date

[mainly in copyist’s hand] 1819 Nov
[mainly in copyist’s hand]

1819 Nov 9.

Bentham Radical

§.1. Seats & Districts

7

But, sooner or later, a result that seems by no means improbable, is – that all such expedients would prove ineffectual: and this in such sort, that a reduction in the numbers would be felt to be absolutely indispensable. In this case the plan here proposed would afford a very simple mode. Throughout the whole expanse of Territory, put two or more contiguous Districts together: this done, let the thus consolidated Districts choose but one Member each, instead of two. The votes of all the voters would in this case be all collected into one Election district office instead of the two.

As to probability of adoption, on the part of the population of the House, for an operation of this sort no great degree of promptitude could with any colour of reason be looked for: it is from the population of the Country, and that quarter alone, if from any, that any such promptitude could be exhibited. Nor even from that quarter does it seem probable that the commencement of any measures, having for their object the application of such a remedy, would take place, till the inconvenience had already risen to a serious height. Why? Because, as in the House, each Member’s chance of returning to his Seat would upon an average be reduced to half its value, so among the Electors would each man’s vote be apt to appear to be: though, upon reflection he might see, that what he lost by the encreased number of the tickets, he gained by the encreased value of the prize.

For the purpose of doing, what the nature of the case admitts of doing in the first instance, towards lessening the difficulty of a condensation, the demand for which is liable to become so imperious, an expedient that might be employed at the outset, is the giving as the 658 Districts are marked out, intimation what two or more Districts may when the time comes, be most conveniently laid together.
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