date

1819 July 31 Defence &c Disfranchisement
1819 July 31

Defence &c Disfranchisement

2. Transference to populous towns

1

Remains the /any/ plan, according to which the seats of the extinguished boroughs would be transferred /transference would be made/ to the as yet unrepresented populous towns. Of this, untill the qualification required, and thence the numbers and condition and numbers of the voters be /Electors are/ determined no very /sufficiently/ precise conception can be formed of it, nor therefore any sufficiently precise judgment pronounced in relation to it. What is more, so extreme it should seem is the improbability of its being adopted, that the time and space necessary for the /any full/ examination of it can scarcely hope for payment.

Inadequacy is an objection /a character/ which applies to it in equal degree with the other mode of transference. But be the measure what it will long as any real quantity of good be it ever so minute will be done by a measure, inadequacy can never form a valid ground of objection to it.

{If the effect of it be to seat in the House any one /though it were no more than a single/ Member whose interest and correspondent assistance are on the side of the universal interest, here is so much good.}

Supposing the effect of it to add, though it were no more than one, to the number of Members whose interest and corresponding /correspondent/ affections are in /on the side of/ unison with the universal interest, here will be so much gained /good/. But whether it does so may depend upon the qualification required, in addition to local circumstances: its usefulness will depend upon the qualification required, because ballot being supposed out of the question it will depend upon the proportion between those /the free/ votes that such votes as are free and such as are as are not so as are engaged by sinister influence

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  • Title: [1819 July 31 Defence of Ballot &c]
    Description: 1819 July 31

    Defence of Ballot &c Disfranchisement

    Transference to populous towns

    4

    All things considered, supposing this mode of transference put to the vote, the result seems to be that those who have at heart the universal interest will do well to give their votes in favour of it: insomuch as, as far as it goes, it presents a chance of doing some little good, and no danger of doing /producing/ preponderant evil in any shape. Compared with the mode of transference to Country districts, it seems for the reasons already given decidedly preferable: and if proposed by itself, even in that case it seems difficult to say on what ground a person sincerely attached to the universal interest can /could/ forbear voting in favour of it.

    But, even admitting that every person sincerely attached to the universal interest will give a vote in favour of it, it follows not that of those who do give their votes a{gainst it} in favour of it, so much as a single one is really attached to the universal interest. For its inadequacy not only to any such purpose as that of effecting any comprehensive reform of applying any sufficient remedy to the existing evils, or even of producing any sensible change in the state of the representation will be rendered manifest to every one who thinks it worth while to look into the particulars of that state. On this occasion as well as any other Of any and every such person /voter/ the object may therefore be – for the sake of the particular, though extensive sinister interest in which his personal interest is included, to throw one obstacle in the way of reform, by propagating a persuasion that by this insufficient measure the great object will be sufficiently attained, and for the sake of his own purely personal interest to receive unmerited popularity in return for a service at best but slight, and which may never have been intended, and which at any rate involves not a particle of self-sacrifice. But good intention requires and admitts of ulterior proofs. By a vote against radical reform it would be effectually disproved.
  • Title: [1818 July 31 Defence of Ballot &c]
    Description: 1818 July 31

    Defence of Ballot &c Disfranchisement

    2. Transference to populous towns

    2

    On this /that/ occasion, ballot, by which alone freedom can be secured to all votes being supposed to be out of the question, universal suffrage may in the situation in question be as far as from being desirable, as from being probably obtainable. Supposing it ever obtained, it seems scarcely possible to say, unless the qualification required and thence the number of persons entitled to vote were previously determined whether /how far/ it would be productive of good. Suppose the number of votes the direction of which would be determined by sinister influence – suppose this number considerably greater than the number of those by whom sinister influence would be effectively resisted, its tendency as to the main[?] point[?] would assuredly /unquestionably/ be beneficial, in the contrary case, the matter in respect of purity and legitimacy would not be minded, it would remain in[?] the same condition as at present.

    The only case in /supposition on/ which any beneficial change would be the effect of it is this – that in consequence of it the {Electors who to the effective will /desire/ of giving /to/ their votes in a direction conformable to the universal interest added the faculty of forming a right judgment respecting that direction}

    number of the Electors qualified in all points {of appropriate aptitude} for voting in conformity to the universal interest would exceed /exceeded/ /outnumbered/ the number of those who were all so qualified: This they might do, although if any portion less than the majority were determined either by sinister influence or by unsound judgment; if by /in so far as the undesirable part who had for its cause/ unsound judgment alone, the error would not be /evil might still be/ irreparable /incurable/ /removable/: not /scarcely/ so in so /scarcely so/ far as it had sinister influence for its cause.

    Suppose no qualification required – in other words suppose universal suffrage the principle by which the right of voting has been determined, it seems difficult to be assured that the majority of the votes would not be determined by sinister influence. To the dominion of the Magistrates as such the votes of all Electors who at the time were either in a state of actual

    pauperism
  • Title: [1819 July 31 Defence of Ballot &c]
    Description: 1819 July 31

    Defence of Ballot &c Disfranchisement

    2. Transference to populous towns

    3

    pauperism or in contemplation/under any apprehension/ of becoming so would of course be subject on this as on other points be subjected: to the dominion of their respective employers, whether Magistrates or not would be subjected the votes of all such Electors as were respectively dependent for their employment, on such persons as at the time were their employers.

    Universal suffrage however is indeed a principle which one may be perfectly assured would not even on so small and inefficient /inadequate/ a scale be adopted. Still however {the number of} those to whose votes while given in the open mode a direction adverse to the universal interest would be given either by sinister interest or by misjudgment would be but too likely to be in such numbers as to determine the Election: and suppose this the case, though in this shape no evil so neither would any good be produced by the transference. On the other side of the account of profit and loss would stand the collateral Election evils: consisting in this case chiefly in the danger of violence and injury to person and property: but these may be considered as sufficiently counteracted by the additional opportunities of appropriate instruction afforded to the lower orders.

    If the effect of it were in any degree to operate in the character of an obstacle to radical and /or other/ efficient reform, here would be a serious evil attached to it. But no evil in this shape presents itself as attached to it. Yes, if of the Members elected upon this partial plan the seats would be endangered by a plan of all-comprehensive reform. But this would not be the case: for upon the plan of radical and all-comprehensive reform the number of seats belonging to the most populous towns would not be less than upon the plan here in question but greater.