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1 Jan y 1810
Parl y Reform
1 '.1
Speaker exchange[?]
Ch.14. Corruption II. Electors
'.1. Leading principles
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Ch.14. 2. Corruption &c - its mischievousness in the case of an Elector.
'.1. Leading principles.
Of influence exercised on the one part, be it influence of understanding on understanding, be it influence of will on will - be it of the coercive kind, be it of the alluring /inviting/ kind - be it legitimate, be it sinister and illegitimate - in so far as it is efficient, the result, on the other part, is obsequiousness.
Every thing - as hath above been so fully explained - every thing depends upon obsequiousness: upon the existence or non-existence of undue obsequiousness, as towards the corruptor general or any casual corruptor, on behalf of the trustee and agent or rather him who should be /being in fact the trustee of right ought to be/ the agent of the people.
A breach of trust of this sort does it never take place? None except what /such/ difference as may happen to be produced in respect of the talents and intellectual endowments and talents of the representative by a competent or incompetent set of Electors, no matter who the Electors are nor wheth[?] corrupted or in any and what degree corrupted.
If in any instance a representative who is either absolutely unfit for the trust or less fit than some other that might have been obtained for it happens to be placed in it, and the substitution has not on the part of the Electors any error or judgment for the cause, what it must have had for its cause is resolvable into a manifestation of undue[?] obsequiousness on the part of the number requisite to produce the/ this/ undesirable effect /result/.
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Title: [4 Dec r 1809 Parl y Reform]Description: 4 Dec r 1809 Parl y Reform Influence Ch.1: Explanations '.4 Corruption 2 3 Still less does the shoemaker say to the customer - yes: you shall have the shoes: but it is on condition that you engage to pay me, and not otherwise. This would be not only superfluous but affirmative. Where on any given occasion, in virtue of some relative situation between two parties, though obsequiousness takes place of its own accord /spontaneously/, such obsequiousness may be in any degree undue, and mischievous, there is neither need nor room /place/ for any act of corruption - for corruption on the active side. But in the obsequiousness consisting the mischievous effect /consists all the mischief/ and the whole of the mischievous effect, the state of mind on the part of the obsequious person, is not the better for the absence of corruption in this sense, but all the worse. On the part of the other /another/ party in the situation of corruptor were an act necessary, no act of corruption no act of obsequiousness - {that is in the case of undue obsequiousness on the part of a trustee, no breach of trust} and thence where the obsequious party is a trustee and the act of obsequiousness undue because {the} prejudicial to the trust no breach of trust. The cause of the corruption, and that a sufficient and efficient one is in the situation, the mutual and relative situation itself. In the instance /On the part/ of the corrupted person The corruption is but the more constant and the more sure, because there is no need of any act by any other person to produce it.
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Title: [3 Dec r 1809 + Parl y Reform]Description: 3 Dec r 1809 + Parl y Reform Influence Ch.1. Explanations '.3 Dependence most mischievous 3 {This[?] reason is an arithmetical one: if no dependence, no more than one instance of undue obsequiousness is produced by one complex operation: if dependence, as many instances as the nature of the case /situation/ produces during the man's continuance in it.} dependence apart, the effect of the undue influence is but occasional and momentary: but, if dependence be the fruit of it, the effect is permanent, continuing as long as the dependence continues, and producing on the part of the corrupted trustee as many instances of breach of trust as the corruptor has occasion to call for during that length /span/ of time. Of the two species of political trust viz. that of the member of parliament, and that of the parliamentary elector, it is in the situation of member of parliament that in which influence undue influence is beyond comparison in an almost infinitely greater degree most apt to be productive of this pernicious fruit. Why? - Because, a vote /the act of voting/ being in both cases /situations/ the act by which the power is exercised, the number of votes which within a given space of time it may happen to a Member of parliament to give is beyond comparison greater than the greatest number which it can happen to a parliamentary elector to give. Under the system of septennial parliaments, casualties apart, a parliamentary elector as such does not find it in his power to be corrupt /violate that his trust/ oftener than once in seven years,
