14 Jan y 1817

Necessity Cat

1 Theory

§.4. Probity how securable

15

Q. 17. Well then: it seems to me that I can not but admitt that taking the word duty in the sense agreed on - no form of government is so good as it ought to be and might be in which any arrangement is omitted that promises to secure the coincidence between personal interest and duty. But now /still/ comes the grand question by what means can this coincidence most surely be effected?

A. This /One thing/ you will find no difficulty in admitting: viz. that if on the other side they have /it has/ nothing to oppose them /it/, his share in the universal interest will in so far as the conception entertained by him in relation to it is correct be on each occasion sufficient to secure the direction his conduct in that line which leads to the advancement of that universal interest: for producing this desirable /the effect desired/ this force, how small so ever it be will so long as it finds not on the other side any thing stronger, much /still/ more surely if it finds not on the other side any force at all to oppose it, be sufficient. But so long as it acts in this direction, be the government what it may, in so far as depends upon disposition, i.e. will, which is all that is at present in question, it has for its support by the supposition, the force of social sympathy in the shape of public spirit or say in the shape of patriotism: and, saving casual and comparatively rare exceptions, it may further count /reckon/ upon having for the further support that of the two military sanctions the moral or popular, or moral, and the religious sanction abovementioned: acting in the course /direction/ prescribed to him, as far as appears to him, by a regard for his own share in the universal interest, and thereby and therewith by his sympathy for that same universal interest, he will be acting in the direction prescribed to him by the value he sets on the action and goodwill of the public as towards him and by the /whatsoever/ eventual hope it may happen to him to entertain of the favour or fear of the displeasure of the Almighty.
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  • Title: [[Marginal summary sheet[?]] [Mainly]
    Description: [Marginal summary sheet[?]]

    [Mainly in copyist’s hand]

    8 Jan 1817

    Necessity Cat

    1 Theory

    §. Probity what

    1

    §.3. Probity, what

    {1

    Quest: 1: Probity what?

    Ans: determination to act without deviation towards the above end -

    2.

    Q:2: Circumstances on what it depends -

    Ans: On coincidence between the mans personal and the universal interest: viz this own share in that interest

    3

    Quest: 3: Every man has he not an interest in the maximum of happiness of his state:

    Ans: Yes: (bating casualties /-sual[?]:/) call it his share in the universal interest.

    4

    Quest:4: Every man has he not a peculiar separate personal interest? Is it not liable to be opposite to the universal? -}

    Ans: Yes: He is born with d o: which would remain with him < > he never a member of any political state, & remains with him in full force of whatever states he is member.

    §.3. Probity, what

    5

    Quest: 5: A man’s Interest, what? -

    Ans: For a man’s interest it is that his happiness be maxamized -

    6

    Quest. 6: A man’s general interest what? -

    A. That which corresponds to his happiness during life: (viz. this: a future not being without special member /mention/, taken into account, say his life interest is happiness.

    5(a)

    1. Interest not expandible[?] by definition: only by paraphrases as here

    2. Paraphrases what?

    3. happiness in relation to pleasures and pains -

    4. Corresponding to every species of pleasure and pain is an interest - a desire

    a motive

    5. idea of pleasure and pain the root of all these others.

    6. Are these all in Spring of Action table -

    §.3. Probity, what

    7

    Q 7. Personal and share in universal interest opposite: which predominates?

    Ans: Personal -

    8

    Quest 8. In every human breast exists not sympathy? its object may it not be the universal interest? this social interest may it not predominate? -

    Ans: Yes - especially if of personal but a small portion be at stake, and on most < > numbers considered, if the universal d o a large d o. But so < > on that side is the predominance that it would be absurd to ground political arrangements on the supposition of its frequency -

    See 1 15, 16
  • Title: [3 Feb. 1817 + Plan Cat Note]
    Description: 3 Feb. 1817 +

    Plan Cat

    Note (a)

    Introd

    III

    §.5. Virtual Universality

    […?] Votes of Electors

    32?

    1

    ?32

    Inserendumne?

    N.B. This was first entituled Principles of Election under which it may perhaps be

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    operating in a direction adverse to that of this[?] universal interest to the

    producing and keeping on foot this disposition, the share which each man has in the

    universal interest, be it[?] minute as it is – yet wherever it finds nothing to

    oppose it – even this minute interest – may reasonably be expected to suffice. In the

    case of the vast majority of the whole people if not of any country at any rate in

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  • Title: [13 Jan y 1817 Necessity Cat]
    Description: 13 Jan y 1817

    Necessity Cat

    1 Theory

    §.4. Probity how securable

    3

    Q. 3. You mean in other words /the word which one finds in the current phrases/ that in the instance of each of them it shall be his interest to do his duty or his interest shall coincide with his duty.

    A. Yes: take these phrases, either or both of them as you please.

    Q. 4. Good: but under every form of government does not every man’s interest /the interest of every member/ coincide with his duty: or to speak more fully and clearly in the instance of every member of the governing body every possessor of the supreme power or a portion of it does not the line of conduct prescribed /pointed/ to him by his interest coincide with the line of conduct prescribed to him by his official duty? Exists there any such official person /office-bearer/ who possesses not a share in the universal interest - a share as great as any that can be possessed by any other member of the community? If not, where are the elements of which in any state the universal interest is composed?

    A. Yes doubtless: but then over and above /in addition/ to this /such/ his share the social, the universal the social interest, every man /the public/ has a self-regarding a personal a private interest of his own, which is distinct and separate and distinct from that universal interest, and that /since[?]/ his share in the universal interest, that it is liable continually liable to be adverse and opposite and adverse with relation, and so effectually and practically opposite, as to lead /engage/ him to /to prescribe to him and engage him to/ act in a course diametrically opposite to that which is or would be prescribed to him by his duty - i.e. by his share in the universal interest: a course which taking for his proper course that which is prescribed to him by his duty, and which he is […?] to act in by his share in the universal interest, may well be termed a sinister one /course/: and the interest which noses[?] him on in it, a sinister interest.