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1819 Octr. 12 5 Nov
r
Not now
Parl. Reform Bill
Reasons
§.2 Electors Who
Preliminary observations
Subversion[?] none: Unprecedented[?] Securities[?] none.
§.2. Electors Who. Preliminary Observations
Of the here proposed Bill if adopted, the effect would be that which is proposed in a former work, to vest[?] establish not in one word Democracy, but in two words Democratic ascendancy. To have all forms and all situations with their respective powers and denominations in the same state as at present. To The legislative branch /authority/ the three branches, King Lords and Commons with the same functions at present. But with this difference, that whereas at present the tenor and effect of all laws is in effect determined by the will of the Monarch under the proposed change it would be determined by the will of the people at large, acting by the hands of their representatives in the House of Commons
On this occasion two grand questions call for answers
1. Why seek to establish Democratic ascendancy.
2. Why not seek to establish Representative Democracy.
To both these questions, answers will be furnished.
A preliminary question with some could naturally be why not content yourself with preserving the existing balance? the balance between each and every other of the three branches of the supreme government. King, Lords and Commons
In this question is involved an assumption: an assumption of the existence of such a balance.
Among the opinions on which the here proposed plan is grounded is this – namely that there exists not any such balance. This opinion has been already advanced in a former work. It will be maintained more in detail in an Appendix to this – See Appendix N o | | . Supposed Balance of the English Constitution: a state of things neither actual possible, nor beneficent.
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Title: [1819 Oct 12 Parl. Reform Bill]Description: 1819 Oct 12 Parl. Reform Bill Reasons §.2 Electors Who Preliminary Observations Monarchical ascendancy misrule each[?] good government a remediless[?] case of misrule | | 1 Aristocratical 2 3. […?] […?] First under the question why establish /seek/ Democtatic ascendancy come the following questions 1. If the superior /sole/ power legislative as well as executive is, as you say in the hands of the Monarch why not leave it in those[?] account[?]? To this the answer is a general[?] one – because in those hands it never can fail to be abused: abused sooner or later, but for the remedy here proposed sooner or later to the highest pitch of abuse and misrule that the state[?] of the public need[?] in the age in question admitt of. This position is maintained at large in another N o of the Appendix. Title Monarchical ascendancy incompatible with good government. A natural question here is if this be the case with Monarchical ascendancy is it so with Aristocratical ascendancy. The answer is in the affirmative. See another N o in the Appendix, N o | |. Title Aristocratical ascendancy incompatible with good government Again it may be asked is it so with the ascendancy of Monarchy and Aristocracy conjoined? The answer here to is in the affirmative See another N o in the Appendix: N o | | Title Ascendancy of Monarchy and Aristocracy combined is incompatible with good government.
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Title: [1820 Feb. 20 Necessity of Radicalism]Description: 1820 Feb. 20 Necessity of Radicalism proved from the Radical Principles of Constitutional Law Heads proposed 1 Topics 20 Feb. 1820 { §.1. Governors interest every where opposite to governed’s d o – self regard g interest predominate: one requires maximum of inequality the other of equality §.2. This applied to the several repeated instruments of falsity, not dependent upon common self. 1 in the case of Monarchy: 2 In the case of Aristocracy. 3 In the case of Democracy §.3. Opposite to the assumption made by all advocates of all governments but democratical – by writers in general – The notion a vulgar error – the dissemination of it a fallacy 1 Causes of the error and correspondent fallacy §.5.2 Consequences in regard to 1. Political Institutions promoting misconduct in all public functionaries: by sinister application of the 3 Sanctions §.6. – 2 – National intellectual strength and moral purity. §.7. Practical result. 1. In new communities representative democracy 2. In Britain, democratic ascendancy §.8. Course to be taken for counteracting the effect of the vulgar error and correspondent fallacy} {§.4. Origin of the vulgar error and correspondent fallacy} {Title proposed 20 Feb. 1820 Necessity of Radicalism proved from the radical principles on the field of Constitutional law, as deduced from experience. Ch.1.* Equality – its subservience to general felicit[?] §.1. + Sole justifiable end of government – greatest happiness of the greatest number §.2. Maximum of equality the tendency measu} §.1. Sole justifiable all-comprehensive end of government – greatest happiness of greatest number §.2. Distinguishable particular ends, subsistence abundance equality, security – their relation to each other. See Dum.[?] Princip. §.3. Subsistence and security obtained, equality the leading means of happiness – happiness so far as depends on things exterior to man, is in proportion to it §.3. Means of {happiness} /{felicity}/ exterior to a mans self, d o interior: - exterior, the d o instrument of felicity. §.4. Instruments of felicity 1. Common to governors and governed: 1 matter of wealth (i.e. of subsistence and abundance) and 2. natural power §.5. Instruments of felicity created and reserved to themselves by government 1 factitious dignity. 2 privileged vengeance. 