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Title: [3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform.]Description: 3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform. B.II. Influence. Titles of Chapters and Sections. Part I. Exequent[?] /Excreatory[?]/ mass[?] Ch. 1. Of Influence, Dependence, Independence, Obsequiousness and Corruption. and Bribery {§.1. Influence, due and undue } §.2. Dependence and obsequiousness. §.3. Dependence, the only considerably mischievous fount of undue influence. §.4. Of Corruption. 3 or 2 Ch. 2. Of the Matter and efficient cause of Corruption – and material cause of undue influence. §.1. Matter of Corruption – its general nature. §.2. Modifications of the matter of corruption – their respective corruptive powers. §.3. Distinction between King-created article and ordinary d o – its uses. § Different articles suited to different purposes. 2 or 3 Ch. 3. Dependence, its mode and degrees §.1. Where the possessor of the benefit is the dependent himself. §.2. Where the possessor of the benefit is a friend of the dependents. 8 Ch. 8. Of the influence of Property. 7 Part 2[?] continued[?] Ch. 7. Of dependence on a party in partiones[?] + Ch. 8. Of the consequence of corrupt Boroughs and other Electoral Districts on party dependence. Part I 4 Ch. 4. Gratitude, considered as a bond of dependence /an efficient[?] bond[?] of corruption/. §. 1: Bond, the affection[?] or the duty §.2. To afford ground for the affection, the benefit must be irrevocable. §.3. The affection rare in this case. §.4. Immorality of the affection in this case. If private[?] interest[?] is the shape[?] no other[?] interest[?] […?] or that[?] See Spencers virtua[?] & Graves[?] motives[?] §.5. Sinister interest by which the duty has been imposed. §.6. or Ch. Bonds of dependence, their invisibility Consequence – Frequent Elections &c necessary. Ch. 5. Dependence, in what cases undue, and in what manner mischievous – /{ Ch. 5. Mischief of conduct[?] […?]}/ or { 6 Independence in what sense desirable. §.1 §.2. Objection answered. } 5 Ch.6. Of the Dependence of Members on their Constituents. §.1. Instructions ought not to be made legally binding. §.2. Instructions ought not to be considered as morally binding. Ch. 7.* Of Corruption &c considered as applicable /accident[?]/ to the situations of Member and Elector indiscriminately. See Ch. 19 How to combat &c. §.1. Radical error in the mode of treatment. §.2. Cause of the error, sinister interest §.3. Leading principle. Sole immediate seat of the mischief parliament itself. Part II Corrupt Memb. Ch. 2. Corruption &c its mischief in the case of a Member – I. The corruption habitual – Corruptor, the Crown. §.1.1. Mischief to the state. §.2.2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupted, habitual insincerity. §.3. On the Opposition side, the insincerity has /had/ necessity for an excuse. §.4. After parli y reform, no such necessity would have place. §.5.3. Mischief to the mind of the subordinate corruptor. §.6.4. Mischief to the King’s mind. Ch. 9. Continuation as II. The Corruption habitual; corruptor an individual – patron of the seat. §.1. Mischief to the state + §.2. Mischief to the mind of the corrupted incumbent. + §.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron. + Ch. 10. Continuation III. Benefit gained or sought by the Corruption, possession of a seat. §.1. Mischief to the state. §.2. Mischief to the mind of the incumbent /purchaser/ or proposed incumbent /purchaser/ §.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron or supposed patron /seller or proposed seller/. Ch. 11. Continuation. Doctrines of the Speaker of the H. of Commons A o 1809 concerning this case examined. §.1. The doctrine examined §.2. Anecdote for illustration Part II Corrupt Membs Ch. 12. Continuation. IV. The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote – matter of corruption liquidated. § 1. Mischief to the state § 2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupt ed. § 3. Mischief to the mind of the corrupt or. Ch. 13. Continuation. V. {The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote:} matter of corruption, unliquidated. §.1. Mischief to the state. §.2. Mischief to the corrup ted mind. §.3. Mischief to the corrupting mind. In case of bribery, briber or bribee must put[?] confidence: this confidence in […?] violated: no real[?] disparity[?] than is produced by it. Part III. Corrupt. in Electors. Ch. 14. Corruption – its mischief in the case of an Elector. §.1. Leading[?] principles §.2. Boroughs open, close, and pocket - §.3. Scales of mischievousness as between the three species according to the Speaker’s doctrines and the above. §.4. Anecdote for illustration Dialogue between a great character and a little one. Ch. 15. Continuation. §.1.
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