date

1819 Sept. 18 Parl. Reform Bill
1819 Sept. 18

Parl. Reform Bill

Reasons

§.9. Election Process

Suffrage secret why

11

{On the other hand, a possible case, it is true, is this. A Voter whose wish it is to give his vote in favour of a certain candidate is made by external influence to give his vote against that candidate. But the external influence is the influence of the public at large: it is the influence of the popular or moral sanction: it is the influence of public opinion, by which the candidate in whose favour it would have been his wish to give his vote, is no unfit Candidate. To such a deputy unfit is this unworthy candidate, that By this public opinion, every Voter who /should/ gives a vote in his favour is /would be/ covered with shame. By the open mode here then not only is the public evil prevented but also /moreover/ a private one – and /the/ evil to the individual.

Answer. As to the public evil, That the direction taken by public opinion and thence by the force of the popular or moral sanction is generally speaking /upon the whole/ more likely to be conformable than unconformable to the universal interest is admitted. But that the free will with which in the case in question it operates is likely to be equal to the greatest force with which in this or that same sinister direction this or that private influence will in general be operating, this is denied.

Such is the /in this case is the known/ uncertainty of man’s genuine wishes, so liable to be turned about in all directions by unknown causes, and at the same time so overwhelming and irresistible is the external force of the influence liable on that occasion to be applied, that the quantity of sufferance liable to be sustained /experienced/ from this cause in the shape of shame by a man in consequence of his being known to have given his Vote in favour of this or that candidate, in how great a degree and how generally so ever regarded as unfit, is in comparison of that which is liable to be experienced from those other sources, is generally speaking very inconsiderable and ineffective.}
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  • Title: [Sep 1809 Parl y Reform 2 o]
    Description: Sep 1809

    Parl y Reform

    2 o

    Ch.1. Electors Voting

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    5

    What he thinks the least[?] shown[?] he will think the public most The large public instead[?] [...?] him from a [...?] [...?] he is joined by a sufficient number[?]

    Remains the influence of public opinion - in other words of the moral or popular sanction.+

    But in the present instance, great and salutary as its influence is in most /almost all/ others, it is not in the nature of this principle to be of any effect or use.

    What is desired is that he should make that choice which in his eyes is the most proper one: in other words that choice which to his conception is most likely to be conducive to his own interests for in the absence of all sinister influence as above described nothing more or better is expected or desired at his hands.

    But this is exactly the sort of choice which he is disposed to make independently of this moral sanction made[?] without his being /standing/ exposed to the force of it: his standing exposed to the force of it is therefore what to this purpose can not be of any use.

    For the seat in question Two candidates present themselves. Under the system of secrecy he will vote for that one of them whose conduct promises in his eyes /expectation of it/ to be most conducive to his /the Electors/ interest, that is to what he regards as the interest of the whole community: for by the supposition he is not /does not stand/ exposed to the action of any other interest.

    Now what can the force of the moral or popular sanction. What can the eye of the public do more for him towards securing[?] the aptitude of his choice?

    Of the two candidates suppose one eminently[?] /decidedly/ fit to be a member, the other as eminently[?] /decidedly/ unfit. What even in this case can the public eye do more than secrecy would do towards securing the vote in favour of the fit candidate. Happen /Let/ his choice to fall /have fallen/ in favour of the unfit one; but since /forasmuch as/ it has, the probability is that in looking upon him as the fittest in his own opinion, he looked upon him as fittest likewise in the opinion of the public: for what to himself seems right what should lead him to consider as being in the opinion of the public other than right?

    + Introd.

    Dum[?]
  • Title: [1819 Sept. 18 Parl Reform Bill]
    Description: 1819 Sept. 18

    Parl Reform Bill

    Reasons

    §.9. Election Process

    Suffrage secret why

    Analysis

    10

    If he does not yield to it /to the intimidative force/, either the evil apprehended by him is actually made to befall him or it is not. If it is, here then whatever the amount and shape of it here is so much evil that in consequence of the preference given to the open over the secret mode actually takes place: say evil of sufferance, still there may remain and commonly will remain an evil, and that a very serious one, the fear, the apprehension of being made to sustain this same evil of actual sufferance. A tradesman suppose has a hundred customers, whose wishes, as he knows, all concurr in favour of a certain Candidate: the voter gives his vote against that candidate. These same customers may or may not any or all of them give him subsequently to this his vote less of their custom than they did before. But be this as it may, what they would do is al all times more than he can know: here then is a continual stream of anxiety flowing into his breast from all these hundred sources.

    Another thing. So far /If/ as the direction in which the influence operates is not only conformable to the direction which the wish of the voter would take were there no such influence but universally known to be so, the influence as above observed is of no effect, and in this open mode every thing is upon the same footing as if it were in the secret mode. True: but this is what can not in any instance be certainly known to any body. What is the consequence? that, in many instances, the sinister influence to the operation /action/ of which the voter stands by his situation exposed being visible to all eyes, the consequence is that while acting freely /with perfect/, a man is generally supposed /regarded/ supposed /regarded/ by an indefinite number of persons, as acting in conformity to such external influence as having been either bribed or intimidated or both at once.
  • Title: [1819 Oct. 5 Parl. Reform Bill]
    Description: 1819 Oct. 5

    Parl. Reform Bill

    Reasons

    §.5 Election Apparatus

    §.8 Election how

    Art. Secresy

    5

    5

    5

    In the open mode, the will of the Elector is exposed to the influence of will in both kinds at the hands of all persons in whose power it may be to cause him to receive evil in any shape, or to cause him to receive good in any shape, and to the number of persons so circumstanced, there is no certain limit: nor yet to the quantity of evil and of good which amongst them it may be in their power, as also in their inclination to cause him to receive: nor therefore to the force with which this sinister influence – for such surely it may be called – is capable of being made to operate.

    In the secret mode he may be, {and is of course} {compleatly and effectually} preserved from all influence of the intimidative kind. For not having any possibility of knowing in whose favour a Voter has given his vote, neither Candidate nor Candidate’s friend nor any other man can have motive or inclination to cause him to receive evil in any shape on that account /for that cause/: the evil he can not but see[?] may be just as likely to fall on a friend as on an enemy. From other sources a man /candidate/ may have reason in abundance for concluding the voter to be an adversary: but none at all from his vote.

    In the secret mode Voters may /will/ in great measure be preserved from influence of the corruptive kind For to the exercise of influence in this kind expence is for the most part necessary: and as in other cases so in this expence will generally speaking not be incurred without a reasonable certainty of an equivalent. By secresy of suffrage alone against the effect of influence in this kind freedom of suffrage would therefore in great measure be prevented /preserved/: namely in the same way that /by the operation of the same causes by which/ influence of the intimidative kind would so effectually be {prevent} preserved.