date

1819 July 3 Defence of | | Universal
1819 July 3

Defence of | | Universal against Ed. Review

II Indirect attacks

1

Thus much for the direct arguments: for the arguments addressed to the self-formed judgments of readers.

Now as to the indirect arguments: the arguments addressed to their derivative judgments: arguments which have for their object, the substracting /takes[?] off/ as much as may be from what is called the weight of any authority which I may be supposed capable of possessing: from the influence with which, in that way, my understanding may be supposed to act /exercise/ on the understandings of my readers.

As to any authority /weight/ with which it may happen in any instance my opinion as such may operate, if there be any such persons, I have declared it in print more than once, I am not of the number. Ipsedixitism, the foundation of most mens opinions and arguments in the field of morals including that of morals, is the instrument against which ever since I began to form an opinion I have had to fight and which {by} pride and shame {I} have ever been prevented from attempting to take /sufficed to prevent me from ever taking/ in hand. I should be covered with shame if any passage could be /were ever/ shewn to me in which I had given any opinion of my own as a reason for itself. But some it appears there are by whom it is regarded in that light: some who from my self-formed judgment are supposed to have a tendency to deduce a derivative judgment for their own use. By the Receiver in question such must have been the opinion /notice/ formed the suspicion at least entertained: for the considera[?] and gentleness so conspicuous on every page excludes all suspicion of every design of which personal ill-will is the source – of any endeavour or wish to wound /gall/ in any degree the feelings of the individual spoken of.

The charges /insinuations/ /imputations/ spoken employed for this purpose seem reducible to these two heads

1. That my habits of life I am rendered comparatively incompetent for /to/ an inquiry such as that in question

2. That the style in which on this occasion I have written has something uncouth in it and repulsive

3. That in the hope of the praise of originality, I have employed new words of my own coining for giving expression to old ideas which might more advantageously be expressed by words already in common use.
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    I mention thus much – I go /travel/ with the more freedom /latitude/ in this line

    of argument – that it may be seen whether any prepossession – any ill humour,

    any precipitancy – adherence to formerly declared opinions has had any share in

    the production of the sentiments here expressed – or rather of the arguments

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    /may be commensurate to/ make by their intrinsic weight. As to opinion – of that

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    each case, as it presents itself at the time.