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K: 28 Aug 1809
Parl y Reform. B.II. Ch.2. Art. 2. Placemen excluded […?]
Infra[?]
§ II Exclusion of Placemen
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§.1.
1. The evil and its causes - viz. the corrupt dependence of Parliam t already described.
p1
{2. The remedy - viz. the removal of the cause of this dependence, & to what extent capable of being carried remains to be shewn.}
{3. In this view, follow the arrangements proposed.
1. Placemen as per list to be excluded from voting.
2. None but placemen as per list to speak or make motions.}
3. Military & Naval Officers to be exempt from this incapacitation.
p2
1. A sure majority /influence/ on all occasions would render the King absolute on all occasions: a d o on most occasions would render him d o on most occasions.
§.2. Commons Judges.
1. Commons are Judges over Ministers.
On this head points y t may be useful for reminiscence though not necessary for information.
1. No man should be Judge in his own cause.
2. In the H of Commons Ministers unite in themselves the character of judges & Parties.
3. Therefore Ministers sh d be excluded from voting viz. from acting as Judges in their own cause.
4. Every man judging in his own cause acts corruptly.
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1 (a)
Except when the judicial power of the judicatory itself is in question: but as to this appeal should lie from every subordinate to the highest judicatory.
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2.
The three first propositions too clear to need any explanation.
p2
The fourth follows as a natural consequence from the others, & the conclusion that arises from it - viz: that a corrupt Judge is unfit to act as such, too obvious to be denied.
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4.
If any error is found in these propositions, on being pointed out it will be corrected.
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5.
The one that will be least readily assented to is the second - viz. that the Members of the H of Commons should be considered as Judges of the King’s Ministers.
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6.
True that in the vulgar sense of the word Judge - a high-seated, wigged, robed man, the Members of the H. of Commons are not Judges.
p3
7.
But if these concomitants are necessary appendages to this character neither are the Members of the H of Lords Judges.
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8.
Admitted that this is but an argument ad hominem but the occasion admitts of none better.
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§.2. Commons Judges.
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By the H of Commons two distinct functions are exercised.
1. the legislative.
2. the inquisitorial or more properly the judicial.
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10.
- and this power may at any time come to be exercised on any of the King’s Ministers.
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11.
It is however distinguishable from other judicatories by these circumstances - that when punishment is to be applied judgment is pronounced by the H. of Lords, when dismissal is involved by the King.
12.
And between these two cases there is this difference - viz. the Lords are under no obligation to apply punishment when called upon, whereas the King, howsoever it may be in pretence, is virtually bound to dismiss his Ministers whenever their removal may be called for.
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13.
Thus in respect of the powers of scrutiny, inspection, superintendence their functions are incontestably judicatorial.
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14.
And as in the cases of ordinary judicature their divisions are founded on evidence, and are pronounced on points greater beyond comparison in point of importance, than ever fall to the province of Judges so called.
p6
{15.
If fitness be among the qualities by the possession of which they wo d entitle themselves to the appellation of Judges, their claims in this respect is greatly exceed those of ordinary judicatories their mode of collecting evidence is superior and comparatively unattended with delay vexation & expence.
16.
In these respects it is in fact the only tribunal that does merit the name of judicatory.}
{§.2. Commons Judges
17.
Society would be destroyed if the decisions of the H of Commons were not consonant to the ends of justice - society does & can exist, tho the decisions of the West r Hall Courts are continually adverse to the Ends of justice.
p7.
17 (a)
If in the case of M rs Clarke for example, supposing her, like the Duchess of Portsmouth to have been in the pay of France & y e H. of C. had proceeded by Bill, before the cause terminated Bonaparte w d have been in London, & y e House itself destroyed.
Let the people think of this & then consider the foul corruption they have been mistaking for purity.}
18.
If in an ordinary judicature the friends of the criminal formed a part of the Jury, this w d be universally regarded as a mockery of justice.
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19.
Compared with the Verdict of a Jury, an address of the H. of C. is of surer efficiency - the address is invariably complied with - the Verdict may be quibbled away.
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20.
Being essentially corrupt Judges and known to be so, the Members of the H. of C. voting in favour of the D. of York neither received nor deserved any credit for their verdict.
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{21.
If Judges are removeable by address from the House, so ought the holders of all other officers in the due execution of which the people have an interest.
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