date

1819 Oct. 11 + Parl. Reform Bill.
1819 Oct. 11 +

Parl. Reform Bill.

Reasons

§.5

§.8

Art Secresy

Burdet

4

4

3. Only to bribery does this argument against the efficiency of the secret mode appear to have been regarded as having application. Efficacious or not against bribery, the efficiency of the secret mode against intimidation would stand unimpeached /unquestioned/ and unimpeachable /unquestionable/.

{3}. The number of seats filled by bribery alone bears but a small proportion to the number of seats filled by bribery and intimidation /{corruption in other shapes}/ taken together. How so ever far from being of itself adequate to the exclusion of bribery, secresy of suffrage is compleatly adequate to the exclusion of effective intimidation. For the purpose what makes it the more needful is – that against sinister influence in this shape it is not only a necessary defence, but the only one. The multitude of the persons that requiring to be influenced is, in proportion to the number, a check, and may easily be made an effectual bar to the procurement of votes by bribery. But can neither be a bar, nor so much as a check to the procurement of votes by intimidation.

{4}. In the wording of this argument against the secret mode, advantage was taken of a degree of obscurity in which /which hangs over/ the import of the word interest, familiar as it is, and on that account unavoidably employed, may be seen to be involved. The word happiness the import of it not being involved in any such obscurity would on that account have been more eligible. But on one account, not to mention others, happiness would have presented itself as not properly applicable to the present case. It is never employed but when the article in question /designated by it/ is considered as having place in a large quantity, and being either entirely free from all admixtures of all unhappiness and thereby all pain, or upon casting up the two sides of the account, exhibiting a large remainder on that side. Interest on the other hand is employed with equal facility be the quantity ever so large or ever so small.

Interest
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