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1819 Oct. 3
Parl. Reform Bill
Reasons
§.5 Election Apparatus
§.8. Election how
Secrecy
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evil, at the hands of persons to whose wishes the voter in question were adverse: good at the hands of persons to whose wishes those same votes were unconformable.
2. Under the secret mode no such undesirable effect could have taken place. Why? Because of the persons /whole number of the voters/ {by whom appre}hensions as above could not but be entertained votes were given in favour of the successful Candidate lest in the event of their voting and thence of /in whose instance the votes given by them in favour of the successful Candidate had no other cause than either their expectation of some good in the event of their giving that direction to their votes, or some evil in the event of their not giving that direction to their votes, there could not have been one by whom under the secret system his vote would have been given on that side. For Why? because in that case, it not being known in any instance which way a man had given his vote, neither qualificatory[?] vote, neither the cause of the good in the one case, nor that of the evil in the other could /would/ have had existence./
In so far as it was by fear of eventual evil that the success of M r Lamb, as above was produced, it is by what is called intimidation or terrorism that it was produced: in so far as it was by hope of eventual good, it is by what is called bribery or by corruption in some other shape that it was produced.
It stands asserted in print, that on M r Lambs side towards the production of the effect, sinister influence in both those ways was and but too effectually employed: that by his friends, expectation of good in various shapes from their hands was held out to Electors in the event of their voting on his side: evil in various shapes in the event of their not voting on his side. Not that in the situation on question to the production of expectation to the effect in question to a greater or less extent, any express intimation, of eventual intention is ever necessary. To a greater or less extent the bare contemplation of the situation is quite sufficient to produce the inference: no mind so ill informed or so much as not to be continually in the habit of deducing it.
In the secret mode, in neither of those shapes could sinister influence have been employed. Why? because neither the intimidation nor the corruption could have found an object to apply itself to a mark to fix itself upon. Reward will not be offered /given/ where it is not possible to know that service has been rendered: punishment will not be threatened where it is not possible to know that transgression has had place.
If there be any such thing as a proposition incapable of being controverted with any colour of truth, this then must be of the number: namely that of every person by whom the open mode is advocated, it is the wish, that terrorism and corruption, one or both of those engines, should be employed: and that accordingly, Miselection, to whatever extent it is capable of being carried by those causes – Miselection, and thence Misgovernment – should have place.
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Title: [1819 Oct. 4 Parl Reform Bill]Description: 1819 Oct. 4 Parl Reform Bill Reasons ult o §.5 Election App §.8 Election how 2 Now then note /As to conformity between vote and wish, note/ how the case stands as between the open mode of voting and the secret mode. In the open mode no man can say to what extent the vote given may be unaccompanied by any corresponding wish. Without any wish in favour of the Candidate voted for or even in repugnancy /spite/ of the […?] in opposition to the most anxious wish that he may not succeed, a vote in favour of that same Candidate may as every body knows, on every such occasion be produced by any one of a variety of causes. Among These causes are, as every one knows 1. fear of eventual evil in any number out of an infinite variety of shapes at the hands of the Candidates and his friends: 2. hope of eventual good at those same hands: evil with reference to the private interest of the voter: good with reference to the same private interest: fear of eventual evil in what event? in the event of his co voters giving /omitting/ to /give/ to his vote a direction conformable to their wishes: {the evil will then be as so much punishment for his transgression in acting in opposition to their wishes:} fear of eventual good in what event? in the event of his giving to his vote the direction conformable to their wishes: {the good will thus be as or[?] much reward for the service rendered by the giving to his vote the direction conformable to their wishes}
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Title: [+ 1819 Oct. 3 Parl. Reform Bill]Description: + 1819 Oct. 3 Parl. Reform Bill §.5. Election Apparatus §.8. Election, how Art | | Secrecy 4 For clearness take an example. On the occasion of the last Election for Westminster, of two Candidates, the Honourable George Lamb and M r John Cam Hobhouse, the former succeeded, the latter failed. On that occasion Among all those by whom the choice so made was approved, can there have have been so much as one, who, on any occasion would have professed to ground such an approbation on any other supposition than this – namely, that, on the side of the successful Candidate the votes given in conformity to the wishes of the respective voters were more numerous than on the side of the unsuccessful candidate? Assuredly not: if so, then, by all persons by whom that choice was approved, it could not but have been admitted, that on the opposite supposition – the evil of Miselection, as above described would have had place. Now then in this state of things, how stands the question of superior fitness as between the open and the secret mode? 1. In the open mode, easily to an indefinite extent the direction given to the votes may have been opposite to that pointed to by the wishes of the voters. Why? because in that mode causes more than one have place, any one of which is in its nature capable of being abundantly sufficient for the production of that undesirable effect: namely expectation of of eventual evil, and expectation of eventual good: evil
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Title: [1818 April 28 + §.10 Parl. Reform]Description: 1818 April 28 + §.10 Parl. Reform Bill Reasons §.8 Election how Mode of Voting Reasons 1 1 ☞ 12 Oct. 1819. Rewrite this with the text before you. Question | | Why not admitt of the mode of voting by letter. (a) Answer. 1. Because in this mode neither secrecy nor thence[?] freedom could be so effectually preserved. 2. Because the timely ascertainment of the number of persons entitled to vote in the several districts, and thence the necessary provision for the receipt of their votes could not so well be made 3. Because if in this case the qualification by past residence were admitted and exacted, there would be but a small number of instances comparatively speaking, in which the demand for the reception /admission/ of this mode of voting would have place 4. Because if either to the exclusion of, or in conjunction with, the qualification by residence qualification by property or by payment of taxes were admitted, a door would be open to { inequality} and disorder /nullity/ by unexpected /and unprovided for/ inundation of votes, in numbers unexpected and unprovided for. 5. Because unless complication delay, vexation and expence in abundance were employed for the exclusion of the inconvenience /evil/, one and the same person might by voting letters sent to different districts, give instead of that single vote which alone is consistent with Equality of Representation, give in one and the same Election an indefinite /unlimited/ number of votes. Note (a) (a) In my Plan of Parliamentary in conjunction with the voting by ballot voting by letter was proposed. By a nearer /closer/ view taken of the subject as above after the mode of voting by ballot had been matured, the comparative impropriety of the mode of voting by letter was brought to light as above. See Plan pages 6. 7.
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