date

[131a-019] 1818 March 23 +
[131a-019]

1818 March 23 +

Parl Reform Answer to Antiballotists

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18

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“ The charm of confidential friendship broken”? – No such thing. By no answer could the charm be broken: for by the question itself it would have been broken already. Without the law, the question would have been an impertinence: under the law it would be, as above, an insult. Under the impossibility of knowing whether the answer were true or false, what good purpose could such a question serve? In any case I see not how in case of falshood, friendship could be injured by the falshood. Yes: if by the friend it were known to be a falshood: but that, by the very nature of the case, is rendered impossible.

So much for the morals evils which, it has been supposed, would under the secret mode, be produced, in consequence of the protection afforded by that mode against terrorism. As to bribery, at the outset the case of bribery was posted off for further consideration. But, so plain is it – on the one hand, that the secret mode would be effectual against bribery – effectual even against undue punishment, and therefore still more effectual against undue reward – on the other hand, that, whatsoever leaning – perceived or unperceived by himself – an Antiballotist may have in favour of the intimidative – in favour of the stronger yet unexpensive mode of sinister influence, he can have none in favour of bribery, thus much observed, it seems that this topic may be dismissed.
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  • Title: [1819 Oct. 11 + Parl. Reform Bill.]
    Description: 1819 Oct. 11 +

    Parl. Reform Bill.

    Reasons

    §.5

    §.8

    Art Secresy

    Burdet

    4

    4

    3. Only to bribery does this argument against the efficiency of the secret mode appear to have been regarded as having application. Efficacious or not against bribery, the efficiency of the secret mode against intimidation would stand unimpeached /unquestioned/ and unimpeachable /unquestionable/.

    {3}. The number of seats filled by bribery alone bears but a small proportion to the number of seats filled by bribery and intimidation /{corruption in other shapes}/ taken together. How so ever far from being of itself adequate to the exclusion of bribery, secresy of suffrage is compleatly adequate to the exclusion of effective intimidation. For the purpose what makes it the more needful is – that against sinister influence in this shape it is not only a necessary defence, but the only one. The multitude of the persons that requiring to be influenced is, in proportion to the number, a check, and may easily be made an effectual bar to the procurement of votes by bribery. But can neither be a bar, nor so much as a check to the procurement of votes by intimidation.

    {4}. In the wording of this argument against the secret mode, advantage was taken of a degree of obscurity in which /which hangs over/ the import of the word interest, familiar as it is, and on that account unavoidably employed, may be seen to be involved. The word happiness the import of it not being involved in any such obscurity would on that account have been more eligible. But on one account, not to mention others, happiness would have presented itself as not properly applicable to the present case. It is never employed but when the article in question /designated by it/ is considered as having place in a large quantity, and being either entirely free from all admixtures of all unhappiness and thereby all pain, or upon casting up the two sides of the account, exhibiting a large remainder on that side. Interest on the other hand is employed with equal facility be the quantity ever so large or ever so small.

    Interest
  • Title: [[131a-002] 1818 March 25 + +]
    Description: [131a-002]

    1818 March 25 + +

    Parl Reform Answer to the Antiballotist

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    1

    1

    M

    r

    Benthams Defence of the Ballot:

    being an answer to certain arguments against the proposed use of the Ballot in the Election of Members of the Commons House, on the supposition of annuality of Election, and virtual universality of suffrage.

    In the argument of the Antiballotists, + as contained in the very ingenious paper which lies before me, I find four and no more than four distinguishable considerations, employed in the character of reasons, or objections, against the use of the secret mode of voting + on the occasion here in question. I shall distinguish them by the leading terms which I find employed in designating them. These are,

    Note +

    + In this paper, in preference to the word ballot, familiar as it is, I use for the most part the words secret modes (viz. of voting): because it presents to my mind a much clearer idea of the nature of the case, than does the word ballot, of which I do not know the origin; and because it matches so well with an appellative of the opposite mode /equally characteristic/, viz. the open mode, which, for the designation of it has not any such single word as the secret mode has in the word ballot.

    The term Antiballotists is used here merely to save words. No such sentiment as that of blame is meant to be attached to it.

    Comments on particular words and phrases would occupy to wide a space. My endeavour will be to collect the substance of the argument, and the fault will lie not in the will but in the understanding, if in any particular I fail of doing it justice.

    End of the Note.
  • Title: [[131a-008] 1818 March 22 +]
    Description: [131a-008]

    1818 March 22 +

    Parl Reform Answer to Antiballot Observations

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    7

    7

    Now then of the open mode, in contradistinction to the secret mode, what in so far as it operates are the effects?

    1 In the first place to produce a forced sacrifice of each voters personal interest: of his interest, and thereby, if the word right be employed, a forced surrender or relinquishment of his own right. I say forced: for (setting aside the case of bribery, of which afterwards) in so far as the openness of the mode fails of producing this effect, it produces no effect other than that which would have place in the secret mode: and those who contend for the open, to the exclusion of the secret mode, have no motive for so doing.

    2 In the next place to produce a {forced} sacrifice of the interest of other persons whose interest the voter ought to join in the protection of: of the persons, for whom, as above, he is in trust, it produces a violation of duty: it produces a breach of trust:

    But, in so far as either of these effects are thus produced, the production of them having for its cause fear of evil, at the hands of the author of the force (and fear of cessation of good which otherwise would accrue is one modification of the fear of evil) in proportion as these effects are either of them produced, compulsion, oppression, tyranny – these words, any or all of them, may, it seems to me, be with unimpeachable propriety applied. For distinction’ sake, and moreover with a view to a purpose which will be mentioned presently, I would call this tyranny Election-Tyranny.