date

31 Dec r 1809 Parl y. Reform
31 Dec r 1809

Parl y. Reform

Abbot

or 15

15

14

In my view of the matter as so often stated, this circumstance, if indeed it be a mischief is of all the mischiefs /ill effects/ resulting from the actual composition of Parliament one of the least mischievous. In my eyes The grand mischief of mischiefs is the state of habitual dependence /state of dependence and high[?] obsequiousness/ on the sinister will of the King and his regent in which in a number sufficient on all ordinary occasions to constitute a majority and thus exercise the power of the House, are holden: in comparison of this state of things, the practice in question - being a practice which contributes not in any perceptible way any more to encrease than to decrease the extent of that general dependence does not present itself to my view as mischievous.
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    And would you then wish to see Parliament unpopularized upon false or erroneous grounds?

    No, I would not: and therefore it is that I am using /employing/ my humble endeavours to prevent its being unpopularized in any degree on the ground in question it being a ground which in my view of the matter is an erroneous one.

    But what I doe wish is to see Parliament unpopularized upon such grounds as in my view of the matter are true /just/ and right grounds: and therefore it is that I have been stating those grounds as to me they seem just.
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    Ch. Mischief of Dependence

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    What then is the necessary consequence - what the mischief of a state of such dependence on the part of such a trustee dependence on the will of a corruptor-general actuated by an interest /acting under the impulse/ opposite in every point to the interest of the people subject to his trust? What, but every mischief {of which the nature of the case is susceptible?} of which abuse of power can be productive?

    Such being the mischief, where and what shall be /wherein shall consist/ the remedy? Remedy there can be but one: which is the transference of the trust into some other, in hope of their proving less {unfit /inept/ and} unfaithful hands.
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    Ch.17. Mischievous not disreputable

    '.1. Bribery, least mischievous

    1

    1

    Ch. 17 Why in its most /least/ mischievous form /forms/ corruption is least /most/ disreputable.

    '.1. Bribery is the shape in which parl y. corruption is least mischievous, most if not exclusively disreputable.

    Of corruption in every case in which it is productive on the fount of it the mischief is permanent continuous its magnitude being cæteres paribus on the length of time during which the dependence continues: the number of breaches of trust which it is within that time capable of producing has no other branch than the number of acts which in the exercise of the trust it can fall into the way of the trustee to perform within that space of time.

    Of corruption in every case in which it is not productive of dependence the mischief is but momentary: it amounts to but a point[?]: on the part of the trustee a single breach of trust is the only bitter fruit of which the corruption is capable of being productive.

    It is in the case where the mischievousness of it is at its minimum, that corruption is in use to be designated by /under/ the name of bribery.

    Bribery as hath been seen is corruption in the case where the mischievousness of it is at its minimum: the case in which the mischievousness of it is at its maximum is the case in which it has for its fruit a state of habitual dependence: such for example as that which is produced by the defensible possession of a defensible lucrative office, or by the expectancy /prospect/ of any such office be the possession of it defensible or indefensible.