JB_128_154.xml

Title: [1818 June 23 Parl. Reform Bill]

Description: 1818 June 23

Parl. Reform Bill

Prefat

Advantage recommend not

3

Not so the Whigs. In this article such as it is, it is impossible to them not to be

feeling /experiencing/ on every occasion an object of annoyance. But the use of it

not being less necessary to them than to their more factional /overbearing/

opponents, hence[?] it is that the person itself and the only antidote to it and that

a most effectual /indisputable/ one are inveighed at: inveighed at perhaps in the

same breath.

Before me lies a Whig Newspaper: on the Wednesday influence a bad /sad/ thing: a sad

obstacle to /in the way of/ the otherwise indubitable success of one of his heroes

But Two days before this in this same paper and in this case too as in the former

from the mouth /pen/ of the Editor comes /had come/ out a prose Epigram in which the

ballot /secresy of suffrage/ is consigned to scorn, and to render it the more

poignant it is put into the mouth of the second Bill

Had the ballot been in use I should have I should have had the seat without fail –

how often have I not /will you not/ heard the observation from a Whig mouth. Well

then this security for free suffrage would you wish to see it adopted /in actual use/

and applied to every seat? Oh no, that’s another thing.

Why not wish to see it adopted? Because so sure as it were, so sure would it kill[?]

all influences. Now /of influence/ there are two sorts of influence: there is

sinister influence and there is legitimate influence. Sinister influence is the

influence that is employed against us: this is bad, and ought to be destroyed.

Legitimate influence is the influence that is employed for us. This is good: and so

good that the salvation of the country depends upon the preservation of it.

131-631.xml

Title: [+ 1819 Oct. 10 Parl. Reform Bill.]

Description: + 1819 Oct. 10

Parl. Reform Bill.

§.5

§.8

Art. Secresy

3

Go to Westmoreland! Go to Cumberland! according to his conscience! To vote according to conscience! /learn there how good and joyful it is, brethren to vote according to conscience! how sad a thing to vote against conscience! how wicked a thing to force men to it!/ Good: but how? by voting out of the sight of tyrants? of tyrants on one side, as well as on the other? Oh no, that would be “wild and visionary, absurd, visionary, and senseless”: practice in America is not practice: never could any a man have thought of such a thing, had he been as conversant with men as with books.

When the subject many – when Peoplesmen have condemned secresy of suffrage, it has been for want of thought: when the ruling few – when Tories and Whigs – condemn /have condemned/ secresy of suffrage, it has been from the result of thought: when the others have condemned it, it has been because they knew so well.

Suffrage, open or secret: say which of the two you will have? This question – this is the spear of Ithuriel. At the touch of it, with not less agony than the most outrageous Tory, the Parliamentary Whig writhes.

Say secret suffrage – secresy of suffrage. Do not say ballot. Election may be by ballot, and yet no secresy. Such will of course be the case, wherever the design is that the secresy professed shall not be preserved. Matters are so contrived that there is no secresy, and then you are told there can be none.

When a Whig Candidate solicits a vote, the only answer need be this question. In and out of Parliament, will you do your utmost to procure Election in the secret mode? If he declines or remains silent – Go hypocrite! the most undisguised advocate of despotism is less profligate than you. Such should be his dismissal. – What? Is it to ambition such as yours, that the bread of my family and of so many hundreds of families is to be made a sacrifice? Is this your patriotism? Yes: knowingly and wittingly, you and those you act with, are either among the creators, or among the preservers of all the evil you profess to lament.

JB_038_270_001.xml

Title: [1826. Jan y. Constitutional Code]

Description: 1826. Jan y.

Constitutional Code

Ch. IX. Ministers Collectively S.14 Locable who.

1.

Of the secret and open mode, which is preferable, depends on voter's

situation

1. Mode secret, the voters vote is exempt from all external,

influence tutelary, as well as seductive.

This situation is favorable to the universal interest, so far as

the voter's personal interest is in alliance with it, or not

hostile to it.

2.

2. Mode open, the voter's vote is exposed to external influence

from all quarters, tutelary, as well as seductive viz. 1. To the

intimidative and corruptive influence of rich and powerful

individuals. 2. To the tutelary influence of the Public Opinion

Tribunal.

3.

Cases, in which the secret mode is preferable, are 1. Where voter's

personal interest forms part of the universal interest; as in

election of Legislators 2. Where, it is not out- weighed by

greater damage to interest of other individuals.

4.

11. Cases in which the open is preferable, 1. Where the voter's

personal interest is adverse to the universal interest. 2. Where

it is adverse to a greater interest on the part of a greater

number of individuals.

5.

Conclusion as to different situations. 1. In situation of Electors

of the members of the Legislature, the secret mode is preferable.

6.

Reason. The majority w d. be exposed to the

danger of being forced or allured to give their

votes to unapt candidates deemed by the voters themselves unapt: and

thus sacrifice to that sinister interest the universal interest

in which their own is included. Hence in the Election Code, the

secret mode alone is employed.

7.

2. In the situation of members of the Legislature In this situation,

every voter will be under the influence of two conflicting

pwoers.

8.

1. The intimidative and corruptive and thus seductive power of

the Prime Minister and Ministers in their character of locators

as to desirable officials situation, conferable on or withholden

from those with whom the voters all connected by self-regarding

or sympathetic interest.

9.

2. The tutelary power of the members of the community at large, in

their character of d o. of the Public Opin.

Tribunal, & d o. of the Constitutive

authority with it's dislocative powers.

10.

Hence, one reason for minimizing the seductive power of those

functionaries — Measures for this, are 1. Minimizing the

value thence the seductive power, of those situations 2. Narrowing

the choice of those locators, as much as possible; viz. by

exposing them to the punitive power of the members of the Public

Opinion Tribunal and of the Constitutive Authority, in the

event of their locating persons other than those pointed out as

most apt by the suffrages of the official talent Judicatory.

10. Contin d.

3. Rendering the members of the Legislature themselves unlocable

in those situations & 4. Making known to all what connections

there are between the persons so located, and the Members of the

Legislature.

Under the uncertainty which form may be most effective, hence the

use of employing the double mode of voting in the case of the

votes given of the Legislature.