date

1819 May 25 Defence of | | Ballot
1819 May 25

Defence of | | Ballot

Caucussing

2. beneficial

10

1. Walsham[?]. 2. Whitlock[?]

Thus then by /in the/ recommending of a Candidate who {in the opinion of the Electors in general} were /on trial should prove/ on any account pre-eminently unfit, or even one who {in the opinion of the Electors in general} /that on trial/ should be found in a considerable degree below par, all who concurred or were regarded as concurring in the recommendation would see /behold/ a sure cause of the loss of their influence or what is the same thing in other words of their situation in this all-directing board. Among the members of it, suppose this or that one disposed to receive {and accordingly actually receiving} a bribe and in virtue of that bribe to give his recommendation in favour of a worthless Candidate, suppose this disposition /situation/ fully understood by one of the Candidates and in case of an adequate prospect of success, the Candidate fully prepared to give the bribe. Even Under these circumstances would the bribe be given? No. For by no recommendation which could be given by this one member would /could/ the effect be produced, to be produced a correspondent recommendation would need to be given by a majority or at the least by a large proportion of the other Members. As in the case of the firstmentioned member so in the case of each of these others, here there would be the necessity of a fresh bribe. But in no one of all these instances could the offer of any such bribe be made but there must be at the least two persons each of whom would have put his reputation in the power of the other: and though for his own sake each might during his own life persevere in forebearing to destroy the reputation of the other, yet upon his death the same interest no longer operating with the same force upon those who by intimacy with him would have been partakers in the secret, upon /thus on/ the death of the other party each party to the disreputable /scandalous/ contract would see the probable exposure of the shame.
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  • Title: [1819 May 25 Defence of | | Ballot]
    Description: 1819 May 25

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    I say, that if in the division concerning the comparative aptitude of different Candidates any very considerable inequality has place no prospect of success can be afforded by the bribe and therefore the expence of giving it will not be incurred. In other words a bribe will not be given for the purpose of procuring the Election of a Candidate who in common estimation is not fit, or even of one who is not in common estimation fit. For in that country such is the multitude of the Offices filled by Election (all offices in general with but few exceptions being thus filled) such is the multitude of the occasions on which the process comes to be repeated such on every /each/ occasion /and so universal/ the scrutiny which the competition causes to be made by the supporters of each Candidate into the character of every other, that among /of/ men who thus put themselves forward every one is known to every other. When of the men who are more or less known to us there is such an abundance, what can be your inducement to put all these aside and recommend to us this man of whom nobody knows any thing? – such would be the question openly or tacitly directly or indirectly but at any rate universally put by the supporters of the other Candidates to any such Members of the Caucus as on the supposition in question have ventured to give their /hazarded their/ recommendation to stake their reputation upon the aptitude of a person standing in a situation so open to suspicion. For so strange a proceeding there can not be any good cause – there can not be any other than a bad one.
  • Title: [1819 May 24 Defence of | | Ballot]
    Description: 1819 May 24

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    That in favour of a Candidate generally regarded either as positively speaking inapt, or negatively and comparatively speaking presenting no or[?] indication of inaptitude or such as in comparison of those afforded by this or that other Candidate is at no time probable: for in the opinion entertained of /in/ this /its/ aptitude in its aggregate capacity, depends the influence of the whole Caucus. By the concurrence of the majority in the recommendation of a Candidate generally regarded as absolutely or comparatively regarded as inapt, the influence of the /that same/ majority and thence of each member of it may be diminished.

    One case there is in which in a manner not altogether uninvested[?] with moral probability corruption on the force[?] may have place. One case and one only. This is – where, concerning comparative aptitude on the part of the several Candidates the judgment of the public at large presents itself as being without much inequality of the parts divided.

    But in this case, supposing corruption employed what does the utmost possible quantity of sensible evil amount to? Next to nothing. Towards giving effect to their choice, all that any one member of the Caucus can do, all that the whole Caucus put together can do /with the Electors/ is to give to the Electors /them/ to understand that in their judgment /opinion/ the Candidate they recommend is more fit for the Office than any other is. Well then upon the extent to which, among the Electors, the opinion has place that the Member in question that the whole Caucus taken together is fitter than any other person or persons are for forming the self-formed judgment in question, and thence for serving as guides to the Electors in forming their derivative judgment, and thus in a word recommending Candidates to their choice
  • Title: [1819 May 30 Disfranchising or Defence]
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    What must be acknowledged is, that even under the ballot, one circumstance there is by which the efficiency of it in the character of a preservative against bribery would be limited by this circumstance. The bribe might be so ordered, as not to be received but in case of Candidate on whose behalf for whose support it was given were returned.

    Under these circumstances, the efficiency of corruption in this form would naturally be, other circumstances equal in proportion to the smalness of the number of the Electors {by whose votes the choice were determined.} Suppose the number to a certain degree small, the bribe might be so large, that though the receipt of it were made dependent on this contingency, the nature of the contingency would not to such a degree diminish the value of the bribe, as to prevent the acceptance of it.

    Suppose the number to a certain degree large, the disrepute and danger remaining the same, and the time during which the secret /bargain/ might transpire being thus protracted the uncertainty of the benefit might in the eyes of the Elected render the bargain upon the whole an ineligible one

    But this cause of inefficiency applies only to the present system, and under the present system only to such boroughs as are close, or want not much of being so. In the case of Electoral districts of such amplitude as under radical reform all such districts would be, it would have little application: none at all under that shortlivedness by which in virtue of another feature of radical reform, the marketable value of seats could be so effectually reduced.