date

28 Dec r 1809 Parl y. Reform
28 Dec r 1809

Parl y. Reform

Ch. Members

'.6. II Corruption continued

Corrupting individual

1. Mischief to public

3

But to the patron it may happen also to be independent. And in that case where is the mischief to the public? Answer - None at all.

The incumbent being dependent on the patron pursues all along the line of conduct prescribed to him by the patron. That line of conduct is it throughout correct, such as is prescribed to him by a regard to the duties of his trust? /support in all good measures, and good motions, oppositive or corrective to all badness?/ In such case /On this supposition/ the arrangement is not merely not noxious - it is in a degree proportioned to the assiduity and talents of the incumbent beneficial to the public. Of any case that can happen this is the most desirable.

Now let the bond of dependence be of that boon[?] kind which is constituted by gratitude. For determining whether the arrangement be pernicious or beneficial to the State, the leading principles are still the same. His dependence being less strict, the line of his conduct admitting of the correspondent modifications /variations/. Sometimes on the independent side of probity and independence sometimes he may on the side of corrupt dependence. In either case the assiduity of his attendance admitts of as many degrees as there are days of sitting in the parliament, and multiplied by the number of the questions put to the vote in each day of sitting.
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    First then let the dependence thus constituted, the dependence of the incumbent Member on his parliamentary patron, be a state of strict dependence.

    It is useless to enquire, in what various ways a dependence of this sort may have been constituted. For illustration let us take the most simple case. A /Incumbent a/ younger son of a Peer or rich /opulent/ commoner, dependent on his father for the quantum of his fortune: patron, the father aforesaid.

    {by the supposition (how rarely soever exemplified) the father has not at the time of the presentation any such situation under the King, or looking towards the favour of the Crown, /King,/ as has the effect of placing him under the King in a situation of dependence. {But though at the moment in question in this sense independent, yet in the instance of this as of any other man the next moment may find him in a state of dependence.}}

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    When from a hand which (no matter how) has a seat in the house of Commons at command, that hand not being in a state of dependence under the Crown a man is placed /finds himself seated/ in that seat, in this case is there any thing of corrupt dependence or corruption? and if so /either/ (mischief being supposed a necessary consequence /concomitant/ of parliamentary corruption) is the quantity of mischief then[?] produced to the public greater or less than the quantity of mischief attached to the corrupt dependence of a Member on the King or a Minister /through a Ministry/ in possession or expectancy, as above?

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    The Member thus seated, does he pay a price for the appointment /this benefit/, or does he receive it without price?

    If without price, is the connection between this incumbent and his patron such as to place him /his conduct in this his office/ in a state of strict dependence on the patron, or in only that loose kind of dependence which as above may happen to be considered as constituted by the sense or obligation of Gratitude? (a)

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    ( ) If paying a price that price be such as is understood to be to a certain amount inferior to the market price, this is a compound case, and in so far as gratitude operates /is considered/ as a bond of dependence, he continues in a sort of dependence under the patron in a sort of dependence, the degree of which is determined by the amount of the abatement on the correct price.

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    15. In the character of an instrument of corruption, and efficient cause of corrupt dependence, the efficiency of an office endowed with pecuniary emolument, or power, or both, differs in some respects according as it is considered as being but in expectancy, or as being in actual possession, indefeasible or defeasible.

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