1
results found in
26 ms
Page 1
of 1
[Damaged MS] 1809
[Damaged MS] Reform
+ '.1
Ch.6. Parl Corrupt Members
II. Corrupt interest - Corrupt individ
'. Mischief to public
16
1
'.6. II. Corruption continued - Corruptor an individual, patron of the seat - 6. Mischief to the public
When from a hand which (no matter how) has a seat in the house of Commons at command, that hand not being in a state of dependence under the Crown a man is placed /finds himself seated/ in that seat, in this case is there any thing of corrupt dependence or corruption? and if so /either/ (mischief being supposed a necessary consequence /concomitant/ of parliamentary corruption) is the quantity of mischief then[?] produced to the public greater or less than the quantity of mischief attached to the corrupt dependence of a Member on the King or a Minister /through a Ministry/ in possession or expectancy, as above?
To these questions before any answer can be returned some further distinctions will be requisite.
The Member thus seated, does he pay a price for the appointment /this benefit/, or does he receive it without price?
If without price, is the connection between this incumbent and his patron such as to place him /his conduct in this his office/ in a state of strict dependence on the patron, or in only that loose kind of dependence which as above may happen to be considered as constituted by the sense or obligation of Gratitude? (a)
Note ( )
( ) If paying a price that price be such as is understood to be to a certain amount inferior to the market price, this is a compound case, and in so far as gratitude operates /is considered/ as a bond of dependence, he continues in a sort of dependence under the patron in a sort of dependence, the degree of which is determined by the amount of the abatement on the correct price.
This sort of arrangement is a very common one. The parties between whom it takes place are usually parties who understand one another to stand /be stationed/ in the war of politics on the same side.
Similar Items
-
Title: [3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform.]Description: 3 Jan y 1810 Parl. Reform. B.II. Influence. Titles of Chapters and Sections. Part I. Exequent[?] /Excreatory[?]/ mass[?] Ch. 1. Of Influence, Dependence, Independence, Obsequiousness and Corruption. and Bribery {§.1. Influence, due and undue } §.2. Dependence and obsequiousness. §.3. Dependence, the only considerably mischievous fount of undue influence. §.4. Of Corruption. 3 or 2 Ch. 2. Of the Matter and efficient cause of Corruption – and material cause of undue influence. §.1. Matter of Corruption – its general nature. §.2. Modifications of the matter of corruption – their respective corruptive powers. §.3. Distinction between King-created article and ordinary d o – its uses. § Different articles suited to different purposes. 2 or 3 Ch. 3. Dependence, its mode and degrees §.1. Where the possessor of the benefit is the dependent himself. §.2. Where the possessor of the benefit is a friend of the dependents. 8 Ch. 8. Of the influence of Property. 7 Part 2[?] continued[?] Ch. 7. Of dependence on a party in partiones[?] + Ch. 8. Of the consequence of corrupt Boroughs and other Electoral Districts on party dependence. Part I 4 Ch. 4. Gratitude, considered as a bond of dependence /an efficient[?] bond[?] of corruption/. §. 1: Bond, the affection[?] or the duty §.2. To afford ground for the affection, the benefit must be irrevocable. §.3. The affection rare in this case. §.4. Immorality of the affection in this case. If private[?] interest[?] is the shape[?] no other[?] interest[?] […?] or that[?] See Spencers virtua[?] & Graves[?] motives[?] §.5. Sinister interest by which the duty has been imposed. §.6. or Ch. Bonds of dependence, their invisibility Consequence – Frequent Elections &c necessary. Ch. 5. Dependence, in what cases undue, and in what manner mischievous – /{ Ch. 5. Mischief of conduct[?] […?]}/ or { 6 Independence in what sense desirable. §.1 §.2. Objection answered. } 5 Ch.6. Of the Dependence of Members on their Constituents. §.1. Instructions ought not to be made legally binding. §.2. Instructions ought not to be considered as morally binding. Ch. 7.* Of Corruption &c considered as applicable /accident[?]/ to the situations of Member and Elector indiscriminately. See Ch. 19 How to combat &c. §.1. Radical error in the mode of treatment. §.2. Cause of the error, sinister interest §.3. Leading principle. Sole immediate seat of the mischief parliament itself. Part II Corrupt Memb. Ch. 2. Corruption &c its mischief in the case of a Member – I. The corruption habitual – Corruptor, the Crown. §.1.1. Mischief to the state. §.2.2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupted, habitual insincerity. §.3. On the Opposition side, the insincerity has /had/ necessity for an excuse. §.4. After parli y reform, no such necessity would have place. §.5.3. Mischief to the mind of the subordinate corruptor. §.6.4. Mischief to the King’s mind. Ch. 9. Continuation as II. The Corruption habitual; corruptor an individual – patron of the seat. §.1. Mischief to the state + §.2. Mischief to the mind of the corrupted incumbent. + §.