125_172.xml

Title: [[Marginal summary sheet[?]] [Mainly]

Description: [Marginal summary sheet[?]]

[Mainly in copyist’s hand]

14 Jan y 1817

Necessity Cat

3

§ 4. Probity how securable

{16}

A - Yes - difficulties abundant: maintain the result, if there were any need of < > with them - This is not necessary - In such a case the strongest securities than can be ought to be had: - self-regarding interest so long as its form amounts to anything ought therefore in every part of it, to be engaged on the side of the immoral interest -

16

Q. 16 - Teaching then duty for official and predominance regard for universal interest a necessary consequence seems to be that no form of government can be so good as it ought to be and might be, in which any arrangement promising to secure the agreement between personal interest and duty is omitted -

But this agreement how is it affectible?

A It share in universal interest finds not in the breast in question any personal interest opposite to it, it can not but determine disposition i e will at least and for its support for the remainder of universal interest together with the tutilory portions of self regard ng d o. above mentioned saving < > on their part

§.4. Probity how securable

17

Q 18. Good - But in the situation in question by what arrangements can matter be so ordered as that the universal interest with its others as above shall find < > of personal interest to oppose it? -

A. That which in his own conception of it is plainly one of his fewer to effect, a man has not in his own conception any interest in endeavouring to effect. Lodge the power in one man, he sees it in his power to sacrifice universal interest to the adverse portion of his self-regarding d o. to the utmost he will < > lodge it in two, so long as the arrangement < > each will find it necessary to allow the other a share. Keep on this adding to the number of the sharers you will at last to that number in the case in which share in universal interest can not be opposed by personal interest being identical with it

18

Q.18. Of such an arrangement would not universal community or equality of possession be the result? -

A. No - only by special application of the form of the religious sanction be established and preserved: nor thus but in a small

§.4. Probity, how securable

scale: too small for self-defence. Two days together, universal equality could not continue; only by assurance of < > to enjoy can < > of production be produced -

From equalization of share in supreme power no such community or equalization of other possessions would result: the community would be seen to be starving: the equilization, destinction[?]

19

Q.19 - As to this element of aptitude it should seem thus, that the only adequate security is afforded by democracy: and that surprising the others possessed in adequate degree - democracy is the only form best adapted to the attainment of the end -

A - Yes - but this condition never forgot to < > it

20

Q. 20 - It all had a share in the supreme power, only the interest of the majority would thus so far as depends on disposition and endeavour be served not the interest of all

A. But in the interest of the minority sacrificed to d o. of the majority their view versa - No objection to our[?] arrangement that it would not attest[?] impossibilities -

§ 4 Probity, how securable

But interests are so interwoven that the happiness of the majority can not be maximized by any means other than such by which the happiness of all will be maximized -

125_339.xml

Title: [14 Jan y 1817 Necessity Cat]

Description: 14 Jan y 1817

Necessity Cat

1 Theory

§.4. Probity how securable

16

Q. < > This seems pretty well out of dispute. But now then how is it that matters can /shall/ be so ordered as that in the situation in question that is /viz/ that of a person possessor[?] of a part in the whole of the supreme power in a state this cluster[?] this combination of Military interests shall find nothing or at least nothing effectual to oppose it?

A. That which it is plainly /in his own view /conception/ of the matter/ out of a man’s power to effect, he will have no interest in endeavouring to effect. In any endeavour he may be disposed to use for the advancement of his own personal interest at the expence of the universal interest a man in whose hands the whole of the supreme power is lodged in a word an absolute Monarch in a word will find nothing to oppose him. At whatsoever expence to the rest /all the other members /of the commu {-nity he may shut the door of his dwelling /habitation/ /mind/ against the apprehensions of all imaginable sources /instruments/ of pain and meanness[?] in every shape he may crowd into it the assurances of all imaginable instruments of pleasure and security.} /-nity he may crowd together within his own grasp the whole stock of the instruments of felicity and security./ Place /Lodge/ the power in the hands of Instead of one person place the power in the hands of two, each in his endeavours to engross to himself the instruments of felicity will, so long as the arrangement lasts, find an opponent in the other: if in this state of things they continue each of them in possession in his share in the supreme power each will have found himself under the necessity of letting[?] on the other for an equal share of the good things of this world in all their other shapes. Keep on thus adding one such line to the number of sharers in that supreme power at every stop you will be adding one to the number of those whose partial interest is thus advanced at the expence of the universal interest that is of the remainder of the universal interest, till at last you will find that the interest which was the partial interest is become itself the universal interest.

JB_128_241.xml

Title: [1818 Dec. r 9 Parl Principles]

Description: 1818 Dec. r 9

Parl

Principles

Beginning

§.1. Misrule

20

Anti Reformist. But of these same Electors suppose a majority each having a separate

personal interest of his own distinct from and opposite to the interests of the

minority to confederate together and concurr in giving to the aggregate sinister

interest thus composed an advantage such as that the interest of some one or more or

even of all together of the interests of the minority is sacrificed by it?

Reformist. If by the Electors of no more than one Representative – if by the

majority of this body of Electors and no other, the confederacy is entered into it is

a confederacy without an object: for supposing the supposed unapt and mischievously

/treacherously/ disposed Representative chosen, still towards the supposed desired

sacrifice still if this be all nothing can /will/ be done.

Suppose seats in any number thus mischievously /unaptly/ filled still if that number

be not so great as a majority nothing will be done.

Unless therefore the number of seats thus filled be a majority of the whole number

of seats no effect can in this way be produced. But if the number of seats thus

filled does amount to a majority of the whole number of seats, then is the interest

thus supported not any interest opposite to the interest of the majority of all the

members of the community, but that very interest itself.