date

1819 Aug. 28 Defence against Ed. Review
1819 Aug. 28

Defence against Ed. Review

Beginning

5

Of the power of the ruling few that part which is in the hands of the King is in the hands of the possessors of Seals: of seals in the two Houses of Parliament: more especially of the House of Commons in which resides the principal share of the power, the deficiency in power being made up in the other House by dignity, and that together with the power hereditary: and among the possessors of seats in the House of Commons a great number perhaps the greater being Members of the House of Lords, hence of the aggregate power the greatest proportion is at all times in the Members of the House of Lords, and thus it is by that division /portion/ of the ruling few whose interest interest is most constantly and permanently opposite to that of the subject many that the lot of those over whom the power is exercised is determined.

To the seats, as such, no immediate pecuniary profit is in either House attached: on the contrary in the House of Commons, in so far as those seats are in reality what in shew and formal discourse they all are, open to competition, the acquisition of them is loaded /burthened/ with considerable expence: the price current, setting aside casual causes of abatement, £1,000 a year: or £5,000 once paid for the seven possible years, reduced by casualties to about five.

But it is by means of the power conferred by the unlucrative offices called seats, that the other offices called offices are obtained: and those offices are almost all lucrative: some of them to a degree unknown even in absolute Monarchies: and of these offices, though some can not, the most lucrative may and of course are held by the possessors of seats: and all the rest are as above potentially at the disposal of the Monarch, actually disposed of by him or the possessors of seats, as they can respectively agree.
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    The holders of those offices to which the greatest share of power is attached, are stiled Members of Administration, and in the aggregate are called the Ministry: and that all punishment in case of abuse of the powers of office may be plainly impossible, are holders likewise of seats.

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    Being descended some of them, from some of those of whom under Charles the 2 d the Opposition was composed, and who had a principal share in the Revolution by which his immediate successor was dethroned, they commonly as a means of /for a ground of/ obtaining popular favour, make profession of a congeniality of opinions and affections with those of their ancestors.

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