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron. + Ch. 10. Continuation III. Benefit gained or sought by the Corruption, possession of a seat. §.1. Mischief to the state. §.2. Mischief to the mind of the incumbent /purchaser/ or proposed incumbent /purchaser/ §.3. Mischief to the mind of the patron or supposed patron /seller or proposed seller/. Ch. 11. Continuation. Doctrines of the Speaker of the H. of Commons A o 1809 concerning this case examined. §.1. The doctrine examined §.2. Anecdote for illustration Part II Corrupt Membs Ch. 12. Continuation. IV. The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote – matter of corruption liquidated. § 1. Mischief to the state § 2. Mischief to the mind of the individual corrupt ed. § 3. Mischief to the mind of the corrupt or. Ch. 13. Continuation. V. {The corruption occasional: benefit gained or sought, a particular vote:} matter of corruption, unliquidated. §.1. Mischief to the state. §.2. Mischief to the corrup ted mind. §.3. Mischief to the corrupting mind. In case of bribery, briber or bribee must put[?] confidence: this confidence in […?] violated: no real[?] disparity[?] than is produced by it. Part III. Corrupt. in Electors. Ch. 14. Corruption – its mischief in the case of an Elector. §.1. Leading[?] principles §.2. Boroughs open, close, and pocket - §.3. Scales of mischievousness as between the three species according to the Speaker’s doctrines and the above. §.4. Anecdote for illustration Dialogue between a great character and a little one. Ch. 15. Continuation. §.1.
-
Title: [25 Dec r 1809 ' 6 Parl y Reform Influences]Description: 25 Dec r 1809 ' 6 Parl y Reform Influences Number 10 XI Olim viz. temp. Gul um, points might be carried by corruption[?] a few individuals: but this was before the King with the royal corruption[?] system was thoroughly established Modo[?] nothing could be thus done - Nabob of Arcet[?] his few members where a man who has a seat puts in a friend - it is this case; and what does this do {' Corruptor, an individual.} {No mischief done but in so far as the corruptor[?] member gives himself to a corrupt administration - viz in possession or in expectancy.} {'.6.II Corruptor and individual - 1 Mischief to the public.} {We come now to the case where the corruptor the person in whose dependence the Member is placed, or by whom dependent or independent he has been seated is - not the Minister - not the agent of the King, but some insulated individual.} Here the act of corruption in so far as on the active side of the transaction any act has had place is in name at least the same, as in the former case: so the immediate result of that act the dependence, if it be a case of dependence. Every thing in last[?] is the same except the consequences - the only material consequences.
-
Title: [28 Dec r 1809 Parl y Reform]Description: 28 Dec r 1809 Parl y Reform Ch. Parl Corrupt I Members '.6. Corruption continued Corrupting individual 1. Mischief to public 2 First then let the dependence thus constituted, the dependence of the incumbent Member on his parliamentary patron, be a state of strict dependence. It is useless to enquire, in what various ways a dependence of this sort may have been constituted. For illustration let us take the most simple case. A /Incumbent a/ younger son of a Peer or rich /opulent/ commoner, dependent on his father for the quantum of his fortune: patron, the father aforesaid. {by the supposition (how rarely soever exemplified) the father has not at the time of the presentation any such situation under the King, or looking towards the favour of the Crown, /King,/ as has the effect of placing him under the King in a situation of dependence. {But though at the moment in question in this sense independent, yet in the instance of this as of any other man the next moment may find him in a state of dependence.}} In the event - and supposing his condition in this respect the same throughout the whole parliament - what in this respect will the condition of the patron be? If in a state of dependence, his condition is thereby taken out of the case here in question, and transferred into the one last /just/ spoken of. From the condition in which this one Member with his right of voting is placed results /to the country/ a real mischief to the country a mischief the nature of which has already been developed.
1
results found.
Page 1
of 1