bestowed under the mask of

sympathy, suffices for her seduction. Partly by original design, partly by a

factitious necessity which under good /prudent and able/ management would not have

been necessary /had existence/ to this pitch is arrived the

conduct of public affairs under the British Monarchy. So prodigious /vast/ is the

proportion of the peoples property drawn from them by /in the way of/ taxes, that in

the character of a corruption fund, an engine of corruption, that what with need

produced by the impoverishment on the one hand, what with ways and means accumulated

on the other, the force of corruption is almost universally irresistible. Of the

money thus taken from the whole body of the people from the people in a body, a part

serves for the corruption and enslavement /corrupting the virtue/ of a majority of

their lenders: so that /and the result/ in looking round among the people the

difficulty is to find a man of any account who is not in some way or other dependent,

who is not under the influence of a separate interest more powerful than his social

interest and under the influence of this sinister interest ready at all times and

upon all occasions to sacrifice to that interest which he possesses in severalty

whatever interest he possesses in common with the people body of the people.

125_029.xml

Title: [June 1810 1 §.5. Influence]

Description: June 1810 1 §.5.

Influence

Ch. Mischief

§.5. 1 Partners in abuse

3 o

1

8

1

§. Independent companies naturally attached to the King’s own regiment[?]

Kings of influenced Member

Anti-reform interest - allies naturally adhering to it, without need of special influence.

I mean even to the purpose of carrying, by a vis matrix[?] as it may be called, any positive measure. But when considered as acting by its own vis inertia[?], viz in such sort as to obstruct and prevent the adoption of any new measure, in to the prevention of which the King possesses or conceives himself to possess /stand engaged by/ an interest, it will be easy to see that the habitual sinister efficiency of the regal will in this case be to a prodigious degree greater than in the other case.

But so long as in the texture of the government so much as a single abuse exists in /from/ which the King derives or appears likely to derive a profit in any shape a profit, so long there will be a beneficial measure which it will be the King’s interest to prevent, and which unless he be of a species different from the human, it must on pain of turning a deaf ear to the suggestions /departure from the principles/ of common sense be for every practical purpose concluded, that it will be his endeavour to prevent.

So many members therefore as there are who by themselves or any of their connections have /possess/ an interest in the preservation of abuse in any shape, so many are there as even without the application of any such instrument /expence[?]/ of distortion as above ought to be considered as labouring to this purpose under an habitual twist of the will /volitional faculty/, disposing and engaging them to resist any and every measure by which if carried abuse would in every shape be abolished or diminished. For no maxim in politics is more thoroughly understood or rather felt or /and in practice/ more steadily applied conformed to /put to use/ than that all those by whom profit in any shape is derived from abuse in any shape are linked /stand engaged/ into partnership by one common interest.

JB_128_049.xml

Title: [7 Oct. 1809 Parl y. Reform. P t. 1]

Description: 7 Oct. 1809

Parl y. Reform. P t. 1. Necessity –

Chapters and Sections

Ch. 1. Plan of this work

§.1. Objects of this work

§.2. Radical grievance Dependence of the House of Commons on the King. Nov. 1816 This

is not the evil itself but its cause.

§.3. Pleas in belief of the Dependence stated.

Ch. 2. Kings separate interest – general view of it.

§.1. K. gs separate interest why held up

to view

§.2. K. gs separate interest – shapes in which it acts.

Ch.3. King’s interest as to to Power – what power he ought to have.

§.1. Power as to 1 measures – 2. – men.

§.2. What power the King ought to have as to each.

Ch. 4. King’s interest as to power continued – What power he ought not to have. (See Ch 13.)

§.1. Powers not properly exercisable by the King

§.2. Pitt y r[?] – his notions accorded with the above.

 Here or further on?

§.3. No medium between the Kings absolute power and the above limitations.

Note on continuing[?] Kings here or elsewhere?

Ch.4. continued.

§.4. King’s inviolability and indismissibility depend upon his impotence.

Ch. 5. Kings interest as to power continued – his sinister interest.

as to d o.

§. 1 King’s sinister interest as to 1. Measures

§. 2. King’s sinister interest as to 2. patronage

Marginals have only §.6

Ch. 6. King’s interest as to power continued.

his sinister interest as to sources of power.

§.1. King’s sinister interest as to war.

§.2. – as to Colonies and dependencies in general

§.3. – as to Penal Colonies

§.4. – as to ill-governed home-possessions.

§.5. Limits to Kings power of patronage

Ch. 7. King’s interest as to 2. Money

§.1. Money how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister interest.

§.2. Admiralty Droits.

§.3. Greenwax.

§.4. Exemption from War-Taxes.

Ch. 8. King’s interest as to 3. Ease.

§.1. Ease, how far the object of his public, how far of his sinister, interest.

§.2.

Ch. 9. King’s interest as to 4. Reputation.

§.1. King’s reputation, what publicly useful, what sinister.

§.2. Mischief of undue reputation in the Kings case

§.3. Kings interest in the means of reputation

Ch. 10.

Kings interest as to 5. Vengeance.

§.1 Sinister how much, i.e What fit, what unfit.

§.2.

Ch. 11. Kings sinister interests – their mutual subservience.

Ch. 12. Sinister interest of the King’s subordinates.

§.1. Shapes in which the sinister interests of the Kings

subordinates act.

§.2. Natural confederacy among the several subordinate possessors of sinister

interest.

§.3. Sinister interests as to war exemplified.

{{ Topics of the Chapters Stated.

I. Radical grievance dependence of Commons on King

N.B. This dependence /The mischief/ depends on the existence of a separate interest

on King’s part. Insert here from Plan – Explanations – Mischief of Commons dependence

Ch. 1.

II. Kings sep. interest, its different branches –

Ch. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9 10. 11. thence unfitness as to probity

III. D o of this subordinate. Ch.12.

IV. King’s unfitness as to intelligence. Ch. 13.

V. Necessity of an adequate check to King’s power, governed

by his separate interest. Only such check, his dependence

on the people, thro’ their representatives. Ch. 14.

VI. Burke’s opinion assuring Kings unfitness, and thence the necessity of his

constant dependence on the people. Ch. 15

VII. Unless the king be thus constantly dependent, his power will encrease to

despotism and his sinister interest govern without controul. Ch. 16

VIII. Inadequacy of other checks upon the King’s absolute power. Ch. 17. }

IX. Particular necessity of King’s constant dependence to the prevention of

unnecessary wars. Ch. 19.

{ King can not be dependent on people but in so far as their representatives are Ch.

Taking representatives out of dependence on King and rendering them in part[?] dependent as formerly on their property in part independent of every body the main object of

Parliam. Reform. }}

{ X. King would naturally[?] be in a state of adequate dependence on people, of

representatives, instead of being either independent or dependent on people, were not

dependent on King.

XI. Necessity of taking them out of the improper dependence and placing them under

the proper one.

XII. For this purpose intelligendum how /by what means[?]/

the dependence is established. }

{ XIII. Corruption and bribery by and to whomsoever applied

are no otherwise productive of considerable mischief, than in as far as they are

contributory to this anticonstitutional dependence. }

XIV. By the means necessary to do away the greatly mischievous corruption, the other

modes will be done away.

XV. The arrangements necessary to place the dependence of Members on the proper

footing as above may be so ordered as to be productive of divers collateral and

subordinate and collateral good effects.