date

1818 July 31 Defence of Ballot &c
1818 July 31

Defence of Ballot &c Disfranchisement

2. Transference to populous towns

2

On this /that/ occasion, ballot, by which alone freedom can be secured to all votes being supposed to be out of the question, universal suffrage may in the situation in question be as far as from being desirable, as from being probably obtainable. Supposing it ever obtained, it seems scarcely possible to say, unless the qualification required and thence the number of persons entitled to vote were previously determined whether /how far/ it would be productive of good. Suppose the number of votes the direction of which would be determined by sinister influence – suppose this number considerably greater than the number of those by whom sinister influence would be effectively resisted, its tendency as to the main[?] point[?] would assuredly /unquestionably/ be beneficial, in the contrary case, the matter in respect of purity and legitimacy would not be minded, it would remain in[?] the same condition as at present.

The only case in /supposition on/ which any beneficial change would be the effect of it is this – that in consequence of it the {Electors who to the effective will /desire/ of giving /to/ their votes in a direction conformable to the universal interest added the faculty of forming a right judgment respecting that direction}

number of the Electors qualified in all points {of appropriate aptitude} for voting in conformity to the universal interest would exceed /exceeded/ /outnumbered/ the number of those who were all so qualified: This they might do, although if any portion less than the majority were determined either by sinister influence or by unsound judgment; if by /in so far as the undesirable part who had for its cause/ unsound judgment alone, the error would not be /evil might still be/ irreparable /incurable/ /removable/: not /scarcely/ so in so /scarcely so/ far as it had sinister influence for its cause.

Suppose no qualification required – in other words suppose universal suffrage the principle by which the right of voting has been determined, it seems difficult to be assured that the majority of the votes would not be determined by sinister influence. To the dominion of the Magistrates as such the votes of all Electors who at the time were either in a state of actual

pauperism
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  • Title: [1819 July 31 Defence &c Disfranchisement]
    Description: 1819 July 31

    Defence &c Disfranchisement

    2. Transference to populous towns

    1

    Remains the /any/ plan, according to which the seats of the extinguished boroughs would be transferred /transference would be made/ to the as yet unrepresented populous towns. Of this, untill the qualification required, and thence the numbers and condition and numbers of the voters be /Electors are/ determined no very /sufficiently/ precise conception can be formed of it, nor therefore any sufficiently precise judgment pronounced in relation to it. What is more, so extreme it should seem is the improbability of its being adopted, that the time and space necessary for the /any full/ examination of it can scarcely hope for payment.

    Inadequacy is an objection /a character/ which applies to it in equal degree with the other mode of transference. But be the measure what it will long as any real quantity of good be it ever so minute will be done by a measure, inadequacy can never form a valid ground of objection to it.

    {If the effect of it be to seat in the House any one /though it were no more than a single/ Member whose interest and correspondent assistance are on the side of the universal interest, here is so much good.}

    Supposing the effect of it to add, though it were no more than one, to the number of Members whose interest and corresponding /correspondent/ affections are in /on the side of/ unison with the universal interest, here will be so much gained /good/. But whether it does so may depend upon the qualification required, in addition to local circumstances: its usefulness will depend upon the qualification required, because ballot being supposed out of the question it will depend upon the proportion between those /the free/ votes that such votes as are free and such as are as are not so as are engaged by sinister influence

    On
  • Title: [12 Aug 1809 Parl Reform Qualification]
    Description: 12 Aug 1809

    Parl Reform Qualification of Electors

    Case in which all Electors by pursuing each his own interest (in respect of the

    choice of Representative) might yet counteract the interest of the whole candidate is

    a rule powerful – each Elector so poor that he is forced to give up his lasting to

    his […?] interests, the Candidate bribes him with his own money.

    Remedy – Check the duration of Representatives situation so short that viz[?] that it

    shall not be worth his while to employ bribery

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    constantly and habitually sacrificed. No Helots[?] – No slaves &c

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    1. Keeping the matter of bribery in excess out of the hands of the Commons this is

    now[?] become impossible

    2. Keeping it from being applied to the Judges over […?] in such manner as to

    influence their judicial conduct: this the only recourse.

