date

Dec r 1809 Parl y Reform +
Dec r 1809

Parl y Reform

+ '.1.

1 o

Influence

Ch.17. Mischievous not disreputable

'.1. Bribery, least mischievous

1

1

Ch. 17 Why in its most /least/ mischievous form /forms/ corruption is least /most/ disreputable.

'.1. Bribery is the shape in which parl y. corruption is least mischievous, most if not exclusively disreputable.

Of corruption in every case in which it is productive on the fount of it the mischief is permanent continuous its magnitude being cæteres paribus on the length of time during which the dependence continues: the number of breaches of trust which it is within that time capable of producing has no other branch than the number of acts which in the exercise of the trust it can fall into the way of the trustee to perform within that space of time.

Of corruption in every case in which it is not productive of dependence the mischief is but momentary: it amounts to but a point[?]: on the part of the trustee a single breach of trust is the only bitter fruit of which the corruption is capable of being productive.

It is in the case where the mischievousness of it is at its minimum, that corruption is in use to be designated by /under/ the name of bribery.

Bribery as hath been seen is corruption in the case where the mischievousness of it is at its minimum: the case in which the mischievousness of it is at its maximum is the case in which it has for its fruit a state of habitual dependence: such for example as that which is produced by the defensible possession of a defensible lucrative office, or by the expectancy /prospect/ of any such office be the possession of it defensible or indefensible.
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    {This[?] reason is an arithmetical one: if no dependence, no more than one instance of undue obsequiousness is produced by one complex operation: if dependence, as many instances as the nature of the case /situation/ produces during the man's continuance in it.}

    dependence apart, the effect of the undue influence is but occasional and momentary: but, if dependence be the fruit of it, the effect is permanent, continuing as long as the dependence continues, and producing on the part of the corrupted trustee as many instances of breach of trust as the corruptor has occasion to call for during that length /span/ of time.

    Of the two species of political trust viz. that of the member of parliament, and that of the parliamentary elector, it is in the situation of member of parliament that in which influence undue influence is beyond comparison in an almost infinitely greater degree most apt to be productive of this pernicious fruit. Why? - Because, a vote /the act of voting/ being in both cases /situations/ the act by which the power is exercised, the number of votes which within a given space of time it may happen to a Member of parliament to give is beyond comparison greater than the greatest number which it can happen to a parliamentary elector to give. Under the system of septennial parliaments, casualties apart, a parliamentary elector as such does not find it in his power to be corrupt /violate that his trust/ oftener than once in seven years,
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    '.3. Mischief to the mind of the person corrupted. /corrupted Representative./

    Suppose /Let/ the corruption /have been/ effected, suppose /Let/ a Member of Parliament, for a determinate sum of money which in this case will receive the name of a bribe, have been engaged to apply to a particular effect presented /indicated/ to him by the donor, his vote and influence. That in this case to the mind of the trustee thus bribed the existence of a taint and contamination will be unquestionable and the depth or darkness of it in whatever may be the proper attribute considerable, is not to be doubted if disputed. Why? because /while he knows/ at the same time that he is doing that which if known would render him to a certain degree an object of general aversion and contempt a man could not say to himself that the act was in its nature /natural tendency/ innoxious[?], and that accordingly public opinion though adverse to him, laboured in that respect under a mistake.

    { {Thus much for positive /absolute/ mischief in this shape.: now for comparative.}

    Taken then by itself, no doubt: but {an act of corruption} in the shape here in question corruption is pernicious not only disreputable but really pernicious. But the mischief of which it is productive or rather of /with/ which it is pregnant in this case in which it is thus disreputable, compare it with the mischief produced by it in other cases in which it is not at all disreputable: viz. those in which it is productive of habitual undue[?] dependence: we shall find it in this case [...?] indeed when compared with which it is in these[?]. But for this see Ch. 17.}
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    '.1. Bribery, least mischievous

    2

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    Such as are /being/ the relative degrees of mischievousness attached respectively to those two modes of violating a public trust, corresponding to these degrees of mischievousness ought /should/ the degrees of disapprobation be that are respectively attached to them by public opinion: and such they would be if in this instance it had happened to the force of public opinion otherwise called the force of the moral sanction, to take the dictates of the principle of public utility for its guide.

    But, though in this ground the force of public opinion is in some degree divided against itself, yet taking the great and preponderant mass of it, the direction in which it cuts can scarcely be denied to be opposite /an opposite/ to that of the principle of utility just stated. Bribery, among political /public/ men, that is among men either placed in or looking forward towards political situations Bribery is generally if not universally spoken of as a sort of act which /the commission of which at least by a member of parliament, and if it be of that sort which consists in the receipt not in the giving of the bribe/ needs but to be known in order to cover the agent with ignominy: while of /to/ a situation by which a man invested with that same trust is placed in a state of continual dependence - if dependence on the will of a /the/ King or a Minister - the possession so far from being regarded as matter of disgrace is according /in proportion/ to the emolument and power attached to the situation, and thence in proportion to the strength of the bonds by which he is bound down in and to that state is accounted matter of honour - conferring on him a title to universal [...?] /[...?]/ and respect.