date

1819 Oct. 4 Parl. Reform Bill
1819 Oct. 4

Parl. Reform Bill

Reasons ult o

§.5 Election apparatus

§.8. Election how

4

Note (a[?])?

Some cases /One case/ it is true there are in which the secret mode is not of itself capable of providing adequate /full/ security against the evil in question; against the evil which has place in so far as /where/ the direction given to the vote is not accompanied by a wish pointing in that same direction: meaning always a wish that wish being one /the same/ that would have been entertained without the expectation of any good as eventually about to accrue to him other than the good consisting in the service done by a good Election choice to the universal interest, and thence to his share in that same universal interest.

Such is the case for example where the good administered the bribe (for such in this case it is) given before the delivery of the vote: the confidence being in the voters gratitude, or in his sense of honour, that is his fear of reproach at certain hands on the ground of perfidy. But in /for/ this case in addition to secrecy of suffrage other securities are here provided: securities which havens but for secrecy of suffrage would be altogether inadequate. See[?]

And in comparison of the evil produced by terrorism – meaning the mischief in the shape of Miselection, over and above all the evil produced in those other shapes that will be seen, the utmost evil that can be produced by bribery and corruption will be seen to be inconsiderable.

Not that in this case though to the vote given the wishes entertained by the voter may at the time of voting have been perfectly conformable, yet in this case the wishes to which it is conformable are not the wishes that would have had place had it not been for the bribe whereas /but/

{The supposition is – the only supposition upon which the system of election is ever endeavoured to be justified – the supposition is that the wish of the Elector is that it is upon the fittest Candidate that /should always be he on whom/ the choice may fall: the fittest that is the one who is likely to render most service to the universal interest and thence to the Elector’s share in that same universal interest. But by no person can it be imagined that by the private benefit so rendered to the individual a man is constituted the very man likely to render in the greatest degree of perfection that public service. (With J.B.s proof of aptitude from relick[?])}
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  • Title: [1819 Oct. 4 Parl Reform Bill]
    Description: 1819 Oct. 4

    Parl Reform Bill

    Reasons ult o

    §.5 Election App

    §.8 Election how

    2

    Now then note /As to conformity between vote and wish, note/ how the case stands as between the open mode of voting and the secret mode.

    In the open mode no man can say to what extent the vote given may be unaccompanied by any corresponding wish. Without any wish in favour of the Candidate voted for or even in repugnancy /spite/ of the […?] in opposition to the most anxious wish that he may not succeed, a vote in favour of that same Candidate may as every body knows, on every such occasion be produced by any one of a variety of causes.

    Among These causes are, as every one knows 1. fear of eventual evil in any number out of an infinite variety of shapes at the hands of the Candidates and his friends: 2. hope of eventual good at those same hands: evil with reference to the private interest of the voter: good with reference to the same private interest: fear of eventual evil in what event? in the event of his co voters giving /omitting/ to /give/ to his vote a direction conformable to their wishes: {the evil will then be as so much punishment for his transgression in acting in opposition to their wishes:} fear of eventual good in what event? in the event of his giving to his vote the direction conformable to their wishes: {the good will thus be as or[?] much reward for the service rendered by the giving to his vote the direction conformable to their wishes}
  • Title: [1819 Sept. 18 Parl. Reform Bill]
    Description: 1819 Sept. 18

    Parl. Reform Bill

    Reasons

    §.9. Election Process

    Suffrage secret why

    11

    {On the other hand, a possible case, it is true, is this. A Voter whose wish it is to give his vote in favour of a certain candidate is made by external influence to give his vote against that candidate. But the external influence is the influence of the public at large: it is the influence of the popular or moral sanction: it is the influence of public opinion, by which the candidate in whose favour it would have been his wish to give his vote, is no unfit Candidate. To such a deputy unfit is this unworthy candidate, that By this public opinion, every Voter who /should/ gives a vote in his favour is /would be/ covered with shame. By the open mode here then not only is the public evil prevented but also /moreover/ a private one – and /the/ evil to the individual.

    Answer. As to the public evil, That the direction taken by public opinion and thence by the force of the popular or moral sanction is generally speaking /upon the whole/ more likely to be conformable than unconformable to the universal interest is admitted. But that the free will with which in the case in question it operates is likely to be equal to the greatest force with which in this or that same sinister direction this or that private influence will in general be operating, this is denied.

    Such is the /in this case is the known/ uncertainty of man’s genuine wishes, so liable to be turned about in all directions by unknown causes, and at the same time so overwhelming and irresistible is the external force of the influence liable on that occasion to be applied, that the quantity of sufferance liable to be sustained /experienced/ from this cause in the shape of shame by a man in consequence of his being known to have given his Vote in favour of this or that candidate, in how great a degree and how generally so ever regarded as unfit, is in comparison of that which is liable to be experienced from those other sources, is generally speaking very inconsiderable and ineffective.}
  • Title: [1819 Sept. 18 Parl. Reform Bill]
    Description: 1819 Sept. 18

    Parl. Reform Bill

    Reasons

    §.9. Election Process

    Suffrage secret why.

    7

    Now as to the evil liable to be produced for /on the occasion in question by/ want of secresy of /in/ suffrage

    1 In the first place, in many instances the wish which by the supposition ought in every instance to take effect this wish /does/ in many instances to a vast extent in an incalculable proportion fails of taking effect: instead of the wish guided by the interest of the individual by whom the vote is given the wish which takes effect is the wish of some other individual by the influence of whose will the voter is induced to sacrifice what would otherwise have been a wish: here then is an evil which is such to the public which is such with reference to the universal interest: the interest served an interest different /which differs/ from the universal interest, and to which the universal interest is sacrificed.

    When inquiry comes to be made whose /of what person it is/ the foreign wish, and thence the interest, which by the sacrifice thus made of the wish and interest in question is in the instance of the vote given by any individual voter served it comes /turns/ /is found/ out to be some rich and powerful person to whose single wish and interest the wishes and interests of some vast number of voters say two thousand are thus sacrificed: by this means except that he is saved from the trouble of giving them this one rich and powerful individual is put into the same condition as if to that same individual were given those same two thousand votes.