3 factitious ease. §.6. Maximum Equality in respect of wealth in so far as consistent with security and abundance – its subserviency to general felicity. §.7. Equality in respect of power, its subserviency to general felicity abstraction made of the effects on government §.8. Equality in respect of the powers by which government is constituted – its subserviency /necessity/ to good government. (Reasons follow.) Sole good form of government representative Democracy. §.9. Cause of the bad side[?] of every other form of government. Necessity of predominance of self-regarding interest over social in every human breast: consequent propensity in governors to engross as much as possible the whole mass of the exterior instruments of felicity, at the expence of the governed. §.10. Consequence – under every form of government, sacrifice of the interest of the governed to their own carried by the governors to the highest pitch possible. Effect of the corresponding propensity since[?] on the severally[?] part[?] of govern. what? §.11/ 2/. Use made by them if to this purpose of the several sanctions or sources of inducement by which human conduct is influenced and determined: viz. 1 the physical. 2. the retributive. 3. the political including the legal. 4. the popular or moral: 5. the sympathetic. 6. the super-human or religious.} §. 13 Opposite Assumption made {to the opposite of fact} by all governors, and their supporters in every government but a democracy. – its absurdity and extravagance vulgar error contained in it. – fallacy employed in the dissemination of it. 1820 Feb. 20 Necessity of Radicalism proved from the Radical Principles of Constitutional Law – Heads proposed 2 §. 14 Causes of the rise and predominance of this error – craft on the one part intellectual weakness on the other §. 15 Consequences of this error – means by which it produces misconduct on the part of governor, infelicity on the part of the governed. §. 16 In all contests between governors and governed, the greatest pox[?] only blames his […?] on the part of the governors. §. 17 Application made of the error in the case of the English Constitution – ways in which it produces misconduct in necessary official situations – depradation – oppression – waste. §.17* Continuation – Ways in which it gives birth to needless useless and pernicious situations – religious establishments §. 18 Blindness /Insincerity/ and mental weakness produced by it in all minds of the Representative democracy and democratic ascendancy – democracy the sole eligible government in a new-formed state – democratic ascendancy preferable in the United Kingdom – why § 20 Objections to representative democracy and democratic ascendancy, their futility – confutation given to them by experience. See Radicalism not dangerous. §.21 Course to be taken for eradicating the radical /vulgar/ error the prevalence of which is thus incompatible with good government. Inserenda 24 Feb. 1820 § In a mixt Monarchy, corruption is effectual, inseparable and all-pervading. §.18* or 13*. Groundless and ridiculous laudation and adulation produced by it (Every thing most religious – Portraits in the Liturgy like Portraits and Plans and Views in old Chronicles §.17* English Constitution By what accidents the good there is in it was produced. King and Barons found more[?] money could be got from people by cajolement than force. King and Barons mutually called on the people. When nothing could be done without people’s representatives – they found it necessary to let in Lords – they and Lords to let in People’s representatives for a share of the plunder. §. Of Distant Dependencies sure effect preponderate evil in the governing and governed states. Yet by accident the only good form of government was the result of Colonization §.9*. or[?] Every man[?] has its price no more than are imperfect rudiments of the essential[?] […?] §. For the same reason that English mixt Monarchy is good as compared with pure Monarchy it is bad as compared with Repres. ve Democracy Inseparable from such mixture is the growing worse and worse. §. Among the power rulers a universal error or pretence is that {for} the[?] political power[?] men are exempted from moral obligation: that by such hands whatever is done is right.. On this need[?] /ground/ the language of England can not be outstretched /outstripped/ by the language of Spain. §.21. If each Monarch & Aristocrat is in the right in maintaining[?] the inequity each individual of the subject many is not the less in the right in endeavouring to release himself from under it: he is not only […?] to himself but to all others who are in his case. § Nobilitas sola atque unica virtus.
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Title: [1819 Oct. 13 Parl. Reform Bill]Description: 1819 Oct. 13 Parl. Reform Bill Reasons Prel. Obs. §.2. Electors who 4 Of the four positions the proof of which is consigned to the above four N os /Essays/ beginning with the first from whence the three others follow as of course, the proof depends upon an radical or fundamental position, namely the necessary predominance of self-regarding over-social affection in every human breast. For the proof see another N o in the Appendix: N o | |, Title | | Self regarding affection universally and necessarily predominant. From the incompatibility of the other forms with good government results the necessity of the remedy proposed under the name Democratic ascendancy in the form of radicalism. This considered what might at first view /naturally/ be expected is that the proof of the disorder should precede all discussion relative to the eligibility of the remedy. But, the subject /topic/ of the undangerousness of radical reform being at once /ground/ so perfectly untouched and the opposite notion being the notion on which all the opposition made to it seems to have almost exclusively rested, the first place is the place which it has been thought might be given to this /that/ article with obvious and indisputable advantage. This position being established, next in order will come naturally come the string of other positions having for their subjects respectively the several other forms of government Last of all will come the paper having for its title Why not pure Democracy, rather than the British Constitution with Democratic ascendancy as established by radicalism.
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