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    2. Duration of Parliament short – bribery not worth while

    3. Voting epistolary: thence occasion of expence over portion for bribery

    /corruptive/ expence lessened

    4. Voting by ballot: the /each man’s/ right being previously established

    5. Annuality: the seat not worth bribing for.

    On the supposition of universal suffrage each Elector could not do wrong if

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    he pursued his own interest and that his permanent interest – his having a a compleat

    and correct conception of that interest.

    Wealth comes under consideration

    1. as being possessed or receivable by an Elector.

    2. as being possessed by a person possessing an influence either over the will or the

    understanding of an Elector.

    When an Elector feels himself incapable of forming any judgment on the merits of a

    Candidate any the slightest neat[?] packet of personal advantage will be sufficient

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    { Corruption from /by/ individuals much less mischievous than d o

    by the Crown.

    {Bribery} /Corruption/ of Electors by the Crown is no further of mischievous than as

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    but this result may be considered as certain

    Corruption of Electors by individuals is no further mischievous than as it

    determines them to choose a representative who would be comparatively unfit either by

    want of probity or intelligence

    A representative can never of himself produce in parliament any mischievous result,

    to do so he must have on the question in question a majority on his side.

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    supposed by the crown contribute to the success of that measure but he may moreover

    get a measure in which he has a sinister interest carried for him by the Crown. }

    {The only corruption therefore which is seriously formidable is that in which

    mediately or immediately the Crown is the corrupter.}

    {Duration short loses.

    1. Making bribery not worth a lot (viz. occasional but the Crown is a permanent

    briber)

    2. Preservation of Members probity Not worth while to plan

    the […?] of a Member, when the fellow[?] may be ousted from it the next year

    3. Promoting intelligence on the part of Members, by making them ashamed of […?]

    & silent votes.

    4. In case of frequent change producing competition, emulating[?] intent[?]

    5. Securing Members attendance.}

    In the hands of an electors advisor, wealth considered as an index of superior

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    In the case of Electors probity is no otherwise of use viz. to himself as to that of

    fellow subjects – than in so far as it is accompanied by intelligence in so far as he

    acts under the guidance of intelligence

    The intelligence under the guidance of which he acts may be his own or borrowed.

    In so far as he is free and pure

    an Elector, if conscious of inability to judge for himself will borrow a judgment of

    the person or persons whom he looks upon as best qualified to give it

    Instruction is of no […?] where men are steeled against it by sinister interest

    If Elenboro’ and Percival had their will there would be no

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    purpose is but suspended.

    Voting Epistolary

    Advantages

    1. Electors in many districts may vote in all without trouble or expence.
  • Title: [1818 April 8 Parl. Reform Bill]
    Description: 1818 April 8

    Parl. Reform Bill

    Reasons

    III Electors Who

    Vote conferring Qualification

    2. Intellectuality

    5

    5

    2. Secondly and lastly as to intellectual aptitude.

    {Here it is that the shoe most pinches: or rather it is in this point it is and no other that the shoe pinches.} On this point must necessarily bear whatsoever argument can in the shape of reason - of genuine reason pure of fallacy - be adduced in opposition to the plan here proposed {for the arrangement /distribution/ of the powers of government}.

    Suppose /Take/ for argument sake on the one hand the whole number of the persons on whom under the existing system the filling of the whole number of seats depends: taking for this purpose not the persons by whom the votes are given, but the persons by whose influence respectively the direction given to those same votes is determined: add together the portions or degrees of appropriate intellectual aptitude possessed by these several persons: this gives the sum of intellectual aptitude possessed by this class of persons: divide /taking/ the number which represents this sum divide it by the number of those same portions: the quotient gives the average degree of the aptitude of a person belonging to this class.

    This same operation perform /apply/ now to each of the class of persons who on the here proposed plan of virtually universal suffrage would be entitled to votes. Average intellectual aptitude of a voter under the existing system: average intellectual aptitude of a voter under the system of universal suffrage: these are the two quantities between which for the purpose[?] in question the comparison would be to be made.

    Note (a)

    On this point, taking for the purpose in question the persons by whom the direction was given to the votes and not (where there is a difference) the persons by whom the votes are given, is - it will not be disputed - not only the fair course, but the course by far the most favourable to the existing system, so far as concerns the pretensions to appropriate intellectual aptitude.